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The thesis investigates the use of natural resources by indebted economies.
This issue is motivated by arguments which suggest that, as a consequence of high
external debt burdens, developing economies have been forced to over exploit their
natural resources. The thesis employs analytical and econometric modelling
techniques to assess this hypothesised debt-resources link, which in the more popular
literature has lacked any basis in economic theory or econometric evidence.
The thesis begins by placing the debt-resources link within the context of
established theoretical literature. It is argued that the literatures on optimal resource
use and optimal foreign borrowing provide an appropriate analytical framework. The
conditions under which a link between external indebtedness and natural resource use
may arise are then highlighted. This discussion emphasises that any link depends on
imperfections in international capital markets.
The thesis presents two theoretical models which extend previous literature.
The first model considers the case of exhaustible resources. In this model a three
sector open economy is outlined: a traded good sector, a non-traded good sector and
an enclave resource sector. The economy has access to international capital markets,
but may face limits on its ability to borrow. It is shown that optimal resource
extraction may be higher for "problem" debtors, where a "problem" debtor is defined
by a constrained regime for foreign borrowing. This model is presented in discrete
time for the purpose of deriving a theory-consistent econometric model.
The second theoretical model analyses the relationship between indebtedness
and forest clearance. The economy trades a good produced with forest inputs.
Demand for these forest inputs results in forest clearance, i.e. deforestation. The
effect of indebtedness is considered in two ways. Firstly, the relationship between the
iii
stock of debt and the demand for deforestation. It is shown that there is no
relationship if the economy is able to freely borrow on international capital markets.
If borrowing is constrained, then a higher stock of debt will increase the demand for
forest inputs and therefore deforestation. The second result is that deforestation
increases for a given decrease in the level of the binding credit ceiling. Thus the
greater is the severity of borrowing constraints, then the greater is the level of forest
clearance.
The thesis also presents two econometric analyses of the debt-resources link.
The first empirical investigation focuses on the case of non-renewable resources and
provides a test of the theoretical model developed earlier in the thesis. A panel data-
set over the period 1968-1989 was constructed for this analysis and Generalised
Method ofMoments (GMM) techniques were employed in the estimation and testing
of liquidity constrained extraction Euler equations. The empirical results reject a link
between indebtedness and mineral extraction.
The second econometric analysis considers the link between indebtedness and
tropical deforestation. Cross-sectional data on tropical deforestation for the periods
1981-1985 and 1986-1990 was used to estimate and test an empirical model of
deforestation. The specification of this empirical model was guided by the theoretical
model of forest clearance presented in the thesis. GMM techniques are again
employed in this analysis. On balance, the results indicates a positive correlation
s
between deforestation and debt variables in both periods. There are also significant
differences between unconstrained and constrained countries. In addition, the results
indicate the relationship between deforestation and debt variables is quadratic, rather
than linear.
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The thesis concludes with a review of the analytical and econometric results
and suggests some avenues for future research.
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This thesis presents an analysis of the use of natural resources by indebted
economies. The motivation for this analysis can be traced to a popular view
originating towards the end of the 1980s which began to associate the external
debt problems of many developing countries with the contemporaneous
observation of increasing environmental degradation.1 This view raises two sets
of interesting questions. Firstly, is there an economic rationale for the idea that
debt and resource use may be linked and if so, what are the precise mechanisms
which underlie any such link ? The second set of questions concern the
empirical significance of the debt environment association. Does the argument
that external debt is a determinant of resource use, and more specifically that
high debt burdens encourage the over-use of natural resources have empirical
validity ? This thesis represents an attempt to provide some answers to these
two set of questions. To this end the thesis employs analytical and econometric
modelling techniques which are well established in a wide range of economic
and econometric literature, but which to date have not been evident to any great
extent in the small academic literature on the debt environment issue and largely
absent in more popular literature.
Over the last decade there has been a tremendous upsurge in the analysis of
environmental problems in the developing country context (see for example
World Commission of Environment and Development, 1987; Dasgupta and
!See for example George (1989).
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Maler, 1991; World Bank ,1992). Increasingly it has been recognised that many
developing countries face serious environmental problems which are interwoven
with structural economic problems. The problem of deforestation in the world's
tropical forests has been extensively documented (Food and Agriculture
Organisation, 1993; World Resources Institute, 1994). Equally, desertification
in the drylands of Latin America, Asia and Africa has contributed to a severe
degradation of the agricultural resource base (Barbier, 1991). Moreover, the
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), hereafter
W.C.E.D., reported an annual increase of 6 million hectares in the area of land
lost to desert. A further 21 million hectares were rendered economically
unproductive by desertification. It is not only rural areas which are facing the
problems of environmental degradation. The urban environment in developing
countries also faces increasing strain. W.C.E.D. again note:
"On the river Ganges, 114 cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants
dump untreated sewage into the river every day. DDT factories,
tanneries, paper and pulp mills, petrochemical and fertiliser
complexes, rubber factories and a host of others use the river to
get rid of their wastes. ...Sixty percent of Calcutta's population
suffer from pneumonia, and other respiratory diseases related to
air pollution In Malaysia, the highly urbanised Klang Valley
has two to three times the pollution levels of major cities in the
United States, and the Klang river system is heavily
contaminated with agricultural and industrial effluents and
sewage." (W.C.E.D., 1987, p240)
This evidence of environmental degradation has given impetus to a recent and
rapidly expanding literature. Much of this work has been couched in terms of
"sustainability" i.e. patterns of economic development which incorporate
3
preservation of the resource base as a key policy objective.2 The precise
meaning of the concept "sustainable development", popularised by W.C.E.D.
(1987), remains elusive and is discussed at length in Pearce, Barbier and
Markandya (1990), van den Bergh and Nijkamp (1991), Klaassen and Opschoor
(1991) and Victor (1991). This said the questions and issues are now the
concern of an increasingly analytical economics literature, (see for example
Pezzey, 1989; Goldin and Winters, 1995)
At a less prescriptive level analyses of the causes of environmental degradation
in developing countries have varied in their conclusions. Mahar (1989) and
Repetto and Gillis (1988) have, for example, pointed to the role of domestic
government policies in tropical deforestation. Hecht and Cockburn (1990) offer
a more political prognosis emphasising the role of vested interests (e.g.
landowners) in the case of the Amazon. Others have stressed underlying
economic conditions. W.C.E.D. (1987) highlighted environmental degradation
as a consequence of the dire poverty in many countries. Thus the fuelwood
crisis in Africa, the destruction of tropical forest for a myriad of reasons and the
overuse of poor soils are all rooted in the failures of development. Against this
background it is has been increasingly argued that the burden of external debt is
adding to the pressures which lead to environmental neglect in developing
countries. Miller states it thus:
2Within this literature has emerged a recent debate about the appropriate resource base. A
"weak" sustainability view would define the resource base as the economy's stock of capital
(physical, human and natural). A "strong" view defines the relevant capital stock (from a
sustainability perspective) more narrowly by focusing on the stock of environmental
resources. With both the objective is to maintain or preserve the relevant stock. With the weak
view this permits substitution between natural and other forms of capital, whilst this is ruled
out by a strong view. See Victor (1991) for a good overview.
4
"When the "costs" of environmental damage are subtle and in
any case felt only in the longer-term, and when the benefits of
environmentally-damaging activities are financially tangible and
immediate, it is not difficult to fathom which option the stressed-
out debtors will choose. Among the immediate financial benefits
would count the enhancement of their ability to service their
debts...." (Miller, 1991, p. 4)
The linkage between external debt and environmental resources has had a
number of interpretations. One claim is that debtor economies have had to
forego budgeting for environmental conservation programmes because of
financial strictures (George, 1989). A second is that the uses of debt-financed
investment have encouraged environmental degradation, e.g. the flooding of
areas of the Amazon to create dams for hydro-power schemes (George, 1989).
However the central theme of this literature, as implied by Miller, has been that
debtor countries are forced to liquidate their stocks of environmental resources
to meet debt-service obligations. It is this interpretation of the relationship
between indebtedness and the environment which provides the motivation for
the analysis presented in this thesis.
The thesis provides four related but reasonably self-contained contributions to
the analysis of the debt-resources hypothesis. The basic proposition is put under
theoretical scrutiny in chapters 2, 3 and 5. Chapter 2 presents an overview of
intertemporal models of foreign borrowing and resource use to provide a basic
framework for understanding debt-resource interactions. In chapter 3 a model
of exhaustible resource extraction in a small open economy is presented and
analysed with the effect of binding foreign borrowing constraints considered in
detail. The main result which emerges is that foreign borrowing constraints are
not in themselves sufficient to lead to a link between the economy's
indebtedness and extraction of exhaustible resources. Rather, it is the severity of
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borrowing constraints which may matter. In chapter 5 a static theoretical
analysis of the link between debt and deforestation is presented. The motivation
for a static analysis is partly empirical and partly institutional. As noted in
chapter 5 various institutional factors contribute to economic agents (in the
developing country context) having shortened planning horizons which means a
static model is a reasonable approximation to their decision making. The
empirical motivation reflects data available for testing theoretical propositions.
In the context of deforestation the best data covers five yearly periods.
Consequently only the predictions of a static model can subjected to the data.
The rest of the thesis in empirical in nature. Chapters 4 and 6 respectively
present self contained econometric analyses of the theoretical models of
chapters 3 and 5. Chapter 4 considers the case of mineral production in
developing economies as an example of exhaustible resource depletion and
frames the basic debt-resources hypothesis in terms of the econometric
estimation and testing of theoretical Euler equations. In this context the
evidence which is presented would reject the notion of a debt-resource link.
Chapter 6 considers the empirical association between indebtedness and
deforestation by testing some of the key propositions derived in chapter 5. Here
the results are more favourable to the hypothesis of interest, particularly in the
early 1980s. A technical feature of the two econometric analyses is the use of
the Generalised Method ofMoments, a methodology which is increasingly used
in econometric practice. Each chapter provides its own motivation for this
methodology, but in essence these techniques provide a useful way of thinking
about the debt-resources hypothesis. More specifically, the validity of moment
restrictions which under the null state the covariance between the set of
6
instruments used in estimation and the error term to be zero are examined. The
thesis concludes with chapter 7. The aim in this short chapter is to review and
reflect on some of the main findings. Some suggestions for future research are
then outlined in light of the questions which remain unanswered by the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Optimal foreign borrowing and optimal natural resource use : a theoretical
review.
2.1 Introduction.
The aim of this chapter is to present the issue of a debt-resources link within an
analytical framework. To this end the chapter presents an overview of relevant
theoretical models which are useful tools for assessing the question of interest. The
primary intent of this overview is to show that the issue of a debt-resources link can
be usefully addressed with a class of economic models which, although to date have
not considered the debt-resources question to any great extent, are more than capable
of illuminating some of its key aspects.
The theoretical framework considered in this chapter is that of optimal growth theory
which concerns itself with intertemporal allocation problems at the macroeconomic
level. The most basic of these problems can be summarised with the simple question:
"How much of its income should a nation save ?" (Ramsey, 1928, p. 543) Ever since
this question was first posed by Frank Ramsey economists have grappled with the
technical, philosophical and policy dimensions to the economic problem in its
intertemporal form. Any question which is concerned with the problems of external
indebtedness and the potential link with the problem of resource depletion must
similarly grapple with an economic problem which is intertemporal in nature.
Moreover these twin issues highlight two obvious limitations of the intertemporal
problem considered by Ramsey. The first follows from the assumption of a closed
economy. All investment is thus generated through domestic savings. The second is
that the economy's production possibilities are defined entirely in terms of some
8
function of the economy's stock of reproducible capital and its labour force
(population). Endowments of natural capital are ignored in the most basic analysis of
optimal growth.1
Given the existence of international capital markets the first assumption obviously
need not hold. Domestic savings can be augmented by inflows by foreign capital
which extends the capacity to create new domestic capital. The second limitation is
somewhat different in character. Unlike the potential for foreign borrowing to extend
an economy's production possibilities, the concern over endowments of natural capital
at the macroeconomic level is about the potential limit on economic activity which the
finite nature of exhaustible resources and the possibly finite nature of regenerative
resources and pollution assimilation capacities may impose. At the very least, there
are thus two additional questions for Ramsey-type growth models to answer. Firstly,
under what conditions does debt accumulation represent an optimal choice given it
constitutes a transfer of negative wealth from present generations to future
generations and secondly, what conditions characterise the optimal rate of resource
use / exploitation ?
These two broad questions have largely been addressed separately in the literatures on
optimal foreign borrowing and optimal resource use. The central theme of this chapter
is that by considering these two allocation problems together within the framework of
capital theory, some useful insights concerning the hypothesis of a link between
resource depletion and external debt can be elaborated.
-'-Natural capital refers to the stock of natural resources in its broadest sense. Thus included in this
category of capital would be non-renewable resources such as oil, gas, minerals; renewable /
regenerative resources such as forests, fisheries, soil. In addition the assimilative capacities of the
oceans and atmosphere mean these resources can also be regarded as natural capital. Common to
each of the types of natural resource is the idea that they generate flows of services to economic
systems either as direct inputs to production, indirect contributions to welfare (i.e. amenity values) or
as sinks for the wastes / pollution generated by production.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Given the separate development of the
optimal foreign borrowing and resource depletion literatures, the initial focus is on the
foreign borrowing decision and the key results which emerge from examination of an
open economy growth model. The model is outlined in section 2.2 with some
standard results derived as a way of elaborating on the issue of optimal debt
accumulation. The chapter then moves on to consider, briefly, optimal resource
depletion in the closed economy. Section 2.3 outlines some of the key results which
have emerged in this literature. Once the analysis is extended to the open economy
some interesting differences emerge and the issues of optimal resource use and
optimal debt accumulation can be considered jointly. Section 2.4 presents the
overview of the optimal use of natural resources in the open economy setting. One of
the key findings to emerge is the role that capital market imperfections, in the form of
an upward sloping supply curve for international credit, play in providing a link
between resource use decisions and the indebtedness situation of the economy. This
theme of imperfections is continued further in the concluding section. A brief outline
of recent literature on sovereign debt is used to motivate an alternative interpretation
of imperfect international capital markets. This is the idea of credit ceilings which has
been considered widely in the theoretical and empirical literatures on sovereign debt.
This type of imperfection provides much of the focus for the theoretical and empirical
analysis in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
2.2 Optimal foreign borrowing in open economies.
Bardhan (1967) and Hamada (1969) represent early contributions to the analysis of
optimal growth in open economies with access to international capital markets. In this
section the insights provided by these contributions are discussed within the context
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of a simple model of optimal foreign borrowing. The intention therefore is not to be
comprehensive in the sense of detailing the large literature which has subsequently
followed these initial contributions. For surveys of this literature see McDonald
(1982), Glick and Kharas (1986), Eaton and Taylor (1986), Eaton (1989) and Cohen
(1991), and see also the discussions in Kletzer (1988) and Eaton (1993). This section,
by way of contrast with these earlier reviews, restricts its attention to a simple
analytical framework which conveys the key ideas and results in the optimal foreign
borrowing literature.
To illustrate optimal foreign borrowing decisions consider the following model of
savings and investment in small open economies presented by Blanchard and Fischer
(1989). The economy produces a single good which may be consumed or invested.
The opportunities afforded by the economy's domestic production possibilities are
augmented by access to international capital markets which are taken to be perfect.
The notion of a perfect international capital market is to be understood in the
following sense. The economy is able to freely borrow at a given rate of interest
subject only to the restriction of solvency. In other words the ability to borrow foreign
capital is not unlimited, even in a perfect international capital market. Such a
restriction is obvious from the perspective of international lenders. Without the
solvency restriction the borrowing economy could borrow indefinitely to finance its
debt service obligations implying that lenders as a group incur losses on their lending.
In other words the net transfer of resources is always in the direction of the borrower.
More formally, debt accumulation with perfect capital markets must satisfy two
conditions. Firstly, the level of accumulated debt in any period must be less than or
equal to the present discounted value of the borrower's future income stream, i.e. the
borrower is solvent. Secondly, the accumulation of debt is subject to a transversality
condition which ensures the discounted value of future debt cannot be positive. This
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need not rule out the possibility that the economy remains a net debtor for the infinite
future, but it does require that in the long-run the level of indebtedness cannot grow
faster than the rate of interest (Eaton, 1993).
The social planner for this simple economy faces two questions: should debt be
accumulated and if so, what should be the time profile of the economy's debt over the
planning horizon ? The answer to the first question will be determined by one of two
factors. First whether the planner wishes to expand the capital stock / productive base
of the domestic economy beyond that allowed by domestic savings. The second will
depend on whether the planner wishes to compensate for an uneven profile of
domestic income / output with borrowing to smooth consumption over time. In the
case of the latter borrowing may be a means of postponing structural adjustments to
adverse income shocks (Martin and Selowsky, 1983; Pitchford, 1989). In the context
of developing countries both factors are clearly relevant. Foreign borrowing provides
a means of achieving a rate of capital accumulation beyond the constraints of low
domestic savings and import capacities or, in the terms of the early development
economics literature, of overcoming the "dual gap" (see Eaton, 1989 for discussion).
Additionally, in the face of international macroeconomic shocks in the 1970s and
1980s, for many developing economies foreign borrowing provided a bridge between
rising expectations and falling income growth and thus obviated any short-run need
for structural adjustments at the macroeconomic level. The high debt burdens of the
1980s arose in part from the (over) willingness to use foreign borrowing to finance
immediate consumption rather than investment (Allsopp and Joshi, 1985; Dornbusch
and Fischer, 1985; Sachs, 1989).
These general considerations can be made more concrete by considering in more
formal terms the optimisation problem faced by the social planner and its solution. In
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anticipation of a key result this will:
"normally depict economies as progressing towards a stable
equilibrium, characterised by equality between the marginal
productivity of capital, the social discount rate and the marginal cost of
(foreign) funds." (Glick and Kharas, 1986, p. 293)
Assume the planner wishes to maximise the integral of discounted utility from
consumption over an infinite planning horizon.2 That is:
(2.1) max V = Jq u(c(t))e~5tdt
where 8 denotes the utility rate of discount and the utility function u(.) satisfies the
standard properties, i.e. uc > 0, u^ < 0, uc(0) = oo and uc(co) = 0.3
The economy's domestic production possibilities are described by:
(2.2) y(t) = f(k(t)),
where k denotes the stock of domestic reproducible capital per capita and the
production function obeys fk > 0 fj^ < 0, fk(0) = co and fk(oo ) = 0.
The economy faces two intertemporal constraints on this maximisation:
(2.3) d(t) = c(t)+i(t){l +A(i(t)/k(t))} + r(t)d(t) - y(t),
(2.4) k(t) = i(t).
The accumulation of debt, d(t), as defined in (2.3) is equal to the excess of absorption
(consumption plus investment spending less interest payments on debt, where r(t) is
the given market rate of interest) over production, i.e. debt is accumulated to finance
2A11 variables are defined in per capita terms.
3Subscripts denotes derivatives with respect to the argument of the function.
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current account deficits. Alternatively, using (2.4) and noting that domestic savings in
equilibrium are given by s(t)=y(t)-c(t)-r(t)d(t), the change in debt over time or the
current account balance equals the difference between investment spending and
domestic savings. Thus in this simple model debt may be used to finance consumption
or investment. Note that by (2.4) capital accumulation is not identical to investment
spending; investment spending of i(t){l+A(i(t)/(k(t))} is required to accumulate
capital of i(t). This indicates that investment is not costless in the sense that
adjustment of the capital stock incurs installation costs of A(.) per unit of investment,
i.e. the economy foregoes output by devoting resources to the installation of new
capital. This cost function A(.) is assumed convex.4 Introducing these capital
installation costs, as Blanchard and Fischer note, will make investment and saving
decisions distinct, a feature which is reinforced by the introduction of foreign
borrowing to the model.5
The planner now maximises (2.1) subject to (2.3) and (2.4) with d(0) and k(0)
assumed given. To solve this problem define the current value Hamiltonian given by:6
(2.5) H(d,k,c,i,a.,\|/) = u(c)- x|c + i{l + a( i/k)} + rd- f(k)| + \j/i,
where A(t) and \|/(t) are the respective co-state variables (interpreted as shadow
prices) for the state variables debt and capital. Note that the current value
Hamiltonian (2.5) can be interpreted as a measure of the net national product (NNP),
measured in the utility numeraire, of this economy at instant t. NNP therefore
comprises the current flow of consumption benefits and the value of growth in the
state variables at instant t.7 However, since the accumulation of debt increases the
4It is also assumed that A(0)=0.
5This model in effect represents an open-economy extension of Abel and Blanchard (1983).
6That is the Hamiltonian is defined such that it represents a value in period t. Note also that time
notation is omitted for brevity.
7See for example Dasgupta (1995).
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economy's external liabilities, an increase in the value of the economy's debt should
reduce NNP at instant t. Hence the minus sign on i\,(t) in (2.5).
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to this problem are given by:8
(2.6) Hc = 0: uc = X,
(2.7) H; = 0: 2c( 1 + A( i/k) -4- (i/k)A i (i/k)) = y,
(2.8) l = (5-r)X,
(2.9) \i/=5\|/-(fk+(i/k)2Ai)x,
(2.10) lim^de"5' = 0,
t—»oo
(2.11) lim \j/ke~5t = 0.
t—>cO
For optimal consumption plans at each instant (2.6) gives the condition that the
marginal utility of consumption is equal to its shadow price. With respect to an
optimal path for investment, (2.7) gives the condition which is required to be satisfied
at each instant. Defining q = \|/A, where q is the shadow price of installed capital
relative to the shadow price of consumption, (2.7) can be written as:
(2.12) q = l+A(i/k)+(i/k)A,(i/k),
which states that at the margin the real value of additional capital is equated with its
real marginal cost. Note this marginal cost has two components: the cost of foregone
consumption and the cost of installing capital. Eq. (2.12), as noted by Blanchard and
Fischer (1989), highlights that investment is a function only of q. That is, (2.12)
implies q can be expressed in terms of the function q = T^i/k) with <3TVS(i/k) > 0 and
¥(0) = 1. Equally, by defining the inverse function cp(q), (2.12) also implies i/k = cp(q)
with <9cp/Sq > 0 and cp(l) = 0. Eqs.(2.10) and (2.11) are the transversality conditions
Sufficiency requires the Hamiltonian to be concave which is guaranteed by the assumptions of
concave utility and production functions and a convex installation cost function.
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on debt and capital accumulation respectively. Note then that (2.10) expresses the
restriction on borrowing already noted. In the limit (i.e. the infinite future) the
discounted value of the economy's debt is zero.
Now consider the question of optimal debt accumulation for this economy. This, as
noted earlier, implies analysis of current account dynamics which depend on the
optimal paths of investment and domestic savings. These two determinants of debt
accumulation, as Blanchard and Fischer note, will be independent given access to
capital markets at an exogenous rate of interest.9 In other words, the maximisation of
present value wealth and present value utility can be determined separately. More
specifically, the implied dynamics of the economy are recursive. The maximisation of
present value wealth determines optimal time paths for investment, capital and output.
Given this, the dynamics of consumption, saving and debt can then be determined.
Consider initially therefore the dynamics of investment and capital. To simplify the
analysis, the economy's discount rate is assumed equal to the exogenous rate of
interest. This, as noted by Blanchard and Fischer, avoids the need to specify the time
path for r as the economy converges to its steady-state equilibrium. Moreover, this
assumption ensures that the rate of interest is indeed exogenous with respect to the
economy's accumulation / decumulation of foreign liabilities. To illustrate, substituting
(2.6) into (2.8) gives:
(2.13) 5-r =—c,
Uc
which by defining the constant r|(c), the elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption with respect to consumption, by r\(c) = -c ucc/uc, allows (2.13) to be re¬
written as:
9This is a standard result with perfect capital markets which is referred to as the Separation
Theorem. This is discussed in more detail in section 2.4.
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c (r-5)
(2.14) - = - -.
c r\
Eq. (2.14) describes optimal consumption over time and is shown to depend on the
discount rate, the elasticity ofmarginal utility of consumption and the marginal cost of
borrowing or the world rate of interest. This is of course Ramsey's famous rule of
optimal saving. Note from (2.14) that r > 5 implies consumption growth is positive
and for r < 5 it is negative. In the case of the latter the economy is decumulating
(accumulating) foreign liabilities (assets), which if maintained for the indefinite future
might imply the economy becoming a net lender of a size to influence the
determination of world rates of interest. Conversely, in the former case the economy
is accumulating (decumulating) foreign liabilities (assets). Again, if maintained
indefinitely the economy may become a large debtor with influence over international
rates of interest. The assumption of r = 8 thus avoids the possibility that the rate of
interest may become endogenous at some point in the indefinite future and thereby
ensures consistency with the type of capital market considered here.
Using the inverse function implied by (2.12), the dynamics of the capital stock given
by (2.4) can be re-written as:
(2.15) k = i = kcp(q),
whilst the time change in the shadow price q by definition satisfies \j/ = q + A.. Note




(2.15) and (2.16) can now be used to characterise the steady-state equilibrium in (k,q)
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space for the economy. For lc = 0, (2.15) combined with the properties of the function
T^i/k) define the steady-state shadow price q* = 1. It follows from (2.16) for q = 0
and the properties of cp(q) that the steady-state capital stock is chosen such that fk(k*)
= r = 5. Thus as anticipated by the quote from Glick and Kharas (1986), the steady-
state equilibrium is characterised by the equality between the marginal productivity of
capital, the rate of discount and the marginal cost of borrowing. This constitutes the
basic result of the OFB literature.10 It remains to confirm the Glick and Kharas
observation that this equilibrium is stable. Linearising (2.15) and (2.16) around this






The Jacobian determinant in (2.17) is negative which indicates the presence of a
positive and a negative eigenvalue. The steady-state is therefore stable in the
saddlepoint sense. Figure 2.1 illustrates the associated phase diagram and may be
interpreted as follows. Suppose the initial capital stock is below the steady-state
value. The corresponding initial value for q is determined by the saddlepath and so q0
> 1 (q*). Initial investment is therefore positive since the shadow price of capital must
exceed the shadow price of consumption. Capital is therefore accumulated, but by
decreasing amounts as the economy converges to k* and q* = 1. Total output and net
output (i.e. total output less investment expenditure) increase over time as the
economy converges to the steady-state.12
10One exception to this is the interesting case analysed by Long (1974) where international
borrowing funds the capital expenditure required for resource extraction. In this case borrowing has
an additional shadow cost, namely the user cost of the resource which the capital is used to deplete.
1 1Linearising around the steady state implies attention is restricted to local stability, i.e. the dynamic
properties of the model in the local neighbourhood of the steady-state.
12If k > k" then q0 < 1, i.e. the shadow price of consumption exceeds that of capital. Capital is
therefore "consumed" rather than accumulated with the effect that the capital stock and output
decline as the economy converges to k".
18
Figure 2.1: Investment and capital dynamics
dq/dt=0
Now consider the economy's accumulation of debt. Debt dynamics are determined by
(2.3) where the only unknown, given the paths of investment, capital and output, is
consumption. The assumption r = 5 will imply consumption is constant over time (see
(2.13)). In addition this constant level of consumption must be chosen such that in the
steady-state:
(2.18) f(k") -c* = rd*,
i.e. interest payments on the steady-state level of debt are matched by the steady-state
trade surplus. Figure 2.2 illustrates a plausible scenario for the evolution of the
economy's debt. In this scenario it is assumed (for simplicity) that the initial level of
debt is zero. Between t = 0 and t = tl5 the economy is running a trade deficit which is
financed by foreign borrowing. As net output, y = f(k) -i(l +A(i/k)), increases over
time (recall earlier discussion of investment and capital stock dynamics), but
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consumption is constant, the economy reaches balanced trade at tj. At this point debt
accumulation is financing debt interest payments. With net output continuing to rise as
the economy converges to the steady-state, after time tj the burden of debt servicing
is increasingly financed from trade surpluses, i.e. the excess of net output over
consumption. Debt is still being accumulated at this time, but at a decreasing rate.
This accumulation is chosen such that in the steady state (2.18) is satisfied. In Figure
2.2 distance AB is the trade surplus which equals interest payments in the steady
state.
Figure 2.2: Evolution of foreign borrowing overtime
For this accumulation of debt to be optimal a further condition is required. That is:
(2.19) Jo' (c- y)e~rtdt = ^ (y - c)e~rtdt,
which states that in present value terms current and future trade surpluses sum to
zero. In terms of Figure 2.2, the constant level of consumption and steady state level
of debt are chosen such that the area between the time path of consumption and net
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output up to tj in present value is equal to the area between the two time paths after tt
in present value.
To summarise, the model of open economy investment and saving considered in this
section suggests two important conditions govern the optimal foreign borrowing
decision. The first is that efficient accumulation of debt requires the marginal cost of
borrowing to equal the marginal product of capital, and in turn the rate of discount.
The second is that investment, capital, consumption and debt should evolve over time
such that in the steady-state equilibrium debt interest payments are financed by the
surplus of net output over consumption. This first condition is the usual efficiency
condition from capital theory: at the margin the rate of return on alternative assets
should be equalised. As will become evident in sections 2.3 and 2.4 the solution to
any problem which can be characterised in terms of the efficient management of
capital assets will yield this result. It is this similarity in the structure of optimal
foreign borrowing to that of optimal resource depletion which makes the framework
of intertemporal allocation an appealing framework for the analysis of a debt-
resources link.
2.3 The optimal use of natural resources in the closed economy.
In this section a brief overview of the theory of optimal resource use in the closed
economy context is provided. The intention, as with the discussion of optimal foreign
borrowing, is not to be comprehensive, but rather to outline the basic structure of the
resource use problem and identify some key results.
A basic distinction in the natural resources literature is between exhaustible resources
the stock of which (known and unknown) is finite and fixed and renewable resources
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where stocks can be replenished by regenerative processes. Initially the case of
exhaustible resources is considered, but as developed later this is easily extended to
the case of renewable resources.
The issue of the optimal depletion of exhaustible resources has, particularly since the
resource "scares" of the early 1970s, been the subject of a large economic literature.13
This literature has addressed two key issues. Firstly what conditions characterise the
optimal depletion of a stock of exhaustible resource and secondly, is the finite nature
of the resource a limit to economic activity ? Amongst others these questions have
motivated the analyses presented by Koopmans (1973), Vousden (1973), Dasgupta
and Heal (1974, 1979) and Solow (1974). A succinct overview is provided in Heal
(1993). For the sake of brevity, the discussion in this section will focus on the first
issue. For a flavour of the debate on the second issue see Dasgupta and Heal (1974,
1979) and Victor (1991).
The simplest model presents the "cake-eating problem". This seeks to solve the
problem of allocating optimally a fixed stock of exhaustible resource. The problem is
then simply to maximise the same objective as in (2.1) but over a finite time period
subject to the constraint:
(2.20) S = -c, S(t) = S(0)-£c(t),
where S0 is the initial stock of the resource. The relevant current value Hamiltonian is
then defined by:
13The issues are not entirely new. To quote Hotelling (1931): "Contemplation of the world's
disappearing supplies of minerals, forest and other exhaustible assets has led to demands for the
regulation of their exploitation. The feeling that those products are now too cheap for the good of
future generations, that they are being selfishly exploited at too rapid a rate, and that in consequence
of their excessive cheapness they are being produced and consumed has given rise to the
conservation movement."
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(2.21) H = u(c) —4>c,
where cj> is the co-state variable interpreted as the shadow price of resource stock.
Two results then emerge. First that efficiency requires the present value of marginal
utility to be equal in all time periods and second, the discount rate and the elasticity of
marginal utility of consumption determine the optimal depletion path which in this
case is also the path for consumption. The problem of allocating a fixed stock of
natural resource leads to an equivalent expression to (2.14) given by c/c = —S/rj. This
states that the rate of growth in consumption (extraction) declines over time for a
positive discount rate and moreover, a higher discount rate implies consumption /
extraction declines more quickly with a shift of extraction from the future to the
present. The discount rate also determines the optimal path for the shadow price of
the resource stock with the equation of motion for the co-state from (2.21) given by
(j)/(j) = 5; the standard Hotelling rule. This rule can be interpreted as saying that the
capital gain from holding resource stock should rise at the rate of discount, i.e. the
return on alternative assets.
A more interesting problem than this simple cake-eating one is the situation where the
finite stock of resources are used as an input to production. The economy now has
two state variables to control: the stock of natural resource as in the cake-eating
problem and the stock of reproducible capital. A key feature of the model is that this
latter capital stock and the flow of extraction represents inputs to the production
process which is summarised by constant returns to scale technology. Note also the
reproducible nature of non-resource capital implies the allocation problem is not
restricted to a finite time horizon if reproducible capital can substitute for resource
inputs. The basic problem is then, as before, to maximise the integral of discounted
23
utility subject to:14
(2.22) K = f(K,R)-c; S = -R,
where F(K, R) denotes the production function, K is the stock of reproducible capital
and R is the flow of extraction. Again denoting the co-state for the resource stock by
(j) and the co-state for capital as \|/, necessary conditions for a solution are given by:
Thus at each point in time marginal utility equals the shadow price of capital, the real
resource rent <j) (i.e. relative to \j/) at the margin equals the marginal product of the
resource, whilst over time the Hotelling rule emerges for the resource rent and the
rate of change in vj/ is determined by the discount rate and the marginal product of
capital. These expressions combined provide insight into the optimal time paths for
consumption and extraction over time. For consumption the usual Ramsey rule
follows as:
which compared to the cake-eating problem shows that the ability to substitute for R
in production allows consumption to increase (or at least not fall) along the optimal
path. Moreover given fk = r in the context of the optimal foreign borrowing problem,
(2.25) and (2.14) are equivalent expressions (in different contexts) which shows that
the conditions for an optimal consumption path in models with foreign borrowing and
exhaustible resource extraction are essentially the same. The point made earlier is
worth re-iterating. This equivalence follows from viewing both problems in terms of
the intertemporal management of capital assets. Thus there is a striking similarity to
(2.23)
(2.24)




14Note here that the variables are not defined in per capita terms.
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the problems of optimal foreign borrowing and resource depletion.
For extraction, a little manipulation of the necessary conditions permits the derivation
of:
R -F
(2.26) T =—'R TIr
where r|R = -RFrr/Fr is the elasticity of the marginal product of extraction with
respect to extraction. Thus the rate at which extraction now decreases along the
optimal path is governed by the marginal product of capital and the production
technology. An equivalent way of stating (2.26) would be that intertemporal
efficiency requires the rate of increase in the marginal productivity of the resource to
equal the marginal product of capital. An intuitively obvious finding when resources
are viewed as capital assets. Moreover this optimality condition which equates the
rates of return also sheds light on the issue of substituting reproducible inputs K for
resource inputs in production. Thus note that (2.26) implies Fr/Fr = FK and define
x = K/R (i.e. the capital to resource ratio) and f(x) = F(K/R,l). Since F(.) satisfies
homogeneity of degree one the marginal productivity of the natural resource can be
defined in terms of x alone, i.e. FR = f(x) -xfx, and it also follows FK = fx > 0, F^ =
fM < 0. The elasticity of substitution (a) between K and R is also usefully expressed in
terms of x. That is:
-fx(f(x)-xfj
(2-27) xf(x)f„ •




Thus the rate at which the capital to resource ratio changes equals the product of the
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elasticity of substitution between K and R and the average productivity of
reproducible capital inputs. Evidently, the greater the ease of substitution and the
larger the "importance" ofK in production, then the rate at which K is substituted for
R will be higher. Dasgupta and Heal (1974, 1979) identify a as a crucial parameter in
terms of the debate concerning exhaustibility and the limits to economic activity.15
However, the ease of capital-resource substitution is not the only issue. Two further
conditions are also of relevance. The first is the nature of the production technology
and whether resource inputs are essential to production. Dasgupta and Heal argue
that the debate about exhaustibility makes most sense when resource inputs are
essential to production. An example of such a technology would be Cobb-Douglas.
However, it is well known that with Cobb-Douglas production functions the elasticity
of substitution is one. The key parameters are then the elasticities of output with
respect to capital and resource inputs, i.e. the exponents in the Cobb-Douglas
specification. So long as the capital elasticity is greater that the resource elasticity,
then output and consumption growth can be maintained indefinitely. That is, the
exhaustibility of resources is not a constraint on economic activity. Dasgupta and Heal
(1979) take comfort from the historical observation that the factor share of capital is
approximately four times larger than that of resource inputs. A second issue is
whether it is fact optimal to exhaust the resource in finite time. If the marginal
productivity of resource inputs tends to infinity as the level of resource inputs tends to
zero, then it can never be optimal to exhaust the resource stock (see Dasgupta and
Heal, 1974 for details).16
This basic analysis of exhaustible resource use in closed economies has been extended
in a number of ways, a few of which given the analysis to be presented in chapter 3
15For a succinct overview see Victor (1991).
16It can be also noted here that the supporting empirical evidence provides only limited support for
the approach to resource use considered here. Chapter 3 provides more detailed discussion of this
evidence and related issues.
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are worthy of note.17 One extension has been the introduction of extraction costs.
Solow and Wan (1976), for example, introduce differential costs of extraction to the
standard marcoeconomic problem of optimal depletion. The differentials arise from
the assumption of differences in ore grade qualities. Their analysis presents two
findings of interest. First, they show that it is rational, i.e. efficient, to fully exploit low
cost resource deposits before extracting from the high cost deposit. Weitzman (1976)
and Hartwick (1978) have reached similar conclusions. Second a wedge, termed the
degradation cost, is created between the shadow price of resources and the shadow
value of the marginal productivity of the resource (recall eq. 2.23). This cost arises
because depletion of low cost resources in the present implies higher costs for every
unit extracted in the future. With respect to the latter Heal (1976) arrives at very
similar conclusions. Extraction costs are introduced with average costs an increasing
function of cumulative extraction. Heal, like Solow and Wan, then shows that
efficiency requires the shadow value of resource productivity to be equated with the
full social cost of extraction which comprises marginal extraction cost and a
"surcharge" for the impact of current extraction on future costs. The analysis to be
presented in chapter 3 has similar features. Solow and Wan's result that low cost
resources are depleted first is reflected in the assumption that extraction costs are a
decreasing function of remaining reserves. Further, the degradation effect found by
Solow and Wan, or equivalently Heal's "surcharge" reflect the notion of "user cost"
familiar from the analysis of resource extraction at the level of individual mines /
firms. This "user cost" is also a feature of the analysis presented in chapter 3.
A second extension of the basic model which has been extensively investigated is the
role of uncertainty in resource use decisions. Fisher (1981) provides a concise
summary of the different types of uncertainty relevant in the analysis of optimal
17Devarajan and Fisher (1981) provide a concise overview of these extensions.
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resource depletion. The first is uncertainty associated with resource demand and
where uncertainty is related to the time horizon, i.e. resource extractors are less
certain about demand conditions a decade away compared to those one year into the
future. In this case Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975) show uncertainty creates an
incentive to shift extraction to the present. However, demand uncertainty may also
create incentives for extraction to be deferred to the future. Assuming variations in
the returns from extraction to be proportional to the level of extraction itself, Lewis
(1977) has shown that with risk aversion extraction is shifted to the future. This result
simply reflects the idea that with extraction falling monotonically over time, then so
must the variation in returns. A third type of demand uncertainty arises from the
introduction of cheaper substitutes or a new backstop at some unknown future date.18
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) show that with the uncertain arrival of a technological
innovation which presents a substitute to an exhaustible resource, resource depletion
will shift to the present since the introduction of uncertainty requires an increase in the
utility discount rate.19 A final type of uncertainty concerns the supply side. Here
uncertainty concerns the size of the resource stock. Intuitively, if resource extractors
are risk averse and are extracting from a stock of unknown size then there will be an
incentive to conserve the resource and shift depletion to the future, see for example
Gilbert (1979) and Loury (1978). Hoel (1978) provides a variation of this analysis by
also introducing uncertainty about future extraction costs. He shows that by contrast
with the effect of an increase in stock uncertainty, increases in cost uncertainty lead to
a shift of extraction to the present. This arises simply because expected welfare is
decreasing in stock uncertainty, but increasing in future cost uncertainty. The analysis
to be presented in chapter 3 considers a resource depletion problem where the
decision maker faces uncertainty about future price and cost conditions. Thus
18The threat of expropriation would also come into this category. See Long (1975).
19More precisely they show that the certainty equivalent problem is solved with the use of a discount
rate which is modified to include the probability of the substitute arriving at time t conditional on no
previous arrival.
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elements of demand and supply uncertainty are a feature of the analysis presented in
the next chapter.
The discussion so far of optimal resource use in the closed economy can be
considered a special case of the more general problem of renewable resource use. To
motivate some of the analysis in the open economy context, consider now this more
general problem. The simplest approach is to modify the resource use constraint to:
(2.29) S = g(S)-R,
where g(S) defines a stock replenishment or growth function. This function is usually
assumed to be concave and positive in the interval [0, Smax], see for example Clark
(1976). Note Smax denotes the equilibrium level of stock that obtains in the absence of
resource exploitation. From (2.29) it is evident that the equation of motion for the
resource co-state <j) is modified to:
(2.30) <MS-gS)<l>.
implying that the rate of increase in the resource rent is now given by the rate of
discount less the marginal physical return to holding resource stock. It then follows
that optimal resource use requires the rate of growth in the marginal productivity of
resource inputs to be equalised with the marginal product of capital net of the
marginal growth in resource stock since the opportunity cost of resource use is lower
given the stock is now capable of regeneration. Note also from (2.30) the steady-state
equilibrium condition is gs = 5. This implies in equilibrium resource exploitation is less
than the maximum sustainable yield since at this rate of use gs = 0.
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2.4 The optimal use of natural resources in the open economy.
Early extensions of the closed economy analysis of the optimal use of natural
resources to the open economy context are provided in Dasgupta, Eastwood and
Heal, hereafter D, E & H, (1978) and Aarrestad (1978, 1979).20 In the former the
case of an open economy endowed with a stock of exhaustible resources is
considered.21 This resource can either be exported or used in domestic production.
Reproducible capital, in addition, is now held in the form of domestic capital or
foreign investments which can earn interest at rate r. The issues addressed in
Aarrestad (1978) are similar with an intertemporal choice problem which focuses on
the optimal use of an exhaustible resource and optimal capital accumulation in the
open economy context, whilst Aarrestad (1979) analyses explicitly the issue of
optimal debt accumulation for a small open economy exporting an exhaustible
resource.
In general terms these extensions to the closed economy analysis can be viewed as a
bringing together of the analyses previously outlined in sections 2.2 and 2.3.22 Taken
together the models of optimal foreign borrowing and optimal resource extraction
have comprised a total of three capital assets: foreign assets (in 2.2 defined to be
negative), domestic reproducible capital and natural capital. In the analysis of optimal
growth in open economies endowed with natural resources it would therefore be
appropriate to consider all three capital stocks implying consideration of the optimal
20The analysis of resource extraction in a trading economy by Vousden (1974) is another example.
However since this analysis assumes balanced trade, unlike the papers by D, H & E and Aarrestad
the link between resource use and international capital flows cannot be addressed.
21Note that the description "small" is not attached to this economy since D, E & H assume that the
export price for the resource is a function of this economy's level of export.
22In the case of D, E & H the assumption is that the economy is a net creditor with outstanding
foreign assets defined as total accumulated financial wealth less domestic reproducible capital. Note
however defining this stock of wealth to be negative implies that the economy can be interpreted as a
net debtor with r denoting the marginal cost of foreign liabilities, i.e. borrowing.
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time paths for domestic capital accumulation, foreign capital (debt) accumulation and
resource use. In general however the analysis of intertemporal problems with three
state variables is complex since a system of six differential equations is implied
(equations of motion for state and co-state variables). Consequently the literature on
the optimal use of resources in the open economy has focused on simplified models to
permit the analysis of dynamic systems with at most two state variables. Thus in D, E
& H the state variables are the resource stock and W which denotes the sum of
domestic and foreign capital. Aarrestad (1978) considers only S and K in the notation
of section 2.3 and in Aarrestad (1979) the analysis is restricted to resource use and
foreign capital flows (e.g. borrowing). A further restriction imposed by Aarrestad
(1979) but not in D, E & H is the assumption that all resource extraction is exported.
In the context of the debt-resources link it can be argued that the primary case of
interest centres on resource exporters and the potential consequences that the
economy's external indebtedness may have for extraction programs. For simplicity
(and brevity) therefore, the remaining discussion of resource use in the open economy
context will concentrate on the case of the resource exporter.23
A key result which emerges from the analysis of the resource exporter is highlighted
by Siebert (1985). That is, optimal consumption and optimal resource extraction are
independent when the economy has access to a perfect international capital market.
This finding is an obvious analogue of Fischer's Separation Theorem which states
production and exchange (i.e. consumption) decisions are independent if agents can
freely borrow or lend on capital markets, (for detailed discussions of this theorem see
Hirshleifler, 1970). In the present context the ability to borrow freely (subject to
solvency) at a given rate of interest permits the separation of the maximisation of
23Though this implies consideration of a special case the key results outlined below would still
emerge from a more general model where resource extraction can also be used in domestic
production, see for example the analysis in Dasgupta, Eastwood and Heal (1978).
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present value resource earnings from the maximisation of discounted benefits from
consumption. This separation of extraction and consumption decisions can be
illustrated by considering the intertemporal maximisation problem which faces the
resource exporter. To simplify the problem capital accumulation is not considered.
The state variables are thus the stock of debt and the stock of natural resources.
Consider an economy importing a single consumption good financed by the export of
a natural resource which for the moment is treated as non-renewable. With the ability
to borrow trade need not balance in every time period. In other words debt can be
accumulated to finance any current account deficit. The intertemporal problem facing
the social planner for this economy can be written as:
o
subject to:
d = rd + c - pq
(2.31) s= -q
d(o) = d0, s(o) = s0,
where c,d, s, r and 5 are defined as above. In addition p now denotes the exogenously
determined real price (in terms of consumption imports) of the exported resource q.
Note that for simplicity extraction is assumed to be costless.
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is written as:
(2.32) H = u(c)-c()q-/\.(rd + c-pq),
where as before (j) denotes the shadow price of resource stock and X is the shadow
cost of foreign borrowing. The canonical system of equations given by:
(2.33) uc-X = 0,
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(2.34) <t>-^p = 0,
(2.35) X = (5-r)X,
(2.36) <j> = 5(j>,
(2.37) d = rd + c-pq,
(2.38) s = -q,
together with the transversality conditions lim e 5tA.(t)d(t) = 0 and lime 5t<f)(t)s(t) = 0
t—HO t—>co
describe necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution.
Differentiating (2.34) with respect to time and using (2.35) and (2.36) it can be
observed that:
(2.39) — = r,
P
i.e. the rate of change in the resource price is determined entirely by the given rate of
interest. In other words the time path for the resource price follows Hotelling's rule. It
is also implied that the optimal time profile for extraction is independent of the time
path of consumption.24 Note that substituting (2.34) into (2.32) allows the current
value Hamiltonian to be written as:
(2.40) H = u(c) - A.(rd + c).
Thus with the condition for optimal extraction satisfied, the social planner can
independently choose the level of consumption which maximises (2.40). Moreover,
note (2.34) and the optimal extraction program can be obtained from maximising the
present value of resource export earnings (pq) over the period [0,T] where the rate of
discount employed is the given rate of interest r (Siebert, 1985). In other words
consumption and extraction decisions can be made separately. One consequence of
this is that extraction decisions are now independent of preferences. Aarrestad (1979)
24The optimal time-path for consumption is given by the usual Ramsey rule, see eq. (2.14).
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demonstrates this for the resource exporter by showing the utility discount rate to
have no role in the time path for extraction. Even when some of the resource is
employed in domestic production D, E & H (1978) show optimal extraction decisions
in an open economy faced with perfect capital markets will be independent of
preferences, i.e. 8 and r\. This contrasts the analysis of section 2.3 which showed that
optimal extraction in the closed economy would be sensitive to these preference
parameters.25 A second consequence of this separation result is that optimal
extraction is determined independently of indebtedness. The assumption of a perfect
capital market ensures exogenously determined interest rates for borrowers. A
necessary condition for optimal extraction is that the shadow price of resource stock
rises at a rate equal to this exogenous interest rate. The independence of interest rates
with respect to levels of debt ensures extraction is determined independently of the
economy's level of debt. In sum, the analysis so far suggests any link between
resource extraction and indebtedness is ruled out under conditions of perfect markets
for foreign capital. As a corollary, the existence of a relationship between resource
extraction and external indebtedness would appear to require the presence of
imperfections in international capital markets.
The role of imperfections in international capital markets as a determinant in resource
extraction is demonstrated most clearly by the related analyses in Rauscher (1989,
1990). Imperfections in capital markets are introduced by dropping the assumption
that the rate of interest payable on external debt is exogenous. Instead interest
payments, r(d)d = h(d), are a convex function of debt, i.e. hd > 0 and hdd > 0. The risk
of borrower default, which is pervasive in lending to sovereign borrowers, provides
the rationale for this assumption. Since this risk is likely to increase with levels of
25This was obvious in the cake-eating problem, but less so in the closed economy model with
production. Substituting for the marginal product of capital in (2.26) using (2.25) reveals the
dependence of the optimal time profile for extraction on preferences.
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indebtedness, interest rates will be also increasing in debt levels given an increasing
default risk premium. This intuitively reasonable justification for a convex interest
payments function has been demonstrated formally by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
They show that in a market for international credit in which default penalties exist and
lenders are competitive, equilibrium will be characterised by an upward-sloping supply
curve for loans over the range [0, d] where d denotes the set of available loans.26
Rauscher considers a small open economy exporting a good which is produced with
inputs of renewable natural resource and importing a single consumption good.
Exports are given by the production function f(q) with fq > 0, f < 0, fq(0) = go and f (
go) = 0. Without loss of generality, export production is assumed costless. The
resource constraint faced by the economy takes the form:
(2.41) s=g(s)-q s0 given,
where q is the flow of extraction, s denotes the resource stock and g(s) is the
regeneration function that satisfies the properties noted earlier in section 2.3. Debt
flows comprise the only capital flows in the model. The balance of payments
constraint is then denoted by:
(2.42) d = h(d) + c-pf(q) d0 given and lim d(t) < d#,v t—
where c is imported consumption and p is the real resource price (in terms of the
consumption good). This resource price, given the small open economy assumption, is
exogenous and for simplicity constant. Note also from (2.42) that the initial level of
debt is given and debt accumulation in the long run is constrained by an upper limit d#.
This is in essence a solvency condition which ensures the borrower cannot increase its
debt without limit.
26For more details see Theorems 2 and 3 and the associated proofs in Appendix A of Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981).
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Subject to the constraints (2.41) and (2.42) the economy faces the standard Ramsey-
type problem. That is to maximise the present value of future utility over the interval
[0,oo] from consumption. The current value Hamiltonian associated with this problem
is:27
(2.43) H = u(c) + A(h(d) + c- pf(q)) +<j)(g(s) - q),
with the canonical system of equations given by:
(2.44) c + >> II o
(2.45) <J> + Xpf = 0,
(2.46) i=(d-hd)K
(2.47) <f> = (s-gs)<j>,
(2.48) d = h(d) + c-pf(q),
(2.49) s = g(s)-q.
Together with the transversality condition lim e St (AXt)d(t) +<J)(t)s(t)} = 0, (2.44) to
t—KO
(2.49) describe necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution (Feichtinger
and Novak, 1991).28
Combining (2.44) and (2.46), the optimal consumption path follows the Ramsey rule:
(2.50) c =—(8-hd),
u„„cc
and it is implied that consumption grows over time if hd > 5 and falls over time for hd
27Note that the costate X , following Rauscher, is positive in (2.43) unlike earlier models. The
difference is simply a matter of definition and does not alter the analysis. Defined in this way X is
the shadow cost of borrowing. Its negative will be the shadow price of consumption, see eq. (2.44).
28Rauscher does note, however, that an optimal solution may not exist under certain circumstances.
For example, if d0 is high and d# is low then it may be impossible to find a path for q(t) which
satisfies the conditions: I"(g(s) - q)dt + s0 > 0 and l"(h(d) + c- pf(q))dt-d0 < d".
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< 5. Thus if the marginal cost of debt is greater than the marginal cost of deferring
consumption then the economy should choose to enjoy higher consumption in the
future. When the opposite condition holds consumption is higher in the present.
Similar considerations are evident with the optimal path for extraction. Differentiating
(2.45) with respect to time and using (2.47), (2.46) and (2.44), the optimal extraction
path is given by:
Along the optimal path extraction increases over time if the return to holding the
resource as stock (gs) is greater than the marginal cost of borrowing. Extraction, in
other words, is deferred to the future. When this return to resource stock is less that
hd, the marginal cost of extraction is less than the marginal cost of borrowing which
makes it attractive to finance current account deficits with export. Extraction in the
present is higher, but falls over time. An alternative interpretation of (2.51) is in terms
of the rate of growth in the marginal productivity of the resource, i.e.
fq/f, = fqqq/fq = hd -gs. If hd < gs, growth in marginal productivity is negative and
extraction is deferred to the future. When marginal productivity growth is positive
extraction takes place in the present.
A further observation about (2.50) and (2.51) is that the optimal time paths for
consumption and extraction are not independent of the level of debt given the role of
hd(d) in both expressions. Note also that in (2.51) the optimal path for extraction is
independent of preferences, in particular 5. Thus, the introduction of capital market
imperfections means consumption and extraction decisions are no longer separate in
the sense that their optimal paths are dependent on the economy's level of debt.
(2.51)
Now consider the relationship between optimal extraction, consumption and the level
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of indebtedness. The first step is to characterise the steady state equilibrium in which
q = 0, c = 0, s = 0, d = 0, <j> = 0 and A, = 0. Equilibrium values for the state and
control variables are implied by the steady-state conditions:
q* = gM
(2.52) c* = pf(q*) - h(d*)
hd(d*)=gs(s*)=5.
The third condition in (2.52) determines the equilibrium levels of debt and resource
stock: d* and s* are chosen to satisfy equality between the marginal cost of borrowing
and the marginal rate of regeneration in the steady-state. These in turn are equal to the
rate of discount. Note therefore that the equilibrium resource stock is below the level
of stock consistent with the maximum sustainable yield (gs(sms>')=0). With values for
d* and s* determined, the first two conditions in (2.52) are used to determine steady
state extraction and consumption.29 The nature of the relationship between extraction,
consumption and debt will depend on how, if at all, the optimal solution converges to
the equilibrium described by (2.52). In an appendix to this chapter it is shown that the
steady-state equilibrium is a saddlepoint with a non-cyclical saddlepath. The important
result which follows is that along the stable manifold of the saddlepoint extraction is
increasing in the level of debt, whilst consumption is decreasing in debt. This is also
shown in the chapter appendix.
A qualitative interpretation of this positive relationship between extraction and debt
cannot be represented in less than four dimensions. A phase diagram analysis is only
obtainable by imposing further restrictions onto the model.30 Therefore, to illustrate
the intuition of the results derived in the appendix it is necessary to simplify the
29The existence of this steady-state equilibrium requires c" to be positive, see Rauscher (1990)
30This is a feature of optimal control problems with two state variables. Qualitative analysis of
optimal solutions typically relies on consideration of distinct phases with simpler solutions (Leonard
and Long, 1992). This approach is adopted here.
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interest payments function such that hdd » 0. With this assumption the sub-system
(s,q) is independent of (d,c) which allows the optimal solution in this simplified model
to be illustrated with a phase diagram (see Proposition 3 in appendix). Interest
payments are now assumed to be determined by the step function:
(2.53) hd(d) = " for
d > d
X d<d'
with r11 > r1. Thus borrowers can face one of two rates of interest. The rate of interest
rh is charged if debt is above the "problem" level d. Consider first the scenario of d <
d. The steady state in the (s,q) sub-system is characterised by:
(2.54)
s=0: q* = g(s*)
q = 0: r1 =gs(s*) = 8.





__fqSss/fqq 0 J_q ~q\'
The determinant of the Jacobian in (2.55) is negative which confirms this equilibrium
as a saddlepoint.31 Figure 2.3 illustrates the phase diagram for (2.55).
Now consider the scenario where debt is above the "problem" level and the borrower
faces a marginal cost of borrowing equal to r\ From (2.52) it is evident that the
steady-state equilibrium in this scenario is associated with a higher marginal rate of
regeneration and therefore smaller resource stock. It then follows from (2.52) that the
steady state level of extraction is lower for the case d > d. As illustrated in Figure 2.4
the "problem" debt steady-state equilibrium, Eh, therefore lies to the left of the
equilibrium E1 from Figure 2.3. Figure 2.4 also illustrates why for the initial values s0
31Note equilibrium is attained, given (2.52), when gs > 0 (i.e. below maximum sustainable yield) and
therefore ga < 0.
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and q0, the saddlepath converging to the first scenario equilibrium (E1) is no longer
optimal. At the point E1 the first scenario time path enters an unstable manifold of the
"problem" debt phase space. On this time path extraction in the long run tends to zero
and the resource stock converges on its ecological equilibrium of smax. The system
therefore
converges to a point where the resource is not utilised which cannot be an equilibrium
given the steady-state conditions and fq(0) = oo. This situation can only be avoided if,
for the given s0, initial extraction is increased to, say qoh, which enables the system to
converge to Eh on a stable manifold of the "problem" debt phase space. Thus,
extraction is higher along the optimal path when debt is above its "problem" level.
This result, as noted by Rauscher, has a simple intuition. The cost of indebtedness
increases with the level of debt. The incentive to reduce indebtedness thus rises with
the level of debt. When the ability to reduce debt is provided by the export of resource
goods, this incentive will imply a shift in resource extraction from the future to the
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present.
Figure 2.4: Optimal extraction time paths with an increase in debt
The discussion so far has concentrated on the role of imperfect capital markets.
Rauscher (1990) considers a further avenue for the link between indebtedness and
resource use. Specifically, it is assumed that environmental quality as measured by the
resource stock is a source of utility. Rauscher then shows that resource use and
indebtedness are linked even with perfect capital markets. The idea here is that an
increase in the initial level of debt represents an inward shift of the economy's budget
constraint. Assuming consumption and environmental quality to be normal, the fall in
income reduces demand for each good, which implies a fall in consumption and an
increase in resource use. A further feature of this extended model is that the stability
properties of the model are no longer well defined. The optimal solution features non-
cyclical saddlepaths only with fairly restrictive assumptions, i.e. f —> 0. In general,
unstable and cyclical solutions cannot be ruled out. The latter suggests debt cycles and
cyclical resource exploitation can be optimal strategies for the resource exporter. The
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stability of the cyclical solutions is established using numerical methods by Feichtinger
and Novak (1991).
2.5 Concluding thoughts.
The open economy models presented in this chapter emphasise the role that capital
market imperfections play in linking external debt and resource extraction. The
approach adopted in, for example, Rauscher (1989, 1990) was to assume that
rationing of credit was achieved by a convex interest payments function. In the
theoretical literature on sovereign debt the existence of upward sloping supply curves
for international credit even in competitive loans markets is well established. Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), for example, formally demonstrate that in a competitive market
equilibrium there exists the convex function h(d). This is a feature of optimal foreign
borrowing which section 2.2 did not explicitly address. The simple model outlined
took as given a horizontal supply schedule for international credit. The level of steady
state debt would, in other words, be entirely demand determined. From the debtor's
perspective (and the lender's) the only factor ultimately governing the borrowing
decision would be the solvency criteria; i.e. the present value of interest payments on
steady-state debt would equal the present value of current account surpluses.
However even where the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied the nature of
sovereign lending and borrowing, as suggested by the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
analysis, does not rule out the existence of credit rationing. The analysis of sovereign
debt reveals incentives for quantity rationing over price rationing (i.e. the interest
rate). This reflects the default risks and asymmetric information that is characteristic
of sovereign borrowing (see for example Kletzer, 1984; Kharas, 1984).
The idea that default risk motivates quantity rationing of international credit can be
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shown with a simple stylised representation of a trade between a debtor and a creditor
(see Eaton, 1993). A country borrows amount B from the international loans market
in period 1 which incurs a period 2 debt service obligation D = B(1 + r) where r is the
interest payable on the debt. If the debtor repays anything less than D in period 2 a
penalty equal to P (in terms of income) is incurred. Repayment occurs therefore if P >
D and an incentive to default exists ifD > P. Creditors therefore ensure that B(1 + r)
is always less than P or equivalently that the available credit, B, is at or below the
level P/(l + r). If debt accumulation satisfies this constraint competitive lenders
should be willing to lend at the competitive rate of interest r. However this assumes
no asymmetries in information between borrowers and lenders with regard to the level
of indebtedness. If the penalty is finite and lenders are unable to observe B, borrowing
by debtors is greater than their willingness to repay which leads to the default
outcome. Rational lenders anticipate such an outcome and thus have no incentive to
lend. Therefore, as demonstrated in Kletzer (1984), debtors can in fact benefit from
making B public knowledge. Moreover, Kletzer also shows that the observability of
the debtor's total debt will in combination with default risk lead to the quantity
rationing of loans.
This theoretical explanation for quantity rationing also appears to have empirical
validity, particularly in the context of lending to developing countries. For example,
Hajivassiliou (1987) notes evidence which suggests that interest rates for international
loans appear to be exogenous, i.e. interest rates are not used to ration access to credit.
Instead, the level of available supply appears to be related to creditworthiness
indicators of the debtor. Evidence in Lensink and van Bergeijk (1991) also supports
the idea that quantity rationing prevails in the supply of credit to developing countries,
with lenders using information on indicators such as income growth and investment
shares to determine the creditworthiness of a borrower. In sum, the empirical
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evidence would suggest that interest rate spreads, which reflect default risk, are
insufficient to explain the observed patterns of international lending. Lender
assessments of creditworthiness are reflected in decisions about the quantity rather
than price of loans.
These brief observations from the sovereign debt literature suggest two questions
about the role of imperfect capital markets as the important determinant of the debt-
resources link. Firstly, at the level of theory, how are debt and resource use related
when debtors face credit ceilings rather than convex interest payments? This
motivates the analysis presented in the next chapter and in chapter 5. Of interest in
chapter 5 it is observed that when resource use decisions are taken in a static context,
debt influences the rate of resource use only in the presence of binding credit ceilings.
The second question concerns the empirical relevance of the debt-resource link. The
analyses in chapters 4 and 6 show that empirical testing of the hypothesis is usefully
pursued by distinguishing between constrained and unconstrained lending regimes
which arise from the possibility that international credit is quantity rationed.
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Appendix
Local stability analysis and comparative dynamics in the Rauscher model.
In this Appendix the stability properties of the Rauscher model are established by
Proposition 1. In section 2.4 it was noted that a higher level of debt will increase
current resource extraction and decrease current consumption. These results are
formally derived in the proof of Proposition 2. Finally, a third proposition confirms
the separation of the (s,q) and (d,c) phase space which arises with the use of the
interest payments step function (2.53). This permits the phase diagram analysis
outlined in section 2.4. The dynamics of the model are governed by the differential
equations for the state and co-state variables. Recall these are:
(A2.1)
s=g(s)-q,
d = h(d) + c- pf(q),
<f> = (s-gs)<l>,
l = (5-hd)x.
(A2.1) represents a dynamic system with four dimensions and six variables: s, d, <j>, X,
q, and c. Two unknowns, the control variables, can be eliminated using the optimality
conditions (2.44) and (2.45). This permits analysis of stability in state-co-state space.
Total differentiation of (2.44) and (2.45) yields:
(A2.2)
Using (A2.2), linearising the dynamic system (A2.1) around the steady-state
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Note that F and G are both positive definite. The stability properties of (A2.3) are
stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Allfour eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are real, two are positive
and two are negative. The steady-state equilibrium is therefore a saddlepoint and
saddlepath stable.






where Z12 -det(J). The term det(J) denotes the determinant of the









§12 0 ,with fy, gy being ij elements ofF and G.
Using Theorem 1-10-2 in Barnett and Storey (1970) it is easy to show that the
determinant of the partitioned Jacobian is given by:
(A2.5) det(J) - §i 1§22("^11^22 A2) _ fq§MUchdd
V ^qq Ucc J
>0,
whereas the constant K is:
(A2.6) K = -(f„gI1+fafe)<0.
For notational ease it is now useful to define x = K/2 and y =
that for all four eigenvalues to be real it must be true that:
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det(J). It then follows
(A2.7) - y > 0 and 52/4 - Z > 0.
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Thus x2 - y > 0 is satisfied. Note now that it is trivially true that x2 > x2 - y since y > 0.
However values of x and -yjx2 - y satisfying this inequality may be positive or




x < and x > Vx^
(A2.9) Z, = x + *Jx2 — y < 0 and Z2 = x - -Jx2 - y < 0.
Returning to (A2.7), since all values of Z are negative, the second condition for real
eigenvalues is also satisfied.





Xl=- +Vfl>0, X2 = ~ +W2 > 0,
5 5
X3=--W,<0, X4 = ~-W2 <0.
Hence, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian are real; two are positive and two are negative.
The equilibrium is thus a saddlepoint with a two-dimensional unstable manifold and a
two-dimensional stable manifold."
Proposition 2. For a given level of resource stock, resource extraction and
consumption are respectively increasing and decreasing in the level of indebtedness
along the stable manifold of the saddlepoint equilibrium.
Proof From Proposition 1 it follows there exists a two-dimensional stable manifold in
the four-dimensional state-costate phase space. To determine the relationship between







where T is a 2 x 2 matrix. Using (A2.ll) the linearised dynamic system can be re¬
written as:
(A2.12)











(A2.13) 5i +Fr = r-'G,
which can be re-written as:
(A2.14) nr+5r-G = o.
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Eq. (A2.14) is an algebraic Ricatti equation which has two symmetric solutions for T;
one positive definite and one negative definite (Barnett, 1971). The latter defines the
stable manifold (see Rauscher, 1989). Hence yn and y22 (where y- are elements of T)
are known to be negative on the stable manifold and det(r) > 0. Returning to (A2.13),
the elements of 51, F, G and T satisfy:
(A2.15)
^llYll + ^12721 = (VllSll ~ 7l2S22)/^e^-^)
^*1 lY 12 ^nY22 =(Y22§12 Y12S22 ) I")
^21Y11 +f"22Y21 = (Y21S11 ~ 711822)/^^ r")
^2lY 12 ^2lY22 — (Y2lSl2 ~~ Y11§22)•
To determine the effect of changes in debt on resource extraction and consumption





It follows that, for given s, dX/dD < 0 since y22 < 0. Also dtj)/dD = y12. The sign of
element y12 can be established from the second row of (A2.15). Rearranging gives:
Y12"Lf,, + det(r)J .detfr) ^22}(A2.17)
Note that g12 = 0, y22 < 0, det(r) > 0 and g22 > 0. (A2.17) therefore simplifies to:
(A2.18)
"f.2Y12 I 22 >0.Yl2 f.l+(g22/det(r))
It is also useful to note that (A2.18) implies y]2 < - f12y22 / fu. Using the values for f12
and fn this is equivalently pfqy22 + y12 < 0. Combining (A2.16) with (A2.2), changes
in debt imply:
32Here dD denotes a change in debt. D is now used to represent debt to avoid ambiguity with the "d"
notation for derivatives.
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(A2.19) ^L = _X-<0,dD u„
dq (pfqY22+Yi2) -ve
(A2.20) -77 = ——7 - >0-dD ucPfqq ~ve
Thus, for a given resource stock, (A2.19) and (A2.20) show that along the stable
manifold increased debt decreases consumption and increases resource extraction.■
Proposition 3. If interest payments are determined by the step function (2.53) the
state-control sub-system (s,q) is independent of the (d,c) sub-system. The (s,q) phase
space can then be characterised in terms of two unique steady-state equilibria which
correspond to distinct borrowing regimes.
Proof. Proposition 3 follows immediately from the assumption of the step function
which implies hdd = 0. Consider initially, however, the general case in which hdd > 0. If
the dynamics are represented in state-control space, linearising (2.48), (2.49), (2.50)
and (2.51) around the steady-state (2.52) gives:
s r 5 -1 0 0~ s- s*
q -fqgss/fqq 0 fqhdd/fqq 0 q-q*
d 0 "Pfq 5 1 d-d*




Now impose the step function restriction hdd = 0. Inspection of (A2.21) reveals that
this imposes Sq/Sd = f hdd/fqq = 0. Thus s and q are independent of deviations in d






Note also that the nature of the borrowing regime will determine the steady-state
equilibrium in (s,q) space. For debt levels above d, the steady-state requires rh = 8,
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whilst for d < d 5 = r1 < r*1. Two steady-states are therefore possible:
6 = rh: (sh\qh*)
(A2.23) . , with sh* < s1* and qh* < q1* (see Figure 2.4).I
5 = r : (s1*^1*),
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Chapter 3
Exhaustible resource extraction by indebted economies: a theoretical
model and empirical issues.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter considers from a theoretical perspective the impact of external
indebtedness on the extraction of exhaustible natural resources. The classic
microeconomic (see Hotelling, 1931) and macroeconomic (see Dasgupta and
Heal, 1974) approaches to the problem of exhaustible resource extraction have
emphasised that the appropriate framework for analysis is dynamic in nature. In
chapter 2 is was shown that the standard approach to the problem of optimal
resource depletion at the macroeconomic level has been to incorporate natural
resources into models of optimal growth. With respect to the relationship
between debt and resource extraction the key result from the previous chapter
was that a link between a country's external indebtedness and rate of resource
depletion only emerges if international capital markets are imperfect.
This chapter presents a theoretical model of resource extraction which like the
models discussed in chapter 2 emphasises the importance of imperfections in
international lending. However unlike these previous models, e.g. Rauscher
(1989, 1990), imperfections in international capital markets are introduced by
means of quantity restrictions on available international loans, i.e. credit
ceilings. The international finance literature has emphasised that equilibria in
international loans markets are typically non-walrasian. If the amount of traded
international loans is determined by the demand side then the borrower's
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notional demand is equal to effective demand. In short, the country is not
constrained in its foreign borrowing. If the quantity of trades is determined by
the supply side borrowers will face a divergence between their desired
(notional) demand and the actual level of loans available to them. In other
words, a borrower is supply constrained.
This approach to imperfections in international lending provides a reasonably
straightforward way of deriving testable hypotheses from the theoretical model.
These hypotheses are based on the first order conditions - the Euler equations -
generated from the solution to an intertemporal choice problem faced by a
resource exporter. The introduction of credit ceilings to the optimisation model
has the effect of imposing liquidity constraints onto the resource exporter's
choice problem. Econometric analyses of the role of liquidity constraints within
an Euler equation framework have been evident in other contexts. Zeldes
(1989) in a study of household consumption and liquidity constraints tests the
hypothesis that the consumption Euler equation can be rejected for liquidity
constrained households. Whited (1992) adopts a similar methodology to test for
the effect of borrowing constraints on firm investment decisions. More recently,
Bond and Meghir (1994) have used the Euler equation approach to investigate
the effects of a firm's financial policy on its investment decisions which are
derived in an Euler equation framework.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents a discrete
time theoretical model of a small open economy with three sectors: Non-traded,
Traded and Resource, in which decision-makers operate under conditions of
uncertainty about the future. In section 3.3 of the chapter the optimisation
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problem is outlined and the Euler equations under the assumption of
unconstrained foreign borrowing are derived. Section 3.4 considers the effect of
binding borrowing constraints on production, consumption and resource
extraction. Section 3.5 then discusses an approach which enables econometric
estimation and testing of the extraction Euler equations derived in Section 3.3
and 3.4. This methodology provides the framework for the empirical testing of
the debt-resources hypothesis considered in chapter 4. Section 3.6 provides a
concluding summary.
3.2 An intertemporal model of exhaustible resource extraction and foreign
borrowing.
Consider a three sector small open economy producing a non-traded good, YN,
a traded good, YM, and a resource good Q which represents a physical unit of
extraction from a stock of exhaustible natural resource denoted by S. The
introduction of non-tradeables represents an extension to earlier models of
resource extraction in open economies which have assumed a single
consumption good.1 In models with tradeables and non-tradeables there exists
substitution possibilities in terms of production and consumption.2 Moreover,
the relative price of non-traded and traded goods - the real exchange rate - will
determine the efficient allocation of mobile factor inputs to non-traded and
traded production and the optimal levels of traded and non-traded
'Mansoorian (1991) does however present an analysis of the impact of natural resource
discoveries on external borrowing in a traded / non-traded good framework.
2See Martin and Selowsky (1983) for a discussion on this and the associated short-run
rationale for foreign borrowing.
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consumption.3 As shown later in this chapter the presence of imperfections in
international lending has important implications for this real exchange rate and
therefore the production and consumption of traded and non-traded goods. The
advantage of this model specification is that it emphasises that the choices
available to a borrower facing imperfect lending are wider than those allowed in
open economy models with a single imported consumption good and a single
exported (i.e. resource) good.
The resource sector is assumed to be an enclave. That is, it is assumed that
there are no supply linkages, in terms of outputs or factor inputs, between the
resource sector and the non-traded and traded sectors.4 This is broadly
consistent with evidence on mining sectors in developing countries (Looney and
Knouse, 1987). Net output (in value terms), YR, from the resource sector is
defined as:
(3,1) Y,r=P,Q,-G(Q„SJ,
where Pt is the (given) real price of the resource good in terms of the traded
good and total extraction costs are denoted by the function G(Qt,St_,).5
Extraction costs are assumed to be a function of current extraction and previous
period stocks. Marginal extraction costs are positive and increasing
(GQ > 0, GQQ > o), whilst the stock effect on costs is negative (Gs <o). This
latter assumption is widely adopted in the natural resources literature and
3That is, in equilibrium the marginal rate of transformation in production and the marginal
rate of substition in consumption will equal the ratio of the shadow prices for non-traded and
traded goods. See eq. (3.20) below.
4This will imply that optimal extraction decisions are independent of the real exchange rate
see Gregory, 1976 and van Long, 1984)
Defining resource output in this manner amounts to a dual representation of decisions in the
resource sector (Neher, 1990).
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presumes depletion begins with more accessible or better quality resource
deposits. With no account of exploration or discoveries in the model the stock
effect can be equivalently thought of as the impact of cumulative production on
extraction costs. Extraction of the resource at any point in the depletion
program satisfies the constraint:
(3.2) St -St_, =-Qt.
The non-traded and traded sectors use capital and labour in the production of
Yn and Ym, with the marginal products to each factor positive and diminishing.
Capital is sector-specific with labour mobile between the non-traded and traded
sectors. The production possibility frontier for non-traded and traded goods at
time t is then defined as:
(3.3) F(YtN,YtM;Lt,Kf)Kf1) = 0J
given an optimal allocation of labour between the two sectors (see Bruno,
1976). The capital stocks in the traded and non-traded sectors are fixed in any
given time period, but evolve over time according to the capital accumulation
identity:
(3.4) K=rt+KU t = N, M,
where I* denotes sectoral gross investment. Note that in (3.4) depreciation in
the capital stocks is assumed zero. This has the merit of avoiding unnecessary
notation since capital depreciation will have no role to play in the model. 6
6Capital accumulation is incorporated into the model to generalise the decisions facing each
agent. However, given the enclave assumption about the resource sector the consideration of
optimal extraction will be independent of investment in the non-traded and traded sectors.
The question of optimal investment is not however divorced from the foreign borrowing
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To complete the model, equilibrium in the non-traded and traded good markets
are given by the following conditions. For non-traded goods, market clearing
requires:
(3.5) YtN = Cf +lf,
where Cf denotes real non-traded consumption. In the case of the traded sector
the introduction of foreign borrowing and the presence of the resource sector
means that the market in tradeables need not balance in every time period. Thus
as noted by Bruno (1976) one role for foreign borrowing in the model is that it
replaces period by period constraints on the market for traded goods with a
single multi-period foreign currency constraint. For the purposes of simplicity
stocks and flows of foreign currency reserves are omitted from the model. The
balance of payments therefore comprises flows in traded and resource goods
and net foreign capital inflows. Again for simplicity it is assumed that these
latter flows are foreign borrowings and repayments. Let Dt denote the stock of
outstanding disbursed foreign debt at the end of period t. As noted by Eaton
(1993) capital account flows for a debtor comprise Bt, loans disbursed in period
t (or the supply of new gross debt), and principal repayments of outstanding
debt in period t. The change in the stock of disbursed debt is then written as:
(3.6) Dt — Dt_, = Bt - Rt.
From balance of payments accounting equilibrium in international flows, given
the simplifying assumptions, requires net debt flows to balance trade flows. That
is:
regime facing each decision-maker, but this chapter will not elaborate on this issue to any
great extent.
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(3.7) Bt — Rt - rt_,Dt_, = C^1 + if1 - YtM - YtR,
where r is the real rate of interest payable on foreign borrowings and CtM is real
traded good consumption.7 Using (3.6) the balance of payments constraint in
(3.7) can be written as:
(3.8) Dt — Dt_j = rt_,Dt_, + C^1+- YtM - YtR.
The balance of payments constraint as defined in (3.8) would be consistent with
a sovereign borrower facing unconstrained lending. The current account
determines the demand for new borrowing Dt-Dt_,. In an unconstrained
regime observed levels of lending equal the notional demands of the borrower.
Thus Dt — Dt_j equals the net supply Bt - 1^ when lending is unconstrained. The
contrary case of constrained lending can be introduced by imposing a lender-
determined upper limit on Bt. Let B* denote this limit on available loans. This
additional constraint can be defined as:
(3.9a) Bt < B*,
or using (3.6) and (3.8),
(3.9b) Rt + rt_,Dt_, +C^ +1^ - YtM - YR < B*.
The constraint defined in (3.9a) and (3.9b) provides a simple but realistic way of
introducing imperfections to international capital markets. It is well established
that international lending is highly imperfect. The most widely observed
manifestation of these imperfections is credit rationing in the form of quantity
restrictions on lending (see Hajivassiliou, 1987 and Lensink and van Bergeijk,
7In (3.7) net exports in traded goods are given by + IJVf - YtM. The model also implicitly
treats the economy's debt as a single foreign liability serviced with interest rt.
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1991). Thus observed levels of lending will equal the minimum of either the
borrower's demand for new loans or the lender's upper limit. In the case of the
former lending is unconstrained in the sense that borrower demand is satisfied
and the level of borrowing over time is consistent with a debtor's intertemporal
budget constraint. Even if the solvency criteria (i.e. the intertemporal budget
constraint) is satisfied a situation where Bt = B* may face borrowers for a
number of reasons. Firstly, credit rationing may be the rational response from
lenders to informational imperfections such as adverse selection in credit
markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Secondly, and of particular relevance for
lending to countries, the sovereignty of the borrower introduces additional
default risks which can lead to lender restrictions on the flow of new debt
(Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Sachs and Cohen, 1985; Cohen and Sachs, 1986;
see also Kletzer, 1988 and Eaton, 1993 for excellent surveys of the issues
concerning sovereign debt).
3.3 The optimisation problem with unconstrained borrowing.
The planning problem for each country decision-maker is to choose the
consumption levels Ck (t = N,M) and the rates of extraction Qk for k =
0,....,T-t which maximise social welfare. More precisely, to maximise the
expected discounted future stream of social welfare from non-traded and traded
consumption conditional on the information set Qt. Formally, the problem is:
<3.io) max e Zp'ufc^.c^JIn, .
cf.CjhQk U=0 J
subject to (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.7), (3.9b) and the initial values
St, Dt, K' which are assumed given. The aggregate utility function u(c^,CtN)
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is assumed to be strictly concave and twice differentiable in both arguments and
(3 denotes the discount factor.8
To solve the problem stated in (3.10) define the Lagrangian function:
vt = u(c^c?) + ^(kf_,+ytn-c*-k*)




+H,(b; - R, - r_,D_, -C? + Y,m -C + K£,
+p.Q, -G,(Q,.S,.,))
The variables X™, X^, <j)t and pt are Lagrangian multipliers and can be
interpreted as the shadow prices of traded and non-traded goods, the rent on
resource stock and the shadow marginal benefit of access to capital markets.
Note also in the context of foreign borrowing that X™ represents the shadow
cost of borrowing and so strictly the shadow price of traded goods is denoted
by -X™. An alternative to the resource rent interpretation of <j>t is the view that
Q
The usual non-negativity constraints have been omitted for convenience. It is therefore





this multiplier measures the shadow opportunity cost of current period
extraction, i.e. the user cost of resource use.
For the moment assume = 0 and by complementary slackness Bt < B*. With











Equation (3.13) indicates that at the optimum marginal utility from traded
consumption equals the shadow cost of foreign borrowing, whilst (3.14) notes
that the resource rent equals the marginal net benefits (in terms of traded
consumption) of extraction.10
The shadow price of traded goods and the resource rent also obey the following
equations of motion which define the conditions for intertemporal equilibrium:
(3.15) = p(l + r,)E,(C).
or equivalently using (3.13),
9
For ease of exposition the first order conditions are hereafter written for k=0. In addition the
transversality conditions are assumed to hold,
i.e.
et(pT_tXTT) > 0; Et(pT_tXTTK;) = 0 (t = N,m) and et(pT_t<|>T) > 0;et(pT_t<j>tst) = 0.
10Alternatively, (3.14) indicates that extraction incurs two type of cost: the cost of physically
extracting the resource and the user cost. Thus at the margin the real price of the resource is
equated with total marginal cost, i.e. marginal extraction cost plus the real (i.e. relative to





(3.17a) <(>, =PE,(<t>„,) + pE,
Equation (3.16) is the familiar condition required for optimal consumption
decisions.11 In the present context (3.16) implies that at the optimum expected
lifetime utility cannot be increased by foregoing one unit of future consumption
and borrowing to enjoy an extra unit of current consumption. Equivalently,
marginal utility in the current period should equal the discounted value of
marginal utility in some future period. Equation (3.17a) contains a
generalisation of the Hotelling rule for extraction over time, namely that the
expected real resource rent should grow by an amount equal to the interest rate
less the expected marginal saving in future extraction costs from deferring
current extraction weighted by expected marginal utility of consumption. That
is, rearranging (3.17a):
where <}>t+1 = Et((j)t+l)/-Et(A,",) and = <j)t/A,f. Note also that the depletion
effect on costs <3G/SSt < 0 ensures that the second terms on the right hand side
of (3.17b) is negative.12An alternative interpretation of this condition for
dynamic efficiency is given by (3.17c) which results from simple rearrangment
of (3.17b) and noting (3.13):
11
See for example Hall (1978).
12Note that the relevant interest rate in (3.17b) is the interest payable on foreign borrowings
and not the rate used to discount the expected stream of future utilities. This reflects the
standard open economy result that production decisions are independent of preferences and
are instead determined by world prices. Recall the discussion from chapter 2.
(3.17b)
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(3.170) I,., -1, -[E,(xr„aG/SS,)/E,(C,)]= r,i,.
Eq. (3.17c) equates the return to investing in resource stock and the cost
associated with such investment. The term (j)t+1 -<j)t denotes the expected (real)
capital gain from investing in period t+1 resource stock or equivalently from
deferring period t extraction. The second term on the left hand side,
-[E,(C 3G/3S,)/E,(0] >0, can be interpreted as the (utility) weighted
"dividend" from investing in resource stock. In other words, the weighted
marginal cost saving that arises from a higher resource stock at the beginning of
period t+1. The right hand side of (3.17c) can be interpreted as the opportunity
cost of investing in resource stock, i.e. the foregone liquidity which arises if
extraction is deferred to the future.
3,4 Production, consumption and resource extraction with constrained
borrowing.
Now consider the case where qt > 0 which implies Bt = B*. The optimal
conditions for traded consumption are now given by:





The multiplier |_it measures the additional utility which is possible if the
borrowing constraint were to be relaxed by one unit. Comparing (3.18) and
(3.13), note that both conditions require that marginal utility from traded
consumption at an optimum equals the shadow cost of borrowing. However the
levels of traded consumption at these optima will clearly be different since
(3.18) contains indicating that the shadow cost of borrowing is greater at the
point where borrowing constraints bind. This suggests that current period
marginal utility (from traded consumption) for constrained borrowers is always
greater than or equal to current period marginal utility for unconstrained
borrowers. From the concavity of the utility function the corollary of this is that
current levels of traded consumption for constrained borrowers are always less
than or equal to those ofunconstrained borrowers. It will also be the case that a
borrower facing constraints on lending will have the incentive to devote more
resources to the production of traded goods. Since labour is the only mobile
factor this would imply a fall in non-traded output. The key here is the effect of
borrowing constraints on the relative price of non-tradeables. In the








where qt is the relative (shadow) price of non-tradeables or the real exchange
rate. Equation (3.20) states the condition that the marginal rate of substitution
in consumption should equal the marginal rate of transformation in production
at the prevailing shadow relative price. With constraints on foreign borrowing it
has been observed that marginal utility from current traded consumption is
higher which given the definition of the real exchange rate indicates that traded
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good production and non-traded consumption are relatively more attractive in a
constrained borrowing regime. Figure 3.1 overleaf illustrates.
In Figure 3.1 AB denotes the production possibility frontier defined by (3.3)
and A'B' is obtained from adding net resource output YR to this frontier. The
vertical axis then defines the total level of traded goods. The equilibrium under
no borrowing constraints is given by the points where the real exchange rate
schedule q, is tangential to the production possibility frontier AB and the
indifference curve UU. That is, the production and consumption combinations
FE and DC. Distance OE is non-traded production and OC non-traded
consumption under this borrowing regime. By identity (3.5) the distance CE
then measures the level of non-traded investment consistent with jit = 0. On the
tradeables side, OF and FG are traded good production and net resource output
respectively with OD equal to traded good consumption.
Ifborrowing constraints are strictly binding then the relevant shadow price ratio
becomes (qt |ptt > o) which is represented in Figure 3.1 by q2. For equilibrium at
this set of (shadow) prices production moves leftwards up the possibility
frontier to the combination JI and consumption shifts down the indifference
curve to combination LH. Traded good consumption has fallen by DL and total
tradeables output increases by GK, of which FJ represents the increase in Ym.
However, the proportion of non-traded goods consumed must rise markedly
since non-traded production is lower by the amount IE. Clearly then investment
in the non-traded sector under a constrained borrowing regime is lower since
distance CE > HI.13
13
This is an interesting outcome in itself given suggestions that the debt problems of the
1980s have led to an "investment crisis" in many developing countries. This is especially true
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Figure 3.1: Production and consumption of tradeables and non-tradeables with
constrained and unconstrained borrowing.
q2
Non-Tradeables
In sum the static optimality conditions (3.13), (3.18) and (3.20) indicate that
imperfections in international lending provide an incentive for greater net export
of traded goods and consumption of non-traded goods than would be optimal
without such constraints. The resource sector as an exportable sector provides
another means by which current account flows can adjust to constrained lending
regimes and in static terms it is easy to show that extraction will be greater,
ceteris paribus, for a country faced with a binding borrowing constraint. The
first order condition for extraction under the two cases pt = 0 and jit > 0 can
be written as:









of infrastructural developments typical of non-traded sectors such as construction. See Warner




The small open economy assumption implies Pt is given and therefore invariant
to the foreign borrowing regime faced by an individual country. From (3.21)
and (3.22) it can be seen that under constrained borrowing the real resource
rent (or real user cost of current period extraction) is lower. Moreover for the
equalities in (3.21) and (3.22) to hold it must be the case that the marginal cost
of extraction is higher in the constrained case. Since extraction costs are
assumed convex in extraction, this implies that the extraction rate is similarly
higher.14 This result has a simple intuition. The marginal benefit of an extra unit
of traded goods increases relative to the marginal benefit of an extra unit of
resource stock with supply-side constraints on foreign borrowing. Thus, the
opportunity cost of current extraction decreases as the natural resource in its
"liquid" form has the additional benefit of easing borrowing constraints through
the balance of payments.
Countries which face credit rationing in international lending will thus hold a
different "portfolio" of capital stocks since greater benefit is to be gained from
capital in the form of traded goods rather than a stock of natural capital. Natural
resources, in constrained borrowing regimes, are more important as a source of
international liquidity than as capital assets. This proposition holds with one
important proviso. That is, the lending constraints are themselves exogenous to
the borrower's extraction decisions. Mohr (1988) addresses the question of debt
repudiation by debtors whose sole source of national income is from the export
of an exhaustible natural resource. When extractors can pre-commit themselves
14An alternative way of expressing this is that the first order condition in (3.21) cannot be
satisfied by constrained borrowers. If Q* denotes the optimal value of extraction which
satisfies (3.21), this will not be the value which satisfies (3.22).
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to an extraction program creditors will determine the credit line as a function of
future resource stocks.15 To avoid the repudiation of sovereign debt lenders
ensure credit contracts are self-enforcing. As noted by Sachs and Cohen (1985)
if a borrower can subject itself to higher repudiation costs, a higher credit line
may be forthcoming as creditworthiness is augmented by the higher costs of
default to the borrower. In the context of a resource exporter Mohr suggests
this self imposed sanction would take the form of investment in resource stock
or in other words, a resource conserving policy. Thus the level of B* is likely to
be endogenous rather than exogenous in a resource exporting debtor. Binding
borrowing constraints and their effects can therefore be avoided by a resource-
conserving and not resource depleting policy which results in a higher B*.
Resource conservation acts as an investment in creditworthiness. However,
Mohr also notes that the creditworthiness benefits of resource conservation will
conflict with the liquidity role of resource extraction. This conflict will be
greater the tighter is the squeeze on the balance of payments. During the 1980s
many developing countries faced this kind of squeeze as real interest rates rose
and resource prices fell (for non-oil mineral producers). These exogenous
factors in turn proved detrimental to creditworthiness and the ability to borrow,
thereby worsening the liquidity position. Consequently, it could be argued that
it is the severity of a constrained liquidity situation which will lead to increased
resource depletion not the existence of such constraints per se.
To see this possibility in the model above the effects of lender constraints on the
intertemporal choices of resource extractors must be considered. The conflict
15Mohr presents a simple 2-period model. Thus the credit available in period 1, under pre-
committment, is a function of the remaining stock in period 2, since for the resource exporter
this determines their ability to repay period 1 borrowing.
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between creditworthiness and liquidity is in essence an intertemporal conflict:
the ability to borrow in the future depends on maintaining collateral in the form
of resource capital whereas the ability to finance current account flows in the
present depends on the rate of resource extraction.
Consider the equation of motion for the resource rent in the presence of a
binding constraint on borrowing. This is written as:
(3.23) <|>t=PEt(<j>l+1) + PEt t+I dS, -PEt
dG
astyV
By comparison with (3.17a), (3.23) illustrates that with binding constraints on
borrowing introduce the additional term PE^p^oG/SSJ which is necessarily
negative. However, from (3.23) it can be shown that the effect of binding credit
ceilings on the allocation of extraction over time will in fact be ambiguous. To
see this consider the constrained regime equivalent to (3.17c). Substituting





where <j)t+1 and <j>, are defined as above. (3.24) equates for the constrained
borrower the return to investing in resource stock and the cost associated with
such investment. This expression indicates indicates that the stock effect
"dividend" is greater in the constrained case. Since the current period incentive
to liquidate resource stock is greater for the constrained debtor (recall eq. 3.22),
current period extraction, ceteris paribus, is greater for such a debtor. Assuming
the resource stock at the beginning of period t is the same under the
69
unconstrained and constrained scenarios, it is implied that end of period stocks
are lower for the constrained debtor. The stock effect on next period costs is
therefore larger. As a corollary, if current extraction is deferred the period t+1
cost saving in the constrained case is larger. Hence, for constrained debtors the
extra "dividend" implies a higher return at the margin to investing in resource
stock. In sum, there is an incentive for "problem" (i.e. constrained) debtors to
defer rather than increase current extraction. However, the right hand side of
(3.24) highlights that constrained debtors also face a higher cost to investing in
next period resource stock. Since E[(pul)/Et(X,"1) < 0, the debtor faced with a
binding credit ceiling incurs a higher marginal opportunity cost of investing in
t+1 resource stock. By deferring period t extraction, the debtor forgoes the
opportunity to generate liquidity made more valuable by the binding ceiling on
borrowing. The overall effect of borrowing constraints on extraction will
therefore depend on the relative magnitudes of the stock effect dividend and the
increase in the marginal opportunity cost of resource stock investment; in the
terms ofMohr there is a creditworthiness / liquidity conflict. If the stock effect
on costs is relatively unimportant then such ambiguity will clearly be resolved in
favour of increased extraction arising from borrowing constraints. If stock
effects cannot be ignored then the marginal opportunity cost of deferring
extraction to the future is required to be relatively high. In other words, the
need for international liquidity in the present must dominate extraction
decisions.
To develop this further it is useful to substitute out of (3.23) the terms <j>t and
Et((j)t+1). Assuming (3.18) holds at time t+1 and recalling (3.19) the equation of
motion for the resource rent (3.23) can be re-written as:
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(3.25)
(l + r,)(p1-G*)- -]p.-Gq')
= Et [uc'" (Pt+1 - GQ,+l + Gs' )]/Et (uc"'),
where GQ" = 3G/cQx, Gs' = dG/dSt, Uc,+l = . The interpretation of
the Euler equation expressed by (3.25) is not obvious given the interaction
between the expected terms. It is useful therefore to rewrite (3.25) in terms of
expectational errors rather than the conditional expectations operator.16 This is
also a key feature of the econometric methodology which can be employed to
empirically test the propositions of this chapter (see 3.5 below). If expectations
are rational (3.25) can be re-expressed as:
where £t+1 is a composite expectational error reflecting uncertainty about future
prices, extraction costs, traded consumption and the borrowing constraint
multiplier. By assumption £t+1 satisfies the orthogonality property E^+jIQJ = 0.




GQt" - GQt = Pt+1 - Pt - r, (Pt - GQl) - Gs'
+(g»-p)p,.,(p,-oQ')-5,.„
where the term (g)i -p)qt+1 is obtained by noting:








p is the discount rate, is the rate of growth in the borrowing constraint
multiplier and (It+1 denotes |4.t/Uc"-'. Note that in (3.27) the left hand side term
(Gq,+1 -GQt) represents the discrete time change in marginal extraction costs.
This implies (3.27) can be interpreted in terms of the rate of change in
extraction along the optimal path.17 In the case of binding borrowing constraints
(3.27) therefore suggests that along the optimal path extraction is determined by
price movements, the depletion effect on costs, the interest rate (i.e. marginal
cost of borrowing), uncertainty (about future prices, costs, marginal utility of
traded consumption, the borrowing constraint multiplier) and of note the term
(g^ -p)£t+i In the unconstrained case it can be equivalently shown that
extraction along the optimal path is governed by an extraction Euler equation of
the form:
(3.29) Gq"-Gq- =Pt+1-Pt-rt(Pt-GQ')-Gs'-£t+1,
where Q+1 is a expectational error satisfying E(^t+1|£^t) = 0. Note however that
this expectational error must differ from that in (3.27) since it excludes
uncertainty about the future borrowing constraint multiplier. Given this and on
the basis of (3.27) and (3.29) it is then possible to state:
17That is G9'*' - GQl = AG9'*1. For A -> 0, this becomes the continuous time change in
marginal extraction cost dGq(Q,S)/dt - GQ9(dQ/dt) + Gps(dS/dt) = G99Q-GqsQ.
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Ifi) H > 0, ii) P > GQt and iii) > p are satisfied then along optimal path
the expected change in extraction under a constrained lending regime is
greater than expected change in extraction under an unconstrained regime.
The necessary conditions i) and ii) are in some ways trivial, i) states the obvious
requirement that borrowing constraints must be strictly binding, whereas ii)
indicates that extraction only occurs (irrespective of borrowing constraints)
when the rent on the resource stock (in real terms) is positive or in other words,
extraction is feasible in an economic sense. The steady state of zero extraction
will therefore be consistent with PT = G^, i.e. the point where the marginal
resource rent is zero. This emphasises that the steady-state is consistent with
economic rather than physical exhaustion of the resource stock (see Sweeney,
1993).
Condition iii) is clearly of most interest. It suggests that only if the rate of
increase in future marginal utility losses arising from constraints on borrowing is
greater than the rate at which those losses would be discounted is there any
incentive to increase the rate of extraction (relative to the unconstrained
case).1819 Thus the need to "cash in" resource stocks only arises if the net
present value of future utility losses from borrowing constraints is positive. It
18
Note also that the discount rate now plays a role in optimal extraction decisions which
reflects the effect of imperfections in international capital markets represented here by
binding credit ceilings.
19An alternative way of thinking about this is to note that (g^-p)A,+I may be equivalently
written as (pt+1 - (l + p)(it)//(oU/c'CtMfl). So if the borrowing constraint multiplier in present
value terms is a constant, i.e. pt+1 =(l + p)pt, then the constrained Euler equation will
reduce to that for the unconstrained case. In other words the condition for dynamic optimality
is the same under either regime, if this condition holds. Only if the rate of increase in p. is
greater than the discount rate do the conditions for dynamic efficiency differ in the two case.
Of course this does not imply that the time paths will be identical since each type of debtor
must satisfy different conditions for static efficiency, i.e. eqs. (3.21) and (3.22).
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would seem reasonable to presume that this rate of growth in marginal utility
losses would be an increasing function of the severity of borrowing constraints.
This idea parallels to a degree some of the stylised facts concerning the debt
crisis period in the 1980s. Increases in the debt repayment burden coupled with
falling commodity prices meant many developing countries faced chronic
balance of payments difficulties. Creditworthiness consequently fell which was
reflected in the marked fall in private lending to developing countries. Allsopp
and Joshi (1985) highlight this collapse noting that new private lending in 1981
amounted to US$ 80 billion, but by 1985 was only US$ 10 billion. Thus
developing countries in this period were increasingly constrained in their ability
to borrow foreign capital. Concurrent with these economic difficulties,
investment by debtor countries has been shown to have fallen during this period.
This fall in investment could be interpreted as one source of the future marginal
utility losses mentioned above as it would feed through to lower income and
consumption growth in future periods.20 Increased resource extraction provides
one avenue for offsetting these negative effects of constrained international
liquidity.
To sum up so far, it has been shown that in the presence of supply-side
constraints on foreign borrowing, there will be an incentive to increase current
extraction of an exhaustible natural resource. However, the existence of
constrained borrowing per se does not guarantee this possibility. The extent to
20
The preceding discussion has already pointed to lower (non-traded sector) investment in a
constrained borrowing regime. At the empirical level, the precise extent to which the debt
crisis directly contributed to the fall in investment is a matter which remains uncertain. What
is known with greater certainty is that investment as a percentage of national income did fall
in this period for many indebted developing countries. Warner (1992) quotes a fall of 22.5 %
for the highly indebted countries and 10.9 % for all developing countries over the period
1982-86.
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which this incentive exists depends on the growth in the marginal cost of
constrained borrowing relative to the discount rate, which can be interpreted as
indicating the incentive will be determined by the severity of the liquidity
"squeeze" facing constrained borrowers. Thus it can be suggested that under
these conditions the creditworthiness-liquidity conflict which Mohr (1988)
argues faces exporters of exhaustible resources will be resolved in favour of the
need for international liquidity. Section 3.5 discusses some general empirical
issues raised by this chapter's theoretical model prior to an econometric analysis
of the extraction Euler equations in chapter 4.
3.5 Econometric estimation and testing of the extraction Euler equations.
A basic premise of this chapter's theoretical model (and those presented in
chapter 2) is the assumption that resource extractors behave efficiently. More
generally, it assumes that resource use decisions can be modelled within a
capital theory framework. So assuming decisions makers regard the natural
resource as a capital asset, the theoretical model describes necessary and
sufficient conditions for optimal resource use over time. Within this framework
the theoretical model has examined these conditions when the resource
extractor in question is a small open economy which exports a natural resource
and has access to international capital markets. More precisely, the theoretical
model has been used to identify the effect that constrained international liquidity
has on decisions with regard to resource extraction.
The debt crisis of the 1980s represented a severe liquidity squeeze for many
developing economies producers, who are reliant on foreign exchange earnings
from the export of natural resources / primary commodities. The actual resource
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use decisions of these economies thus provides an opportunity to test the
predictions from theory. However, it clear that any empirical analysis will
represent a joint test of whether resource use within developing economies is
consistent with the efficient paths described by the model and conditional on
this consistency, whether periods of constrained international liquidity are
observed to result in higher resource extraction.
Thus in the remainder of this chapter two general issues are considered. Firstly,
existing empirical evidence on the efficiency of resource extraction is reviewed.
This review will emphasise that Euler equation models, whilst having received
considerable attention at the level of firms and resource markets, have not
received the same level of attention when resource use is considered at an
aggregate level. This is particularly the case with respect to resource use in
developing economy contexts.21 This lack of attention is perhaps surprising for
two reasons. Firstly, there is now a wealth of theoretical literature on the
optimal use of resources by closed and open economies, recall for example the
discussions in chapter 2. A second, and related, reason is the growing
theoretical literature on the issue of sustainable development; see Toman,
Pezzey and Krautkraemer (1995) for an overview. In this literature a basic
premise is again the efficiency of resource use within a capital theory
framework. Thus empirically testing whether observed rates of resource use in
developing economies are consistent with a theoretical and efficient path for
resource use is of interest from the point of view of assessing the applicability of
these theoretical models.
21Questions concerning resource use within developing economies have tended to be
addressed within the framework of macro-econometric models which incorporate ad-hoc
specifications for resource supply. An example is Nziramasanga and Obideguu (1981).
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The second general issue concerns the econometric methods employed to
estimate the extraction Euler equations and to test the prediction that resource
extraction is higher in constrained economies. A particular concern will be to
consider how this main hypothesis of interest can be tested whilst controlling for
the auxiliary hypotheses concerning the dynamic efficiency of resource use.
3.5.1 Resource use and dynamic efficiency : a review ofempirical evidence.
The empirical literature in resource economics can be classified into three main
areas: (a) the literature on economic indicators of resource scarcity, (b) tests of
arbitrage behaviour in resource markets and (c) econometric tests of the theory
of exhaustible resources. Each is considered in turn.
(a) Economic indicators of resource scarcity
Theoretical models of resource use to paraphrase Norgaard (1990) derive time
paths for net resource prices and extraction costs which are necessary
conditions for the efficient allocation of scarce natural resources over time. It
would appear logical then to argue that observing the actual behaviour of
resource prices and costs should provide information on the long-run
availability or scarcity of natural resource stocks. This logic lies behind a
considerable empirical literature on the measurement of resource scarcity.
Indirectly, this logic also provides a test of the theory of resource use: scarcity
will be reflected in rising costs or rising prices, both of which are predicted in
the theoretical literature.
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In a seminal work Barnett and Morse (1963) examined unit costs of extraction
and the relative price of resource in the U.S. over the period 1870 to 1957.
Both indicators were observed to fall leading to the conclusion that
technological change, new discoveries, substitution and economies of scale had
more than offset any effect of resource depletion. Barnett (1979), in a re¬
assessment of these conclusions, continued to find no evidence of any upturn in
unit costs or relative prices and hence maintained scarcity was not increasing.
The appropriate choice of scarcity indicator has been a particular focus in this
literature. Brown and Field (1978) criticise the Barnett and Morse focus on unit
cost as backward looking and argue for in situ prices (i.e. price net ofmarginal
extraction cost or <j) in the context of the model presented earlier in this
chapter) as the preferred indicator since they are forward looking. This has a
theoretical appeal since it is easy to demonstrate that the resource rent is
equivalent to the discounted value of future extraction costs associated with
current extraction; see for example Levhari and Liviatan (1977) and Bohi and
Toman (1984). Smith (1978, 1979) prefers a relative output price measure since
the rate of price change is equal to a weighted average of the rate of interest (a
pure scarcity rent) and the rate of change in marginal extraction costs
(interpreted as a differential quality rent).22 The advantage of the latter, of
course, is that it is easily observed whereas in situ prices are typical not. The
findings from Smith (1979) based on data in Manthy (1978) provide evidence of
22This is easy to show in a model with extraction costs, but no stock effect on costs. Static
efficiency requires <|> = P - CQ, where CQ is marginal extraction cost. Differentiating with
respect to time gives <j> = P - CQ, which when combined with the simple Hotelling rule
*/* = r gives p/p = (p - cq/p)r + (cq /p) cq/cq.
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negative time trend coefficients for relative prices, but importantly, these
coefficients exhibit structural breaks. Notably the negative coefficients are
observed to increase (i.e. move towards zero) towards the end of the sample
period (1870-1972) which weakens support for the hypothesis of no increase in
resource scarcity. This evidence could be taken to indicate that "ultimately the
exhaustibility underlying Hotelling's model should re-assert itself'. (Slade, 1991,
p. 11).
Slade (1982) attempts to show models of the Hotelling type can in fact be
consistent with price paths which are U-shaped, thus reconciling theory with the
observation of falling relative prices for resources. The key is the effect of
technological progress on extraction costs.23 A sufficiently high rate of technical
progress can offset any depletion effect on marginal extraction costs implying
such costs fall over time. If this decline outweighs the discounted increase in
resource rents, then resource price will be predicted to fall, not rise. However, if
technical progress itself is subject to diminishing returns, i.e. the cost reducing
impact of technical change declines over time, eventually prices should begin to
rise. Slade examines this hypothesis by estimating quadratic time trends for 12
metal commodities with annual time series data covering 1870-1978 and finds
the parameter on the quadratic term to be positive in all cases and statistically
significant in 11 of the commodities (lead is the exception). This implies price
movements consistent with the U-shaped hypothesis for the majority of metals
considered. It also provides some insight into the instability found by Smith
(1979) who estimated linear time trend models. If the underlying price path is
23There are alternative explanations which can reconcile theory with falling prices. For
example new discoveries as in Pindyck (1980) and the introduction of a new backstop
technology as in Heal (1976).
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non-linear then the slope of a linear approximation will vary according to the
sample period chosen for estimation. In other words the parameters of the linear
model will vary according to the time period. A final conclusion to be taken
from Slade's findings relates to the turning point in the fitted quadratic curves.
By the 1970s prices of every commodity has passed the minimum of the
estimated convex relationships, indicating that scarcity as measured by relative
price was increasing. These findings receive further support from Hall and Hall
(1984) who estimate linear time trends models for unit cost and relative price
indices of scarcity, but also allow for structural breaks in the estimated
coefficients. Market interventions, primarily the impact ofOPEC post 1974, are
controlled for with crude dummy variables. Their findings find qualitative
differences between the 1960s and 1970s, with the conclusion being that the
data no longer supports the Barnett and Morse view that scarcity is either static
or diminishing.
The focus on relative prices rather than the more appropriate resource rent
reflects, as noted above, the greater difficulties associated with observing rents.
A number of studies have however proposed ways of measuring indirectly or
estimating rents. Since the marginal benefit from exploration is represented by
the in situ value of any discovery and the optimal level of exploration equates
marginal benefits and costs, Devarajan and Fisher (1982) argue that unit
exploration costs provide an indirect way of measuring rents and therefore
scarcity. They present figures on average real exploration costs for U.S. oil and
gas for the period 1946-71 which show unit costs to have increased at an annual
average rate of 5.7 %. Leaving aside the use of average rather than marginal
exploration costs and the approximate nature of the measure, Devarajan and
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Fisher are still inclined to conclude that the trend is of increasing scarcity.24
Halvorsen and Smith (1984) argue in favour of econometric estimates of
resource rents. They present a model of a vertically integrated natural resource
firm which extracts and processes mineral ores. Assuming the firm maximises its
discounted flow of profits they show that the shadow price of ore in situ can be
estimated from the firm's cost function.25 They estimate a translog cost function
with data on the Canadian metal mining industry and the parameter estimates
are then used to construct the estimated in situ price. Over the period 1956-74
the estimated price of unextracted ore is observed to decline markedly, whereas
the relative price of metal output has been relatively unchanged. Resource
scarcity appears then to have declined.
It would seem then that economic indicators provide no conclusive evidence
with respect to resource scarcity either way. Given the logic which lies behind
the measurement of scarcity it would also seem unclear whether this evidence
provides support for or against the underlying theoretical models of resource
use. However, even if the evidence was conclusive in either direction, it is
equally unclear whether this empirical literature provides any test whatsoever of
the theoretical literature for as Norgaard (1990) outlines "the logic behind the
arguments that economic indicators can inform us of whether resources are
scarce are not is fallacious." (Norgaard, 1990, p. 19). The logical fallacy of the
scarcity literature is illustrated by reducing the theoretical models to the
following deductive reasoning which paraphrases Norgaard:
24Devarajan and Fisher highlight for example that with uncertainty in exploration marginal
exploration cost need no longer equate with the in situ price at optimal levels of exploration.
25Formally, the in situ price is the negative of the partial derivative of the cost function for
reproducible inputs used in processing and extraction with respect to the level of extraction.
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Major Premise: If resources are scarce, and
Minor Premise: If resource extractors, knowing resources to be scarce,
behave efficiently,
Conclusion: Then economic indicators (e.g. in situ prices) will reflect
this scarcity.
Norgaard's fundamental criticism is that the empirical scarcity literature
attempts to determine whether resources are scarce (the major premise) by
observing economic indicators (the conclusion). In other words they attempt to
run the reasoning in reverse and in doing so ignore the minor premise.
Consequently, a refutation of scarcity may actually be explained by a violation
of the minor premise and not a fall in scarcity itself. This clearly highlights the
need to investigate this minor premise.
(b) Arbitrage Behaviour in Resource Markets.
One test of this minor premise is to examine the simple Hotelling prediction that
in equilibrium the rate of increase in resource prices should equal the rate of
interest, recall eq. (2.39). This can be interpreted as an arbitrage condition
which views the rate of price appreciation as the capital gain from holding
resource assets and leads to the prediction of a close association between rates
of change in resource prices and the rate of return on other capital assets (i.e.
the rate of interest). Heal and Barrow (1980) provide the first empirical tests of
this interpretation of the Hotelling theoretical framework. Since the focus is on
arbitrage behaviour Heal and Barrow do not outline an explicit model of
resource extraction. Instead they specify log-linear demand and supply functions
for a given resource and introduce arbitrage to the model through the demand
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function. Specifically, resource demand is a function of the ratio of the expected
rate of capital gain from the resource (measured by price appreciation) to the
expected capital gain in addition to the standard price and income arguments.
With market clearing and expectations generated by a distributed lag of past
values the basic model specification is represented by:
(3.30) (AP/P), = XLa*(AP/PU +ZLjkg.->c+e.'
where r is the rate of return on alternative assets, g is the rate of income growth
and s is a stochastic error.
Heal and Barrow (1980) examine monthly price data for copper, lead, tin and
zinc with the resource price defined by the 3-month forward price. The interest
rate is the return to maturity of a 91 day UK treasury Bill and income growth is
derived from the OECD Index of Industrial production. The findings in Heal
and Barrow (1980) offer some general support for the view that resource price
movements are related to the returns on other assets. However, they are keen to
stress " [the] conclusions we reach are very tentative, but suggest that the
matter is considerably more complex than simple equilibrium theory [i.e.
Hotelling] would suggest." (Heal and Barrow, 1980, p. 161). More specifically,
their empirical results establish a statistical relationship between resource price
movements and changes in rates of return on alternative assets which leads to
the unsatisfactory "...implication that if interest rates are constant then the rate
of change of resources prices must be zero, a conclusion which contradicts the
simple asset market equilibrium [i.e. Hotelling] argument." (Heal and Barrow,
1980, p. 175).
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A subsequent analysis by the same authors, Heal and Barrow (1981), of long
term price movements reached similar conclusions in that their results were not
supportive of the simple Hotelling predictions. More recently, Agbeyegbe
(1989) has provided further evidence on the relationship between interest rates
and resource price movements with an examination of quarterly data between
1968 and 1982 on prices for copper, lead, zinc and silver. The conclusion once
again is supportive of a statistical relationship between changes in resource
prices and changes in interest rates.26
Smith (1981) examines the performance of the Heal-Barrow specification of the
arbitrage model relative to a number of competing specifications since the Heal-
Barrow reduced form is consistent with a number of different structural
specifications for the underlying supply and demand model. These competing
models are distinguished by rates of return (i.e. single / multiple; short-term /
long-term) and assumptions with respect to expectations (i.e. perfect
expectations / current values ; imperfect expectation / lag function of past
values).27 Examined on their out-of-sample forecasting the arbitrage models are
assessed relative to an first order autoregressive time series model. Smith finds
that the arbitrage models are not uniformly superior to the AR(1) model.
However, where the arbitrage models do dominate the AR(1) model (anthracite
coal, copper and lead) the preferred specification is that ofHeal and Barrow.
26Further insight into this finding is available from the stationarity properties of the
Agbeyegbe data. Resource price changes are 1(0), whilst interest rates are only stationary after
first differencing.
27The simple equilibrium Hotelling model is specified with price movements a function of a
single interest rate in the current period and extraction costs assumed to be zero.
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Two points are worth noting with respect to this limited support for arbitrage
models of resource prices. The first is with respect to the role of uncertainty.
The Heal and Barrow approach assumes under uncertainty the expected rate of
increase in resource prices will equal the expected rate of interest. Gaudet and
Howitt (1989) show that such an equivalence is generally not valid. Using
capital asset pricing theory they show that the return to resource assets under
uncertainty must differ from returns on other assets. Specifically, if risk aversion
is assumed, the analog of the Hotelling rule will show that expected growth in
resource prices differs from expected returns by an amount determined by the
covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and the difference
between the rate of increase in resource prices and the interest rate. The
negative of this covariance provides a measure of the riskiness of resource
assets. If resources are riskier then the negative of this covariance is positive
and the expected gain to resource assets must in equilibrium be higher than
alternative expected returns.
The second point relates to an observation by Smith (1981). He notes that by
focusing on movements in output prices for resources, the Heal and Barrow
model ignores potentially important aspects of the arbitrage process, e.g.
movements in extraction costs. The underlying arbitrage condition in Heal and
Barrow is only consistent with the efficiency predictions of Hotelling type
models under the special conditions of constant marginal extraction costs and
no stock depletion effect. With the introduction of increasing marginal
extraction costs and depletion effects, as with the theoretical model presented
above, the link between prices and interest rates is broken (Levhari and
Liviatan, 1977). Related to this point is the observation that the behaviour of
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resource producers on the supply side are effectively ignored in the arbitrage
models of Heal and Barrow. Thus the results of the arbitrage models cannot be
used to assess whether actual extraction decisions are consistent with the
dynamic efficiency conditions predicted by Hotelling models which incorporate
extraction costs in their general sense, i.e. with stock effects in addition to costs
associated with physical extraction. Also, as noted for example by Miller and
Upton (1985), Hotelling type models provide decision rules for the optimal
management of stock resources and not, except indirectly, resource prices. An
optimising resource extractor will choose its path of extraction and therefore
marginal extraction costs, so that the path of price net of extraction cost
satisfies the Hotelling dynamic efficiency condition. This is irrespective of the
path for market prices.28
The empirical literature has examined this direct dynamic efficiency proposition
with respect to resource extraction in one of two ways. The most prevalent has
been to estimate and test empirical specifications of the dynamic efficiency
condition However, before assessing this literature in section (c) below it is
worth noting the findings from the only example to date of the second
approach. Miller and Upton (1985) present an alternative to the time series tests
employed in the arbitrage models of Heal and Barrow. Their analysis is
motivated by their demonstration that if the in situ price of a resource is
expected to follow the Hotelling rule then the asset value of remaining reserves
depends primarily on current period product price and extraction. This
proposition is termed the Hotelling valuation principle and if valid implies asset
values are homogenous of degree one in current output price net of current
28This describes of course the analysis presented earlier in this chapter.
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extraction cost and orthogonal to possible explanatory variables such as interest
rates or expected future resource prices. Their empirical evidence based on a
cross-section of U.S. oil and gas companies is strongly supportive of their
interpretation of the standard Hotelling model. Furthermore, their Hotelling
valuation principle is shown to explain a higher proportion of the variance in
reserve asset values compared to alternative non-Hotelling valuation methods.
(c) Econometric tests of the theory of exhaustible resources
A weakness of the arbitrage approach is that it is by its construction a reduced
form approach which could be consistent with any number of underlying
theoretical models. Empirical testing of the optimality of resource extraction
should ideally entail econometric estimation of a structural model of extraction
and an investigation of whether this model satisfies the restrictions implied by
the dynamic efficiency condition for in situ prices . A difficulty encountered
with this approach is the unobserved nature of the key variable. Two distinct
approaches have been employed to over come this.
The first is to directly estimate the production technology used in extraction.
Stollery (1983) adopts this approach in an analysis of the extraction of nickel by
the dominant producer INCO (International Nickel Company). Annual data
from 1952 to 1973 is used to estimate a log-linear demand function and a Cobb-
Douglas production function. Resource rents are then estimated as the
difference between estimated values for marginal revenue and cost. These
estimated resource rents in turn are used to estimate a dynamic efficiency
condition which explains changes in the in situ price. Stollery obtains a
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reasonable estimate of 0.15 for the firm's discount rate and concludes that
extraction by this dominant producer has been consistent with a Hotelling type
model. These results are dependent, however, on interpreting the difference
between firm marginal revenue and cost as an estimate of the resource rent.
Farrow (1985), for example, notes that this difference could equally represent
the change in profit margin arising from a dynamic limit pricing policy on the
part of the dominant producer. Similarly Cairns (1985, 1986) presents a critique
of the Stollery analysis with the argument that a myopic pricing rule (i.e. a fixed
mark-up on extraction costs) fits the nickel supply data equally well. Stollery
(1985) in a response to Cairns tests this myopic pricing rule against his
preferred Hotelling model. The in situ resource price is found to be statistically
significant when included in a nickel price equation. With myopic pricing this
variable would have an expected coefficient of zero, but should be included
under a Hotelling interpretation.
Stollery's analysis relies on a Cobb-Douglas specification for the production
technology. Two other studies employing the dual approach, i.e. estimation of
the extraction cost function, are less supportive of Stollery's evidence in favour
of the Hotelling model. Farrow (1985) examines the efficiency of extraction
with monthly data on prices and costs for a competitive mining firm in the
period 1975:1 to 1981:12. The tests are based on estimation of:
(3.31) A(j>t = 5(J)t_1 + SC/dXx,
where <j) is the resource rent, 5 is the discount rate to be estimated and dC/dX is
the depletion effect on costs (modelled here in terms of cumulative extraction).
Testing for efficiency is then based on obtaining a reasonable estimate for the
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discount rate and a coefficient of unity on the depletion term. It is important to
note in (3.31) that neither the dependent variable nor the explanatory variables
are directly observable. To implement (3.31) Farrow estimates a translog cost
function which is then used to compute the marginal cost effect of cumulative
extraction and to compute (J). Given the competitive market structure this is
estimated as the difference between market price and estimated marginal
extraction cost which follows from the standard condition for static efficiency in
Hotelling models. As Farrow recognises such a procedure is not without
consequence for the empirical testing which follows. Specifically, since the
static and dynamic conditions are both necessary for efficient resource
extraction, imposing by assumption one condition to test the other biases any
test towards a finding of efficiency. This being said, the results obtained by
Farrow strongly reject the condition of dynamic efficiency. The estimated
discount rates are consistently found to be negative, as is the coefficient on the
depletion cost term. Both are contrary to the predictions of (3.31). Moreover,
these findings are robust to variations of the basic model, i.e. time-varying
discount rates, uncertainty about future prices and capacity constraints on
extraction.
Halvorsen and Smith (1991) provide the other example of duality theory applied
to the estimation of the extraction production technology and a test of dynamic
efficiency. By contrast to Farrow (1985), Halvorsen and Smith do not attempt
to directly estimate the condition for dynamic efficiency. Instead, the conditions
required for efficient extraction are used to impose parametric restrictions on a
restricted extraction function which is jointly estimated with a cost shares
equation. A Hausman test is then constructed using two sets of estimates
89
obtained with and without the restrictions implied by the condition for dynamic
efficiency. Annual time series data (1954 to 1974) for the Canadian metals
industry is used to estimate the system of equations. For a range of assumed
constant and variable discount rates, the evidence provided by Halvorsen and
Smith rejects strongly the restrictions implied by dynamic efficiency. However,
they insist on being tentative about rejecting the Hotelling model given the high
level of aggregation in the data.
The optimality of resource extraction in Canada receives further attention in
Young (1992). She examines the extraction behaviour of a panel of Canadian
copper mining firms over the period 1956-82 in two steps. First a variety of cost
functions are investigated to determine an appropriate specification for
extraction costs. Once this is established the relevant marginal cost expressions
are substituted into an Euler equation for extraction which derives from the
condition for dynamic efficiency. This approach has the two notable advantages
over earlier studies, for example Farrow (1985). First, it permits allowing direct
estimation of the structural Euler equation parameters and second, it avoids
difficulties which arise when estimating with "generated" regressors, i.e.
computing valid standard errors for the estimates, see Pagan (1984, 1986). As
with Halvorsen and Smith, the extraction Euler equation is estimated jointly
with the preferred cost function specification. The parameter restrictions
implied by this joint estimation are rejected given an increase in implausible
estimates for price and output elasticities compared to the same estimates
obtained without the cross-equation restrictions. Thus, at the level of individual
firms the evidence in Young substantiates the earlier findings of Farrow which
reject Hotelling explanations for observed resource extraction.
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The studies considered up to now have focused solely on the consistency
between the production behaviour of resource extractors and conditions for
dynamic efficiency. However as noted by Bohi and Toman (1984) the resource
supply process involves three interconnected stages: exploration, development
and extraction. The related studies by Pesaran (1990) and Favero (1992) adopt
the Euler equation framework to examine oil exploration and extraction
decisions in the U.K. continental shelf. Pesaran elaborates the basic framework
in which a representative price-taking firm operating under uncertainty chooses
the rates of extraction and exploratory effort which will maximise the
discounted future stream of profits. Necessary conditions for optimal extraction
and exploration are derived and then specified for empirical analysis by
assuming functional forms for extraction costs and the discovery function. In
general the extraction model performs poorly with Pesaran noting "an important
trade-off between statistical fit and the plausibility of the estimates" (Pesaran,
1990, p. 379). In particular estimation of the extraction model with the
assumption of rational expectations obtains an estimate for the discount rate of
around 1 % which is considered too low in an industry as unpredictable as the
oil industry. The cost function parameter estimates also imply implausible (i.e.
negative) estimates of in situ resource prices. Plausible estimates for resource
rents are only obtained by imposing a zero discount factor or infinite discount
rate.29The investigation in Favero (1992) examines the sensitivity of this result
to the inclusion of the UK tax regime for the oil sector. As in Pesaran the results
favour a zero discount factor. The implication is that U.K. oil producers operate
under very short time horizons which are difficult to reconcile with an
29It is also notable that residual serial correlation is observed. This violates the rational
expectations assumption.
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intertemporal model of extraction along Hotelling lines. However, as Favero
notes these findings may reflect the high degree of uncertainty generated by
instability in oil prices, the unpredictable nature of the tax regime and by the
high technical costs of production associated with off-shore platforms.
In summary, the empirical evidence from estimation of structural models of
extraction suggest little compelling support for the view that observed resource
extraction has been consistent with the efficiency predictions of intertemporal
allocation models. The evidence from the arbitrage literature is no more
compelling. In combination this evidence would seem to find favour with
Norgaard (1990) who was so critical of the empirical literature on resource
scarcity. Equally however, as Miller and Upton (1985) note, "the role of the
Hotelling principle as the central proposition of resource economics is unlikely
to be much affected by "mere" empirical testing. No viable alternative paradigm
exists." (Miller and Upton, 1985, p. 24)
3.5.2 Econometric estimation and testing of the extraction Eider equation
under unconstrained and constrainedforeign borrowing regimes.
The econometric analysis presented in the next chapter represents a contribution
to the literature on the estimation of structural extraction Euler equations
reviewed in (c) of 5.3.1 above. This analysis specifically aims to test the
prediction that resource extractors faced with constraints on their ability to
borrow international liquidity will, as a consequence increase their rate of
resource depletion. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 have outlined a theoretical rationale for
this hypothesis and since the theoretical model is premised on efficient
92
behaviour the econometric analysis can also be viewed as presenting a test of
the dynamic efficiency of resource use. It is implied therefore, as noted above,
that the econometric analysis of the debt-resources hypothesis involves the
testing of joint hypotheses. However, as outlined below, the theoretical
framework permits a testing procedure which allows some distinction to be
made between these hypotheses.
The econometric analysis, as outlined in the next chapter, is conducted in the
context of mineral production in a sample of developing countries. This is of
interest from the perspective of both the indebtedness and efficiency aspects of
the theoretical Euler conditions presented in this chapter. Clearly the possibility
of constrained international lending is of most relevance to economies, which
given their stage of economic development, are typically net debtors rather than
creditors. This relevance is greatly enhanced by the macroeconomic
circumstances of the 1980s which for many developing economies are
characterised by increased debt servicing burdens and a reduced ability to
borrow on international capital markets. With respect to efficiency, it is of
interest to assess the extent to which the "positive" intertemporal allocation
approach is useful in modelling resource extraction in developing economies.
Given the novelty of this application of this approach to resource use decisions
the econometric analysis is of interest in its own right. However, as noted
earlier, with the emergence of literatures on sustainability and sustainable
development which use the tools of intertemporal allocation, the testing of such
models in the context of developing economies has even greater significance.
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Estimation and testing of theoretical Euler equations is now standard in a wide
variety of contexts. For example the approach has been widely adopted in the
literatures on intertemporal consumption, investment and labour supply
decisions (e.g. Hansen and Singleton, 1982; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Hotz,
Kydland and Sedlacek, 1988,). This approach has also been adopted in
structural modelling of resource extraction. For example the studies by Pesaran
(1990), Favero (1992) and Young (1992) reviewed earlier are all based on the
direct estimation ofEuler equations.
In the present context the Euler equations (3.27) and (3.29) would provide the
basis for econometric analysis. In general notation these Euler equations defines
the first order condition:30
where x,+1 is a k dimension vector of variables observed at time t+1, (3 is an
unknown parameter vector of dimension 1 and h is a (possibly) non-linear
function.31 Et denotes the expectations operator conditioned on information
available in period t. Under the assumption of rational expectations (3.32) is
written as:
This brief exposition follows Hansen and Singleton (1982).
31The specification of h(.) is obviously important to the empirical testing of the model. The
advantage of the econometric approach outlined here is that estimation of the model only
requires specification of the extraction cost function. Closed form solutions for equations
(3.27) or (3.29) are not required. The issue of extraction cost specification has been widely
discussed in the empirical natural resources literature. See for example Bohi and Toman




which implies E,(et+1) =0. Thus in the present context the function h(xt+1, (3)
under unconstrained borrowing is given by:
(3.34) hu(xt+1,p) = GQt+1 -GQl -Pt+1 +Pt +rt(Pt -GQ') + GS'
whilst for the case of constrained borrowing:
(3.35) h.(x„, ,p) - h,(x,.„p) + (g„ -p)p,„(P, - )
If zt denotes a q dimension vector of variables that are observed in the period t
information set then a set of r population orthogonality conditions implied by
the Euler equations can be defined by:
(3.36) E(g(xt+1,zt,p)) = 0,
where g(xt+1,zt,p) = h(x1+1,p)<8>zt and E now denotes the unconditional
expectations operator. Estimation of the parameter vector 3 can be obtained
from Generalised Methods ofMoments (GMM) using the sample moments:32
(3.37) m(p) = ^2g{xt+„zt,p).* t=l
The natural choice for the estimator of P is the vector which minimises the
criterion function:
(3.38) J = m(p) Wm(p),
where W is a symmetric positive definite matrix of dimension r x r and (3 is an
initial consistent estimate of p. Hansen (1982) has shown that the optimal
choice of W, judged in terms of the efficiency of the GMM estimator, is the
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of m(p). In addition to providing an
32
Note that identification of the parameter vector requires r > 1.
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estimate of the parameter vector {3, the GMM approach also provides a test of
any over-identifying restrictions implied by the theoretical Euler equation (see
Hansen, 1982; Hansen and Singleton, 1982). This feature can be exploited to
provide a test of the debt-resources hypothesis.
An established approach to estimating and testing Euler equations with liquidity
constraints has been to impose extra over-identifying restrictions onto the Euler
equation and then test the validity of these restrictions. This would be
equivalent to imposing the restriction that (gR -p)jit+1(Pt -GQt) = 0 onto
(3.35). Zeldes (1989) and Whited (1992) provide examples of this approach.33
Estimation and testing in both papers proceeds with the assumption that the
standard (i.e. unconstrained) Euler equation is satisfied when liquidity
constraints do not bind, whereas, to the contrary, the standard Euler equation
should be rejected when constraints are binding. Thus in the present context this
corresponds to (3.34) being an appropriate specification for unconstrained
borrowers, but this specification being rejected for constrained borrowers. Thus
the liquidity constraint hypothesis can be tested by stating the standard Euler
equation as the null model specification. If A denotes a matrix of instruments
correlated with borrowing constraints (in Zeldes' paper household income is
used) the null model imposes the over-identifying restrictions E(A's) = 0, where
s denotes the null model expectational error. The validity of these restrictions
can then be tested (as in Zeldes' paper) by including A as regressors in the
model and testing their statistical significance or by using Hansen's test of over-
33
Bond and Meghir (1994) use similar methods to investigate the effect of financial policies
on firm level investment.
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identifying restrictions to test the null model specification (as in Whited).34 If
the regressors are statistically significant the restrictions E(A'e) = 0 and the null
model are rejected. Alternatively, the Hansen test should reject the null model if
it is true that E(Ae) * 0.
This testing procedure in essence involves testing the validity of the null
extraction Euler equation on two sub-samples of observations: an unconstrained
sub-sample and a constrained sub-sample. For the first group extraction should
be observed to be orthogonal to a vector of instruments which correlate with
the presence of binding credit ceilings. For the constrained group theory
predicts that extraction may also be a function of the multiplier on the credit
ceiling constraint and as consequence the orthogonality conditions valid for the
unconstrained group should, in contrast, be violated for the constrained group.
Note extraction may be a function of the credit constraint multiplier for
constrained economies. From the previous section it was suggested that the
condition g^ > p was required to hold for the rate of extraction to increase
under constrained borrowing. If a = g^ - p then the null specification of the
extraction Euler equation is obtained by the over-identifying restriction a = 0. If
this restriction is valid, then extraction decisions are independent of constraints
on international lending, irrespective of whether they bind or not. Thus it might
be expected that the null extraction Euler model should be rejected for resource
exporters which can be classed as severely constrained.
34
This is usually referred to as the J statistic. See Hansen (1982) for details of the test. There
are also other moment specification tests as detailed in Newey (1985). These are discussed
further in chapters 4 and 6.
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Testing the validity of the extraction Euler equations for two distinct sub
samples has a further advantage. The approach is able to distinguish between
the failure of auxiliary assumptions and the presence of binding borrowing
constraints. Zeldes makes a similar point in the context of his investigation of
liquidity constrained consumption:
"While the failure of any of auxiliary assumptions ...could lead to
a rejection of the Euler equation, it seems unlikely that such a
failure would lead to a rejection for low-asset consumers, but
not high asset consumers. However, we would expect to see this
pair of results if the rejection of the Euler equation is due to
liquidity constraints." (Zeldes, 1989, p. 322)
In the present context the auxiliary assumptions can be interpreted as the
efficiency of resource use and the Euler equation in question is that consistent
with no binding credit ceiling. Moreover, for "low-asset consumer" read
"constrained debtor" and for high asset consumer read "unconstrained debtor".
In short if the intertemporal allocation model of efficient resource extraction is
inappropriate for modelling resource use in developing economies then data on
both unconstrained and constrained observations should reject the restrictions
implied by dynamic efficiency. A rejection of the null Euler equation for only
constrained observations would give stronger credence to the view that the
extraction of resources is higher in "problem" debtor economies.
3.6 Concluding summary.
To conclude, this chapter has presented a discrete time theoretical model of a
small open economy exporting an exhaustible natural resource. It was shown
that under certain conditions the economy, when faced with constraints on its
ability to borrow international capital, will have an incentive to increase the rate
of resource extraction. A key point is that binding borrowing constraints are in
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themselves not sufficient to encourage the increase in extraction during
constrained periods. It is also required that the "cost" of lending constraints to
the borrower be, in present value terms, positive. This indicates that there exists
an underlying economic rationale for the idea that problem indebtedness
(interpreted as severely constrained borrowers) can lead to the increased
extraction of natural resources as a means of generating scarce international
liquidity. This chapter has also briefly outlined an approach which enables
econometric testing of the theoretical model and the debt-resources hypothesis.
This approach proceeds by imposing over-identifying restrictions onto the
theoretical Euler equation for extraction which holds under the presence of
binding borrowing constraints. A rejection of these over-identifying restrictions
indicates that extraction is not orthogonal to these constraints and such a
rejection can be interpreted as being supportive of the debt resources
hypothesis. These econometric tests are pursued further in chapter 4.
Chapter 4
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Exhaustible resource extraction by indebted economies:
an econometric analysis.
4.1 Introduction and related literature.
This chapter presents an econometric analysis of the debt-resources hypothesis in the
context of developing country mineral producers. The analysis, as outlined at the end
of chapter 3, employs Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation
techniques. These methods, since Hansen and Singleton (1982), have been
extensively employed in the estimation and testing of stochastic Euler equations
generated by dynamic optimisation problems. A distinguishing feature of the
empirical analysis presented in this chapter, therefore, is the derivation of the
econometric model from the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3. Epple and
Hansen (1981) note the advantage of this approach to the econometric modelling of
exhaustible resource supply. In particular a theoretical basis allows for a clear
economic interpretation of the parameters in any empirical resource supply equation,
including restrictions on sign and magnitude. Furthermore, this approach to
modelling should permit an explicit treatment of stochastic factors which give rise to
the error term in the econometric model. In addition to these general points, the
theoretical model presented in chapter 3 suggests an explicit interpretation of the
debt-resources hypothesis which as already noted is particularly amenable to the
GMM estimation framework.
The use of the GMM approach to the econometric estimation and testing of a
theoretical model of resource extraction by an indebted economy is distinct from
previous empirical studies which have investigated or alluded to this issue, e.g.
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Gilbert (1986,1989), Chang (1987) and Sen (1993). The studies presented by Gilbert
and Chang are motivated by a desire to provide empirical explanations for the
observation of excess volatility during the 1980s in the long run elasticity of U.S.
dollar commodity prices with respect to changes in U.S. dollar exchange rates.
Within the context of a general equilibrium model of the determination of
international commodity prices, Gilbert is able to show that given gross
substitutability in the production and consumption of a vector of traded commodities
dollar commodity price elasticities are predicted to lie in the interval [-1,0]. Most
econometric evidence in the 1980s as noted by Gilbert suggested elasticities which in
absolute terms exceeded unity.
One of the explanations proposed for this observation is based on the effect of
developing country indebtedness on commodity prices. The rationale for this
relationship lies with the supply responses of developing country primary commodity
producers faced with a "target revenue" constraint for foreign exchange. This
constraint exists, it is argued, because of the financial pressures of high external debt
burdens which are magnified by appreciations of the dollar since this increases the
value of dollar denominated foreign liabilities. Consequently individual debtor
countries reliant on primary commodity export for their foreign exchange earnings
will, given this constraint, shift their commodity supply curve to the right or even
operate on a negatively sloped supply schedule. Both of these potential effects imply
producers increasing supply at lower prices in the attempt to maintain foreign
exchange revenues. The effect at the aggregate level is to create excess commodity
supply leading to further downward pressure on commodity prices. Given this debt
effect a greater than proportionate response of commodity prices to dollar
appreciations can then be rationalised. Chang (1987) in a response to Gilbert (1986)
presents econometric evidence which is unable to substantiate the basic hypothesis of
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debt service induced changes in commodity supply curves. Even the evidence from
Gilbert himself is not convincing as the finding of a negative relationship between
debt servicing and commodity prices is only statistically significant for agricultural
foods. For metals and minerals the estimated negative relationship between debt
servicing and price is not statistically different from zero implying that "target
revenue" constraints on the supply of this group of commodities are at best
unsubstantiated.
The empirical results presented by Sen (1993) focus entirely on the export supply
behaviour of a number of Latin American metals / minerals producers with the
hypothesised debt link motivated by an argument similar to the "target revenue"
constraint. The model estimated by Sen specifies the level of metals or mineral
export as a linear function of the contemporaneous level of price and debt servicing.
In all cases the debt servicing coefficient is positive and in most cases statistically
different from zero. It is difficult to know, however, the degree to which these
findings would be robust to the inclusion of variables purposely ignored by Sen, e.g.
an index of OECD industrial production, or a more explicit treatment of the
dynamics in the estimated models. With respect to the latter the reported Durbin
Watson statistics indicate first order autocorrelation cannot be rejected. This may
indicate the need to model more explicitly the dynamics of export supply.1
Two observations can be made about these empirical studies. Firstly, the focus on a
link between exports and indebtedness means that the question of whether
indebtedness is a relevant determinant in the depletion of exhaustible natural
resources, interpreted in this context as mineral production, cannot be assessed.
'A more general econometric issue associated with omitted variables is that the OLS estimator of the
coefficient variance-covariance matrix is biased if the omitted variables are correlated with the
included regressors (see Greene, 1990). If so in this case, this would preclude any valid statistical
inferences to made from Sen's reported estimates.
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Moreover the ambiguous nature of the findings in the studies by Gilbert and Chang
may be a reflection of the "world" level of analysis which obscures possible debt
effects on mineral supply at the level of individual countries. A second point alluded
to by Chang is that the explanations offered in these studies for a debt effect on
commodity supply ignore the possibility that debtors can adjust to temporary shocks,
e.g. to price or dollar exchange rates, through short-term borrowing. In other words
these studies fail to control for the distinction between constrained and unconstrained
periods of international lending which the analysis of chapter 3 has emphasised.
In addition to the testing of an explicit theoretical model the econometric analysis
presented in the rest of this chapter attempts to provide some insight on these two
issues. To address the first the empirical model is specified in terms of mineral
extraction / production and then estimated using panel data on mineral production in
a sample of developing countries. With respect to the second issue the approach
adopted in this analysis exploits the distinction between unconstrained and
constrained debtors to construct tests of the debt-resources hypothesis.
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows. Section 4.2 discusses issues of
specification which permit the derivation of an econometric model from the
theoretical Euler equations considered in chapter 3. The data-set used in the analysis
is described in section 4.3 along with a discussion of the econometric methods used
in the analysis. The issue of specification testing is also considered at this point.
*
Empirical results are presented in section 4.4. Section 4.5 provides a concluding
summary to the chapter.
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4.2 Specification issues.
4.2.1 The extraction cost function
The starting point for the empirical analysis is the null specification of the extraction
model given by the Euler equation (3.29) in the previous chapter. Simple
rearrangement allows this condition to be written thus:
(4.1) Gq" =Pt+1-Pt+GQ' -rt(Pt -GQl )-Gs' -£t+I.
Given a specification for the extraction cost function (4.1) will yield a resource
supply equation derived from economic theory and which can be consistently
estimated. However, one difficulty with this model is that extraction costs are defined
by a function which has levels of extraction and remaining stocks / reserves as its
arguments. It is the latter which gives rise to the expected marginal stock effect on
costs denoted by Gs' .2 The difficulty associated with defining extraction costs in this
way is that with most functional forms the specified model of supply will include a
stock or reserves variable for which data, particularly at an aggregated level, may not
be available.3 In an attempt to overcome this data problem the standard approach
2Recall from chapter 3 that this stock effect was negative reflecting the idea that the cost of extraction
increases as the stock is depleted. Standard justifications for this assumption include the view that as
depletion progresses mining operations move further down the mine which increases the cost of
bringing ore to the surface. A second view is that higher grade ores are depleted first implying
remaining ores are more costly to extract. Recall Solow and Wan cited in chapter Norgaard (1990)
is critical of this assumption and refers to the Mayflower problem. He claims that if the Pilgrims on
the Mayflower had known the location of the highest quality agricultural land, Plymouth Rock would
not have been the destination of choice. In short there is no way of knowing where high quality
resources are to be found beforehand. In the context ofmineral extraction this view may be countered
by geological surveys of resource deposits which can reveal thickness of seams etc. Additionally,
evidence in Livernois and Uhler (1987) from individual oil pools in Alberta, Canada indicates that
extraction costs are increasing in the order of discovery which counters the Norgaard view that "The
history of North America...is a history of using low quality resources before learning led to the
exploitation of higher quality, less costly resources." (Norgaard, 1990, p.23)
Exceptions in recent literature are the related studies by Pesaran (1990) and Favero (1992) which are
able to employ UK Department of Energy data on proven oil reserves in the UK continental shelf. See
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which is employed in the empirical resource supply literature is to specify extraction
costs in terms of levels of extraction and cumulative extraction with the latter acting
as a proxy for the stock effect on costs. The intuition for this approach is
straightforward. If S0 denotes the initial (known and unknown) stock and
j Qs defines cumulative extraction to period t then the level of remaining
stock at the end of period t is given by the identity St = S0 — X,. This identity
relationship will ensure equivalence between a stock based cost function and a
cumulative extraction specification for extraction costs (Epple and Londregan, 1993).
More precisely if the former is denoted by G'(Q,S) and the latter by G2(Q,X), then
the two cost functions are related by the identity G'(Q,S0 — X) = G2(Q,X). In terms
of the marginal effect on costs this equivalence between the two specifications
simply implies that the marginal effect of cumulative extraction is the minus of the
marginal stock effect.4 For the data-sets employed in this empirical analysis stock
data was unavailable and so the cumulative extraction approach is used which allows
(4.1) to be re-written as:
(4.2) GQ»' = Pt+, - P. + GQ' - r, (Pt - GQ') + Gx- - £t+1.
The discussion so far has focused on costs associated with physically removing stock
from the ground. Adjustment costs are also a typical feature of extraction activities.
Pesaran (1990) for example cites adjustment costs in oil production arising from the
need to maintain reservoir pressure. More generally, the presence ofadjustment costs
*
can be justified with the argument that any deviation of actual extraction from the
desired level (in the sense, say, of the optimal response to a change in demand
conditions) will reflect the economic costs which adjustment to extraction levels may
Harris (1993) for a detailed discussion of the geology and estimation of exhaustible resource stocks /
proven reserves.
4That is given St = S0 -Xt, G'X' = 3G/3X, =3G/3S, -3SJdXt = -SG/dS,.
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entail. The relatively high capital intensity of mining activities and the long
"gestation" periods for mining projects would be relevant factors in this respect.5 In
an optimising framework it would be possible to incorporate these adjustment costs
into the objectives of economic agents deciding upon an optimal extraction program.6
Frank and Babunovic (1984) follow this approach in an effort to model the slow
supply adjustments evident in mineral markets. They adopt a simple adjustment cost
formulation which they argue captures the lags in extraction adjustments associated
with the exploration and development process. This provides a simple way to
implement analyses such as Pindyck (1978). Results from their empirical analysis
reveal strong support for the presence of adjustment costs in the model of mineral
supply they consider. It would be appropriate therefore to allow for the possibility of
adjustment costs in the extraction model of (4.2). For ease of exposition it is assumed
that the marginal extraction cost expressions in (4.2) are inclusive of adjustment
costs which avoids any undue complication of the analysis. The empirical
specification of the Euler extraction equation thus employs an extraction cost
function of the form:
(4.3) G(Q„X,_„QJ = (S„ + (S,/2)Q. + 8,X,_, )Q, + AC,.
(4.3) is a simple linear-quadratic functional form which has been extensively
employed in the literature on resource supply (see Epple and Hansen, 1981; Bohi and
Toman, 1984; Epple, 1985 and Epple and Londregan, 1993).7 The dependence of
extraction costs on lagged extraction Qt_, reflects the presence of the, adjustment cost
5 Capital set-up costs for large-scale mining ventures can be considerable. For example in the case of
the Carajas mineral complex in the Brazilian Amazon they are estimated to be of the order of 5-6
billion U.S. dollars (Siebert, 1985). Another example is the Selebi-Phikwe nickel-copper mine in
Bostwana with estimated capital expenditure of 304 million U.S. dollars by 1983 (O'Faircheallaigh,
1985).
6The adjustment cost models in the literature on firm level investment provide an obvious parallel.
7Pesaran (1990) and Favero (1992) are again perhaps an exception. Their functional form allows for
a non-linearity not considered here which is that the rate of increase in marginal extraction costs is
increasing in reserves. With (4.3) this second order condition is constant. The general properties of
(4.3) are however, with appropriate restrictions on the cost parameters, the same as the functional
form employed by Pesaran and Favero.
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term ACt which like Frank and Babunovic is specified with the quadratic term
(5!/2)(Q1-Q,.,)!.
The marginal cost terms with respect to Qt using (4.3) are then specified as:
a°/0Q. =5» +<5' +5>)Q' +5-x.-. "8'(5- >0-
(4.4)
52G/5Q( =5, +53 >0.
With respect to cumulative extraction:
(4.5) 5G/5Xt_, = (- 8G/SSt_,) = 52Qt > 0.
The restrictions required of the marginal conditions are also indicated by the
expressions given in (4.4) and (4.5). These ensure that the cost function satisfies the
properties 3G/3Qt>0, d2G/SQ2>0, 8G/SSt_,<0 which were assumed in the
previous chapter. Increasing marginal extraction costs thus require 5, +53 > 0 and the
restriction -§2 < 0 is consistent with the anticipated effect that depletion (i.e.
declining stocks) has on costs. The parameter 53 captures the dependence of
marginal extraction costs on the speed of adjustment and is expected to be positive.
The constant 80 would also be expected to be positive to ensure non negative
marginal extraction costs at low levels of extraction. Epple (1985) however notes that
relaxing this restriction on 50 may be needed to improve the fit of estimated models.8
One final point concerning the structural cost parameters is that in standard linear-
>
quadratic specifications 8, measures economies of scale in current "extraction with
8j >0 consistent with decreasing returns to scale (i.e. increasing marginal cost) and
increasing returns to scale indicated by 8, <0. With (4.3) incorporating quadratic
adjustment costs in extraction increasing marginal cost with respect to current
8Most empirical studies which have adopted the linear-quadratic funtional form for costs have
obtained negative estimates for this parameter. An example is Epple (1985). See also Epple and
Londregan (1993) for an overview of some econometric findings.
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extraction is observed with 5, -f-53 > 0. Note also that 53>|5,| is a sufficient
condition for 8, +S3 > 9 to hold. Given that the primary hypothesis of interest in this
analysis concerns the effect of indebtedness on extraction estimation of the cost
parameters is perhaps of secondary importance. Thus in the econometric analysis
estimates of the structural parameters are inferred from reduced form parameters
rather than estimated directly.9 Using the cost function derivatives the null Euler
equation (4.2) can now be specified as the econometric model:
Q,,i =e-'(8, +26, -52)Q,-e-'SjQ,., +e-'p„,-e'P,
'ri[P| ~80 -(5, +5,)Q, -5,Xm +63Q,_i] + E,+),
where 9 = 81+83 -52 and st+1 is a random disturbance defined as - 9"'Q+1 which
satisfies the orthogonality condition E(st+1|Qt) = 9.
4.2.2 Constrained and unconstrainedforeign borrowing regimes.
The extraction model specified in (4.6) represents the null specification considered in
the econometric estimation and testing presented below. The term null is used here in
the sense that (4.6) corresponds to the extraction Euler equation which holds if
extraction is independent of the foreign borrowing constraint multiplier. It was noted
at the end of chapter 3 that a test of this independence or orthogonality property of
the null Euler equation provides one approach to the testing of the debt-resources
hypothesis. More specifically, such orthogonality is expected to be violated for
observations which correspond to periods of constrained borrowing.10 +
9The estimates are of course not unimportant since they will provide some indication of how well the
Euler equation model specification fits the mineral production data.
10Recall however one of the important results from the previous chapter which suggested it is the
"severity" of binding constraints rather than a strictly positive borrowing constraint multiplier per se
which distinguishes the unconstrained and constrained Euler equations. This was the interpretation
that was offered of the finding that the unconstrained Euler equation (3.26) holds even if pt >0, but
gw =P-
108
Testing these hypotheses requires a method for identifying periods in which
constraints are binding. The approach adopted in this empirical analysis is based on
defining a dummy variable indicator of binding borrowing constraints. More
precisely define:
Df = 1 if pt+1 >0 <o p., > 0,
= 0 if £t+1 =0 » jxt = 0.
The construction of this dummy variable follows the International Debt literature
which has identified debt arrears as an important indicator of constrained borrowing.
Debt arrears information, as noted by Hajivassiliou (1987), provides an observable
indication of the severity of lending constraints. The role of arrears in identifying
constrained lending can be demonstrated from simple manipulation of the definitions
for the change in debt and the balance of payments given in section 2 of chapter 3.
Recall (3.6) which defined the change in the stock of disbursed debt. This total stock
figure can be decomposed into two components: the stock of borrowing falling due
for repayment in the present or future and a stock of arrears which represents
deferment of principal due in previous periods and / or capitalisation of unpaid
interest." For convenience it was implicitly assumed that this latter stock was zero in
(3.6). Relaxing this assumption gives Dt=Dt+At, where Dt is the stock of
outstanding debt due for repayment and At denotes the stock of outstanding debt due
to accumulated principal and interest arrears. The change in the total outstanding
stock of debt stock as given in (3.6) was defined as net capital flows in a given
>
period: the balance between the supply of new debt Bt and principal" repayments Rt
due in that period. This balance as defined ignores any element of arrears in the
outstanding stock of disbursed debt since it only constitutes net new borrowing in
"The element of arrears and its role in the total debt stock was evident from the debt reschedulings of
the 1980s. To ease repayment pressures lenders would negotiate the deferment of debt repayments
usually by extending the repayment schedule. As a consequence despite a substantial fall in the
availability of new (voluntary) lending particularly by private lenders, for many developing countries
the total stock of debt outstanding increased.
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period t. Thus Dt -Dt_, = Bt -Rt. The total change in the stock of outstanding debt
will then equal this change plus any change in debt arrears. More explicitly, total
indebtedness evolves according to:
(4.7) D, - Dt_, = Dt - Dt_, + AA, = Bt -Rt + AAt.
The total demand for new borrowing given by Dt -Dt_, will be determined by the
current account defined earlier by (3.8). In an unconstrained borrowing regime
observed net lending is equal to the demand for new funds, i.e. Bt = Rt + Dt - Dt l
and further by implication Rt +Dt -Dt_, < B*. Given (4.7) it must also be true that
the change in arrears is zero. Hence when p., = 0, then AAt = 0. In the contrary case
of constrained lending the observed level of lending is determined by the credit
ceiling. In this regime the (voluntary) supply of new loans is less than the borrower's
desired demand. This implies: Rt + Dt - Dt_, - B* >0. This condition corresponds to
the borrower's excess demand for new loans in a constrained regime. Balance of
Payments equilibrium considerations require this excess demand to be matched by an
offsetting "excess supply" which in this context can be interpreted as debt arrears.
The accumulation of principal and interest arrears effectively represent an alternative
source of lending. A balance of payments equilibrium in a constrained regime will
therefore entail Rt + Dt - Dt_, - B* = AAt > 0. The dummy variable Df can then be
defined as:
= 1 ifAAt>0 « Pt>0,
= 0 ifAAt<0 » pt=0.
In practice a positive change in arrears may be observed in situations of relatively
severe liquidity constraints. Running down currency reserves would provide an
obvious alternative for financing any "excess demand" on the balance of payments.
Nunnenkamp (1990) has observed that low stocks of currency reserves are indeed a
characteristic of severely constrained borrowers indicating perhaps that the
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opportunity cost of foregone currency reserves is probably less than the cost of
accumulating arrears up to a certain point.12 One reason for this might be that arrears
carry more weight than currency reserves in the determination of a borrower's
creditworthiness. Hajivassiliou (1987) for example presents evidence showing past
arrears to be a significant determinant of levels of new loan supply (the relationship
is negative as expected), whilst levels of reserves are shown not to be significant.
However, as reserves tend towards zero borrowers who still face lending constraints
must inevitably turn to arrears to satisfy any excess demand.
One issue which arises from this discussion of arrears as an indicator of constrained
lending concerns the role of the current account. In a situation of excess demand why
are arrears accumulated instead of adjustments to the trade flow component of the
current account, (i.e. net trade in trade goods and resource exports in the context of
the model presented in chapter 3) ? One explanation, suggested by Hajivassiliou is
that deviations from current account targets may involve high costs (relative
presumably to the costs associated with arrears accumulation). These may be due to
domestic political concerns linked to the maintenance of living standards. A further
reason is that adjusting levels of export will typically involve lags, whereas arrears
by definition are the consequence of a non-action. Such lags are a feature of the
above model. In the model a constraint which binds in period t is hypothesised to
lead to an increase in extraction (i.e. an adjustment to a component of the flow in
tradeables) during the period t+1. Thus it is binding constraints in a, previous period
which, under certain circumstances, influence extraction of the resource. This is
important because it means any possible simultaneity problem is avoided: the
12This point may be when reserves are zero, but could also be at some low level of positive reserves.
In the limit, as reserves tend to zero it could be argued that the opportunity cost of foregone reserves
tends to infinity. It will then be rational for a borrower to accumulate arrears where the marginal costs
of doing so are less than the marginal costs of reducing reserves (marginal benefits of accumulating
arrears).
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accumulation of arrears in t is exogenous with respect to extraction in t+1 (though
such accumulation beyond t+1 may not be exogenous).
4.3 Data, econometric estimation and specification testing.
4.3.1 Data
The econometric model outlined in Section 4.2 is estimated with panel data on
mineral extraction in a sample of developing countries over the period 1968-89 (22
annual observations). The cross-sectional dimension of the panel is defined in terms
of country-mineral combinations.13 A total of 89 cross-sectional units are obtained
from 33 developing countries and the minerals Bauxite, Copper, Iron, Lead, Tin and
Zinc giving a total sample of 1958 observations. The structure of the data-set is
detailed in a data appendix to this chapter along with summary characteristics of
external indebtedness and export status as defined by World Bank classifications.
Data for the extraction and cumulative extraction variables are based on mine
production data available in the British Geological Survey's WorldMineral Statistics.
Given the small open economy assumption of the theoretical model, real prices for
the minerals included in the sample are based on world prices (in U.S. dollars)
published in International Financial Statistics. It can be noted that defining the price
variable in terms of foreign currency (i.e. U.S. dollars) would imply the assumption
%
that producer costs are similarly denominated in US dollars (see Chang, 1987). For
capital intensive activities such as mining reliant on imported technology this
I3Chang (1987) also adopts the approach of considering country-mineral combinations, but does not
pool over these combinations as considered in this empirical analysis. An alternative to defining the
panel in terms of country-mineral combinations would be to consider individually sub-panels defined
by mineral type (or indeed country). However, as Table IV. 10 in the data appendix indicates, either of
these approaches would imply N (the cross-sectional dimension of the panel) is small. The estimation
methods employed in the analysis are based on large N and fixed time dimension asymptotics which
means pooling across countries and minerals has the advantage of consistent econometric estimation.
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assumption can be considered a reasonable approximation. In addition, the price
variable is defined in real terms with traded goods treated as the numeraire. The
empirical version of the model defines real price as nominal price relative to an index
of export unit values for industrial (OECD) countries provided again in International
Financial Statistics. This variable acts as a general price deflator in the empirical
model and is treated as a proxy for the world price of traded (manufactured) goods.14
The World Bank's World Debt Tables provide the data for the interest rate variable
and the construction of the dummy variable indicator of foreign borrowing
constraints. The data appendix at the end of this chapter provides further details of
the variable definitions and sources.
4.3.2 Econometric estimation and specification tests.
a) Econometric methodsfor dynamic panels.
In the following discussion of the econometric methods employed in estimation j is
used to notate countries, m minerals and t the time period. Guided by (4.6) the basic
empirical specification to be estimated can be written as:
where jm denotes the combination of country j and mineral m.15 The errors in the
model (4.8) are assumed to satisfy E(Sjm t) = 0, E(Sjm tSjm s) = 0 for t * s and E(sh t£jm s)
= 0 for h A jm and t =£ s. In addition orthogonality conditions of the form:
14Pesaran (1990) and Favero (1992) adopt the same price deflator to obtain their real dollar price (of
oil).
15Note also that the dependent variable in the empirical model is now written in terms of period t
rather than t+1 as in the theoretical model. All explanatory variables are correspondingly "lagged" one
period. This is done merely to retain consistency with standard notation.
Qjmt=RD +RO 4-RP + R P +R r
(4.8)
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(4.9) E(Qjmssjmt) = E(wjmisjmt) = E(fjmsjmt) = 0, (s<t)
where wjm>t denotes (Pm,t5Pm,t-1 ^j>t-, ,rjt..Pm>t-1 ^j>t-1Qjm,t-1 !Xjmt.2,rjt., Qjm,t_2)', are
assumed. The reduced form parameters P = (P0, P,,...,P8)' are defined by:
Po=0-|(51+25,-5I),P1=-8-|51,PI=e-',p, = -8-',p,=e-18o,
P, =-8-,,P,= 9-'(8, +S3),P7 =0"'Sj,P3 =-9"'8j.
Note therefore that the restrictions p, = P7, P2 = - P3, P2 = - P4 and P3 = P4 are implied
in (4.8). In addition, the structural cost parameters 5 = (80, 51; 52, 53)' can be
identified from the reduced form parameters as follows: S0 = P4/p2, 5[ = P6/p2 - P8/p2,
§2 = P7/p2 and 83 = P8/p2.16With respect to the anticipated signs of the structural cost
parameters it was noted in section 4.2 that 8, + S3 > 0 and S2 > 0 would be consistent
with marginal extraction costs increasing in extraction and cumulative extraction. For
the reduced form parameters it is therefore expected that 0 < P25-P3»~P5»P6» P7 < 1 and
If S2 is small relative to 8, + S3 then note that P0 > 1 is not ruled out.17
Two further observations may be made about the empirical model. The first point
concerns the error term in (4.8). The error in the econometric model recall is a
composite random disturbance which arises from amongst other things uncertainty
about extraction costs and prices. In a panel model these shocks need not be
independently distributed over j, m or t. This will be particularly true of the price
shocks since the assumption that prices are determined on the demand side will
>
imply that producers of mineral m experience the same shock. Moreover, historically
commodity prices have tended to move together; note for example the respective
l6These structural cost function parameters can be uniquely identified only if the reduced form
restrictions noted previously cannot be rejected.
17One advantage of the panel model is that the stationarity assumption |(30| < 1 is not required where
the time dimension of the panel is fixed. This arises because the properties of panel estimators for
models such as (4.10) are based on semi-asymptotics, i.e. only the cross-sectional dimension of the
panel is allowed to tend to infinity.
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commodity price boom and slump of the mid 1970s and early 1980s, suggesting
correlation of price shocks across minerals. To account for these potential
correlations the error term in (4.8) can be more fully specified in terms of the error
components:
(4-10) sjm-t =(pm+^t+cojmt,
where \ is an aggregate time shock and cpm is a mineral specific component in the
error which may account for shocks to extraction costs or indeed prices which are
specific torn.18 The aggregate time component to the error term shock can be thought
of as general commodity price shocks which affect all j and m.
The second observation with respect to (4.8) concerns the term fjm. This denotes a
fixed cross-sectional unit effect which has been introduced to control for
heterogeneity in the marginal cost intercept S0. (see Eq. (4.4)) One rationale for this
can be seen by recalling from section 4.2 the equivalence between stock and
cumulative extraction cost functions. To illustrate, if the depletion effect on costs is
specified in terms of stocks rather than cumulative extraction then (4.3) (ignoring
adjustment costs for the purposes of the illustration) could be written as:
(4.11) riQjnu'Sjm.,-,) = (s, + (8,/2)q,„ -8:sjnl l_,)q,„.
The constraint on resource use implies SjmjM = Sjm 0 - Xjmt_, where Sjm 0 denotes the
initial resource stock. The correspnding expression for marginal extraction cost is
then given by:
(4.12) <9G/5Qjm t = 50 - 52Sjm 0 + 5jQjm t + 52 Xjm t_[.
18An example of the latter would be the unanticipated fall in tin prices in 1985 which arose from the
collapse of the International Tin Council.
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In the context of a panel model of resource supply defining - 52Sjm 0 as the fixed
effect fjm provides a method which controls for unobserved characteristics which give
rise to heterogeneity in marginal extraction costs across cross-sectional units. One
obvious characteristic is the initial level (and possibly quality) of the resource
stock.19 A further point is that assuming the marginal cost intercepts equal 50 - 8
2Sjm 0, it is easily seen that they are not guaranteed to be positive if (as expected) 52 >
0. It was noted above that in much of the empirical literature which has employed
cumulative extraction cost specifications negative estimates are often obtained for the
marginal cost intercepts. However the view that this is contrary to expectation (e.g.
see Epple, 1985) overlooks the point that the intercept in a reduced form supply
equation does not uniquely identify the parameter 50. In particular the use of
cumulative extraction rather than remaining stocks to measure depletion must imply
the omission of a relevant variable; namely initial stocks. Since this variable is fixed
its effect will be proxied by the intercept in a regression model.
The estimation of dynamic panel models such as (4.8) has been the subject of a
recent and expanding econometric literature. One well established finding in this
literature is the (semi-) inconsistency of the Within (or Least Squares Dummy
Variables) estimator. That is for an econometric model of the form:
(4.13) yit =f+ayit.,+x'itP + oit i=l,...,n; t=l,....T,
where u is an i.i.d error with constant variance then estimates of a and the vector P
are obtained from OLS estimation of (4.13) expressed as deviations from time means
which "sweeps" out the fixed effect p. That is,
(4.14) y.,-y. = a(yit_, -yi,.1) + (xit -Xj) P + (uit -0,).
19This initial level of stock is also clearly correlated with explanatory variables such as extraction and
cumulative extraction levels which is a further reason to view the individual heterogeneity as being a
fixed rather than random characteristic.
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Assuming T to be fixed (as with most panels) this OLS estimator is inconsistent
since it can be shown that (see Nickell, 1981; Hsaio, 1986; Sevestre and Trognon,
1992):
feNr'ZS(yit-i -yi,-.)(ui. -Ui.J
(4"15) cr2 T-l-Tcx+aT .
= =£ 0
T2 (l-a)2 '
given the asymptotic correlation between the transformed lagged endogenous
variable and disturbance term.20
Consistent estimation of the parameters of interest in dynamic panel models has
therefore relied on alternatives to the within transformation. The commonest
approach is to first difference the econometric model. Thus estimation of P = (f30,....,
P8)' in (4.8) is obtained from the model:
AQjm,t = P0AQjm,,-i +P1AQjmt_2 +P2APmt +P3APnit_1
(4-16) +P4AVl + P5A(VlPm t_,) + P6A(r )
+P7A(r.t.,Xjm,.2) + P8A(rjt_,Qjmt_2) + Asjint.
where Asjm t = (cOjm t - C0jm t.,) + (A.t - A,t_t). For notational purposes it is more succinct
hereafter to define i = jm and recalling the vector Wjmt from (4.9), the transformed
model can be written as:
(4.17) AQjt =p0AQit_,+p,AQit_2+Aw'itp + Asit, i=l,.,N; t^l,.,T
where p = (p2,p3,p4,p5,p6,p7,p8) .21
20Note in addition if T—><x then (4.15) does tend to zero.
2INote therefore that (4.17) is written without the reduced form parameter restrictions being imposed.
In the empirical analysis below this unrestricted specification is estimated initially with the restrictions
then being tested. The results below suggest these restrictions cannot be rejected.
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Estimation of (4.17) by OLS would lead to inconsistent estimates given correlation
between AQit., and Asjt. An instrumental variables approach to estimation is therefore
appropriate. One possibility as suggested in Anderson and Hsaio (1982) is to
instrument AQiM with either AQit_2 or Qit_2. Sevestre and Trognon (1992) note
however that it should be possible to obtain more efficient instrumental variable
estimators than that proposed by Anderson and Hsiao.22Asymptotically efficient IV
estimators of the type analysed by Hansen (1982) within a Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM) framework have been extended to dynamic panel models by, for
example, Holtz-Eakin et. al. (1988), Keane and Runkle (1990) and Arellano and
Bond (1991).
The orthogonality properties of the error term imply that with first differencing a
valid set of instruments for identifying the parameters in (4.17) contains values of Qit
and w'it lagged two or more time periods. Thus following Arellano and Bond (1991)
the valid instrument set for each i can be denoted by:
(4.18) Z; =diag(Qil,....,Qil;w;i,....,w'J (fors<T-l),
which defines as a (T-2) x r block diagonal matrix with the sth block given by
(QiI,...,Qis;w'il,....w'is). The orthogonality properties of the error in (4.8) can then be
expressed in terms of a r x 1 vector of moment restrictions defined by E(zjsi) = 0
where = (si3 — si2, ,siX-eiT_,) .23 However, a GMM estimator which exploits
sample equivalents of these moment restriction, i.e. N^'^^ZjSy, will not give
consistent parameter estimates given the presence of a time-specific component in
the first differenced error, As noted by Chamberlain (1984), these sample
orthogonality conditions will only to converge to zero as T —» co with the presence of
22The Anderson and Hsiao estimator, for example, takes no account of the MA(1) structure of the first
differenced error term.
23This vector would be equivalent to the population orthogonality conditions defined in (3.32) of
chapter 3.
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aggregate shocks. One option as employed in Keane and Runkle (1990) is to use a
long panel to ensure the GMM estimator has the desired properties .In the context of
large N fixed T panels however it is evident that the typical time dimension will be
insufficient to guarantee this consistency. An alternative which is more widely
employed in practice therefore is to use time dummy variables as a way of
controlling for aggregate shocks in the model and thus eliminate its effect from the
error term (e.g. Hotz, Kydland and Sedlacek, 1988 and Whited, 1992). Thus
following this latter approach the model in (4.17) stacked over each i now becomes
in matrix form:
(4.19) Y = W(3 + D,k + V,
where:
Y = (Yj', ,Yn')' Yj = (AQi3, ,AQiX)'
w = (W,\ ,WN')' Wj = (AQ'j^AQ'^Aw))'
V = (Vr, ,VN')' Vj = (Acoi3, ,Acoix)'
Dx = (Iijt-2v—Jn,t-2)' 11tx-2 a (T-2) x (T-2) identity matrix
(3 = (P0, .Ps)'
x ~ (7-3-7.2, ,a,x-a,x_1)
and the orthogonality conditions are now expressed as:
?,s?n"ir.,zivi=fcn-'z'v = 0,
where Z is the N(T-2) x r instrument matrix (Z'1,....Z'N)' with Z^now defined as
Z, = diag(QiI,....,Qil;wil,....,wis;l).
The GMM estimator for y = (P, X)' can then be obtained by minimising the criterion:
(4.20) (n-'z' v)'an(n-'z' v)=(n-1y ,1, v;z, )an (n-1y", z;v),
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which in the linear case implies the estimator:
Vgmm =(xzanzx)~'(xzanzy)
(4.21) „ , , ..
=(ill, kz,k(ST., z;x,))" ((si x;z, )an (si z; y, )),
where X = (W Dj).
The efficiency of the GMM estimator (4.21) depends on the choice of AN. A
necessary condition for efficiency (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993; Theorem
17.3) is that as N—>co the matrix AN should tend to a matrix proportional to O*1 which
denotes the inverse of the average covariance matrix of the empirical moments Z( V,,
i.e. <D = N"1^^iE(zjViViZi). Using AN = O*1 the asymptotic variance-covariance
matrix of (4.21) can thus be denoted by (see for example Arellano and Bond, 1991):
(4.22) a var(y GMM) = N -(x ZO"'Z x)"'.
The computation of (4.21) and (4.22) thus requires a consistent estimator for ®
.Under the assumptions of conditional homoscedasticity and serial independence of
the errors a suitable choice for Ajq would be (n-1^^ ZjZj ,24 The latter
assumption of serial independence would not be appropriate in the present context,
however, since the first differenced error implies within group errors are MA(1). If
conditional homoscedasticity can still be retained then a consistent estimate of
E(zi'ViVi'zi) may be obtained using zj'hjzj where hj is a (T-2) square matrix with
twos on its main diagonal elements and minus ones on the first Sub-diagonals.25
When, however, the true structure of the error variances is unknown it may be more
appropriate to relax conditional homoscedasticity and allow for conditional
heteroskedasticity over both i and t dimensions. With the Euler equation errors in
24This would give the two-stage least squares or ordinary IV estimator.
25Note that with the first difference error var(coiI-toit_])=2CT^and E(((oit-coit_l)(coit_5-(Bit.5.]))=-a^ for s=l
and zero for s > 1.
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chapter 3 it was clear that these composite errors were heteroscedastic given the
interaction between variables and random forcast errors. A consistent estimator for O
can then be obtained from (see Holtz-Eakin et. al., 1988 and Arellano and Bond,
1991):26
(4.23) ®„=N-X,v,,v„(Z.Z,.),
where vit (t = r, s) is an initial consistent estimate of element t in V) and Zit denotes
row t of Zj.27
b) Specification Tests.
The discussion so far has concentrated on the estimation of the empirical
specification of the Euler equation model. As outlined at the end of chapter 3 one
approach to the testing of the debt-resources hypothesis is to test the validity of the
over identifying restrictions exploited in this GMM estimation, i.e. the sample
moment restrictions NT 2-ij=|ZiVi ■ It is anticipated under the maintained hypothesis,
furthermore, that these restrictions are valid for unconstrained observations, but
rejected for those which are classed as constrained.
Two specification tests can be employed to test the validity of these over-identifying
restrictions. The first is the standard test for mis-specification or validity of the
instrument set employed in estimation; see for example Sargan (4958).28 Hansen
%
(1982) extends this test to GMM estimators and shows that N times the minimised
26This estimator is analogus to the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator due to White
(1980). It is appropriate where the error terms for different cross-sectional units are uncorrelated.
Errors within units may however be correlated, e.g. as with the first differenced error.
27The initial estimates of vit can be computed using an initial consistent estimate of y which itself can
be obtained using 6 = N *Zli,Z.H.Z..
28Validity of the instrument set here refers to the orthogonality property of the instruments which is
required for consistent IV estimation. This property is simply the moment restrictions EfZ'W) = 0
referred to above.
121
value of the criterion (4.20) is asymptotically distributed as a Chi square variable
with r - k degrees of freedom where r is the number of instruments (orthogonality
conditions) and k the number of parameters estimated. This test, referred hereafter to
as the J-Statistic, is of particular relevance to the testing of Euler equation
specifications. The moment restrictions used to construct the GMM estimator are
implied by the underlying theoretical model (recall for example the discussion in
section 3.5.2 of chapter 3). The J-Statistic can therefore be interpreted as a test of the
Euler equation specification.
This test is however only a general specification test. It could be argued that the main
feature of the debt-resources hypothesis is that it implies a test of whether extraction
is orthogonal to a particular set of variables. More specifically, ifA denotes variables
correlated with the presence of constrained borrowing the null Euler equation for
extraction implies the additional moment restrictions E(A'iVi)=0. If valid, these
restrictions would suggest extraction is indeed orthogonal to these variables. Thus it
is also of interest to test the validity of moment restrictions which can a priori be
considered "suspect" or "contaminated".
Following Newey (1985), suppose the set of instruments used in estimation, Zi5 can
be partitioned into (Zu, Zi2) which implies a corresponding partition of the vector of
moments Z'jVj into (Z^Vj, Z'^Vj)'. If only the instruments Zi2 are considered to be
"contaminated", then the mis-specification may be parameterised as the expectation
ofZ'i2Vi with the restrictions E(Z'ilVi) = 0 satisfied under the mis-specification. Thus
the alternative hypothesis is stated as:
(4.24) e(z;1vi) = o, e(z;2v)*o.
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Clearly in the context of the debt-resources hypothesis the vector of suspect moments
Z'i2Vi can be interpreted as the vector A'jVj. Thus in terms of the definitions above:
Za =diag(Qil, ,Qis;wn, ,W;s;l),
zi =(ZiI;diag(Ail, ,Ais)),
and under the alternative the sample moments N-1^^]AiVi are considered
"suspect", i.e. under the alternative hypothesis A; covaries with the error from the
null specification of the Euler equation model.
In related econometric analyses, e.g. Zeldes (1989) and Whited (1992), the testing of
equivalent moment restrictions, with for example the J statistic, has exploited
differences between unconstrained and constrained sub-samples which are predicted
by theoretical Euler equations. For example, in the context of Zeldes' investigation of
the permanent income / life cycle model (with rational expectations) of household
consumption, the standard Euler equation of consumption which equates marginal
utility from current consumption with the present value of future marginal utility is
predicted to hold only for households who do not face liquidity constraints.29 The
equivalent Euler equation for constrained households will contain an additional
variable which is the lagrange multiplier on the liquidity constraint. To the extent that
this variable covaries with current household income, Zeldes argues that disposable
income levels should be a determinant of consumption in constrained households.
Thus in Zeldes' analysis defining A in terms of observations on household income
should imply rejection of the restrictions E(A'e)=0 for constrained households, but
not unconstrained households. Whited (1992) employs similar reasoning in the
context of firm level investment by arguing that the lagrange multiplier from a
29That is households who do not face binding borrowing constraints. In Zeldes model this constraint
is defined is terms of a non-negativity constraint on household assets.
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constraint on a firm's debt accumulation will covary with indicators of financial
"distress", e.g. the ratio of debt service to cash flow.
This approach is repeated in the present analysis. More specifically, the Euler
equation model is estimated using unconstrained and constrained sub-samples of
data. For the unconstrained group it is anticipated that the "suspect" moment
restrictions will not be rejected since the theoretical model indicates no role for the
borrowing constraint multiplier in the Euler equation. The converse may be expected
for the constrained group. The tests statistics outlined in Newey (1985) for testing
hypotheses such as (4.24) are employed in the analysis, with the matrix of suspect
instruments A specified in a number ofways (see section 4.4 below for details).30
So far testing of the debt-resources hypothesis has been discussed in terms of
"suspect" moment restrictions which involve instruments correlated with constrained
borrowing. This testing also exploits information, in this case on debt arrears, to
examine these restrictions with samples of unconstrained and constrained
observations. An alternative approach to the testing of similar hypotheses is provided
by Bond and Meghir (1994) in an investigation of the effect of financial constraints
on investment decisions with a panel ofU.K. companies. The approach used by Bond
and Meghir is to interact the explanatory variables suggested by a basic (i.e.
unconstrained) Euler equation for optimal investment with a dummy indicator of
financial constraints which is defined in terms of whether firms issue shares and pay
dividends. For firms where the former is zero and the latter positive the inference is
that a firm has sufficient internal finance to fund investment plans and is therefore
unconstrained. The tests conducted by Bond and Meghir are then based on the
30These tests simply involve computing the usual chi-square test statistic from the subset of
"contaminated" sample moment restrictions, i.e. N~' Z,Zi2V , and the associated variance-covariance
matrix, see Newey (1985) for details.
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estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables interacted with the dummy
indicator which measure differences between unconstrained and constrained firms.
Thus the estimated parameters are expected to reveal systematic differences between
unconstrained and constrained groups of firms. Another way of investigating such
systematic differences between groups of observations with respect to the estimated
parameters is to directly test for parameter constancy / stability. Such tests have been
developed in the GMM context by Hoffman and Pagan (1989) and Ghysels and Hall
(1990). These tests are applied to the testing of the debt-resources hypothesis in the
following manner.
If there are no systematic differences between the unconstrained and constrained sub-
samples it would be reasonable to hypothesise that the parameter estimates from one
of the sub-samples can be used to predict over the other sub-sample. The absence of
any such differences suggesting that the error terms in each sub-sample are drawn
from the same underlying distribution. To illustrate more formally, assume the
unconstrained sub-sample of size N) is used to compute predictions for extraction in
the constrained sub-sample of size N2. It is then possible to test for parameter
stability by examining the average prediction error over the constrained sub-sample.
In the GMM context this extends to examining the expectation of a vector of
predicted moment functions. More precisely, let the average prediction error be
denoted by N~' V where V is the constrained sample prediction error evaluated
at estimates obtained from the unconstrained sample. For a GMM test these
prediction errors are generalised to the predicted sample moments N'1^. ZlV and
to test the null hypothesis that they equal zero. Technical details on the econometrics
of the test statistic are reserved for an appendix to this chapter.
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Some general tests of model adequacy are also reported with the empirical results
presented in Section 4.4. The first is a test of second order serial correlation in the
estimated residuals. The consistency of the GMM estimators outlined above depends
crucially on the assumption of serial independence in the levels equation error term.
Equivalently for the first differenced model consistency hinges on the assumption
E(vitvjt_2)=0, since with the first difference of serially uncorrelated errors E(vitvit.,)
need not be zero. Section 4.4 reports the test statistic presented in Arellano and Bond
(1991) which is asymptotically distributed 5V(0,1) under the null of serial
independence. Tests of appropriate functional form are also reported, with the
statistics computed as a GMM equivalent of the conventional RESET test (see Pagan
and Vella, 1989). As with the tests for parameter stability noted earlier, technical
details on these specification tests are left to the chapter appendix. Finally a measure
of goodness of fit appropriate in the context of IV estimation is also reported, see
Pesaran (1990) for details.
4.4 Empirical results.
The empirical results presented below were obtained with two modifications to the
estimators discussed in 4.3. The first modification concerns the actual set of
instruments used in Zj or equivalently, the actual moment restrictions exploited to
construct the GMM estimators. The optimal instrument set as defined in (4.18) is
impractical in practice even for panels with only a reasonably sized-time dimension.
*
For this reason all available moment restrictions are not exploited in estimation, but
it could be argued, as in Bond and Meghir (1994), that remote lags are unlikely to be
useful instruments.
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The second modification concerns the estimator used to construct O which is
essential for the GMM estimator (4.21) and its covariance matrix (4.22). In initial
investigations the use of the estimator (4.23) did not prove very successful in the
sense that the matrix O was not guaranteed to be semi-positive definite.31 A further
issue with the choice of (4.23) to estimate ® is that it does not allow for the
possibility that the moments Z'jVj are unlikely to be independent of the moments Z) _t
Vj for x = 1 given V; is a vector of first differenced errors.32 This would suggest in
the present framework an estimator for ® of the form:
(4.26) ©=N-'y*,©, =N
or equivalently for t = 0, 1:
(4.27) © = N-122, + (®u + )) •
The estimators (4.26) and (4.27) are analagous to the covariance matrix estimators
outlined by Newey and West (1987a) and employed in the panel studies of Keane
and Runkle (1990) and Young (1992). It is well established, however, that the
estimator (4.27) which corresponds to the truncated kernel estimator is not
guaranteed to be positive definite (see Newey and West, 1987a). To avoid this
possibility is it standard to impose a weighting structure on (4.27) to ensure the
estimator is positive definite. This gives:
3'This was found with a variety of instrument sets. As a check on the computations which were
obtained using Shazam 7.0, the DPD program written by Arellano and Bond was also used to estimate
the extraction Euler equation. In some cases estimates could not be computed because the <£> matrix
was not positive definite. In others the reported standard errors were incredibly small indicating
possible singularity problems Of note is the finding by Arellano and Bond (1991) of downward bias
in their estimated GMM standard errors. They suggest as a result alternative estimators of avar (y)
which really implies different estimators for ®. One possibility which was investigated was to restrict
to zero elements not on the main diagonal and the first sub-diagonal of the matrix ViV'i which reflects
the MA(1) structure. The resulting matrix for ® remained non positive definite.
32Note that given earlier assumptions about the error terms it can be assumed that Z'jVj are
independent of Z'hVh and Z\ _TVh _t for i h.
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(4.28) © = N- (K„©i0 + k, (©„ + ®„)),
where kt denotes a series ofweights such that kt = 1 for t = 0 and less than 1 for |xj >
0. The reported results use the Parzen kernel for kt. In addition the eigenvalues for
the estimators of O computed using (4.28) were used as a test of positive
definiteness. In all cases these were positive as required.33
4.4.1 Estimation and testing of the extraction Euler equation with unconstrained and
constrained sub-samples.
Tables IV. 1 to IV.3 report the estimation results obtained from splitting the data-set
into the unconstrained and constrained sub-samples. The interest here, recall, is to
observe whether the extraction Euler equation is rejected for constrained
observations, but not for those classed as unconstrained.
The estimations in Table IV. 1 do not provide a direct test of this hypothesis since
OLS and LSDV estimates are reported here. The earlier discussion in section 4.3.2
noted the inconsistency of these estimation methods and the results are detailed
primarily for the purposes of comparision with the GMM estimates outlined in
Tables IV.2 to IV.3. A number of observations on Table IV. 1 are however worthy of
note.
33Andrews (1991) provides discussion of different kernel estimators. He recommends the use of a
quadratic spectral kernel given its asymptotic optimality. However it is complicated and time-
consuming to compute. Easier computationally are the Parzen and Bartlett kernels. The Monte Carlo
evidence in Andrews suggests the Parzen weights may be preferable to the Bartlett kernel. This
evidence though is in the context of time series models.
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Table IV.l
Estimation ofthe Extraction Euler Equation with Unconstrained and Constrained
Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: OLS OLS LSDV LSDV
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Po 1.0732 0.9684 1.0180 0.8699
p,
(0.0337) (0.0415) (0.0351) (0.0420)
-0.0943 0.1091 -0.0794 0.0990
(0.0388) (0.0466) (0.0389) (0.0433)
P2 0.0004 0.0024 0.0005 0.0019
P3
(0.0006) (0.0120) (0.0007) (0.0012)
-0.0005 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0012
P4
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0008) ((0.0013)
-0.6143 2.2171 0.0628 -0.2192
(1.921) (3.331) (3.105) (4.779)
Ps 0.0021 0.0043 0.0052 0.0006
(0.0034) (0.0061) (0.0034) (0.0060)
PS 1.2116 1.5136 2.4875 1.2051
P7
(0.3534) (0.5574) (0.3908) (0.5134)
0.2021 -0.3090 0.2234 -0.3169
(0.0780) (0.0646) (0.0800) (0.0651)
P8 -1.9850 -0.2398 -3.1867 -0.0898
(0.4077) (0.6805) (0.4396) (0.6267)
Sample Period 1972-89 1972-89 1972-89 1972-89
No. ofObservations 975 627 975 627
R2 0.895 0.945 0.808 0.837
Notes: Standard errors ofestimates in parentheses.
First, the OLS estimates of P0 for each sub-sample when compared with the GMM
(and LSDV) results are suggestive of the upward bias usually associated with the
presence of fixed effects. Compared to the GMM results in Table IV.2 to IV.3, this
upward bias in the OLS estimates is marked. Relative to the LSDV estimates in
Table IV.l the bias is less marked which is surprising since it is well established that
LDSV estimates of the first order autoregressive coefficient are themselves biased
downwards, see Nickell (1981), Hsaio (1986).34 Indeed, the LSDV estimates are
substantially greater than those obtained by GMM. This finding replicates similar
34Though the extent of the bias is smaller as T increases. The panel used in this analysis has a
relatively large T dimension.
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results in Arellano and Bond (1991) obtained from the estimation of dynamic
employment equations and as suggested there, may be explained by the possible
endogeneity of included variables assumed to be strictly exogenous (in this case
current prices).
A second point to note about the results in Table IV. 1 concerns the degree to which
the Euler equation model explains variation in the dependent variable. The R2
measure suggests between 81-90 % is explained in the unconstrained sub-sample,
with a corresponding 84-95 % for the constrained sub-sample. Although it is not
possible to lay much stress on results obtained by these estimation methods, it might
have been anticipated that the explanatory power of the Euler equation model would
be lower for the constrained sub-sample given the omission of variables correlated
with the borrowing constraint multiplier. A further point of note is with respect to the
estimates for P4 which corresponds to the coefficient on the interest rate variable.
This variable of any in the Euler equation model might possibly pick up the influence
of indebtedness on extraction. Notably of all the parameter estimates P4 is the most
poorly determined and its sign changes with estimation method and sub-sample. This
evidence would cast doubt on any notion that interest rates on foreign debt should be
regarded as a determinant of extraction, though see following discussion of the GMM
results.
The GMM results for each sub-sample are detailed in Tables IV.2 and IV.3. Four
distinct specifications of the instrument set were employed in obtaining these
estimates; respectively A, B, C and D. The basic instrument set is defined by A. Here
the instrument matrix Zj is given by:
(4.29) Z. =fdiag(Qit_4,Qit.3,Qlt.2,rit_2Qit_2,l):(w;3 w'iTJ t=5, ,T.
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In addition to the instruments specified by (4.29), a set ofmineral dummies variables
are included to control for any potential mineral specific effects.
The three remaining specifications of the instruments provide alternative ways of
specifying the sub-set of instruments which define Af. Testing the moment
restrictions associated with this subset of instruments, recall the discussion in 4.3.2,
is of particular interest. These additional instruments are included in Zf as single
column vectors implying that not all moment restrictions available under the null
hypothesis of exogeneity are exploited.35
The additional instruments in sets B, C and D are chosen on the basis of variables
which are considered to correlate with terms included in the Euler equation for
extraction obtained with the binding constraint on foreign borrowing. Recalling the
model from chapter 3 and eq. (3.27), these are the lagrange multiplier on the
borrowing constraint and the marginal utility of (traded) consumption. Instrument set
B is restricted to incorporating variables which proxy the role of the marginal utility
of consumption in (3.27). The additional instruments are defined by the t-2 values of
the aggregate consumption / GDP ratio (CGDP) and its interaction with other Euler
equation variables, i.e. price, extraction and cumulative extraction. One motivation
for focusing solely on these consumption instruments is to test whether consumption
and extraction are independent for constrained observations. By examining the over-
*
identifying restrictions imposed on these extra instruments, it can be established
whether the prediction that the separation theorem is violated for such borrowers is
valid.
35This is for computational reasons since the relatively large T dimension of the data-set means the
variance-covariance matrices obtained from the optimal instrument sets are particularly difficult to
invert within Shazam 7.0.
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Instrument sets C and D extend the analysis conducted with instrument set B by
including variables which may correlate with the credit ceiling multiplier. Two
approaches are adopted as a check for robusteness. The first, which defines the
additional instruments in C, follows the related analysis in Whited (1992) with the
implicit assumption that the constraint multiplier can be modelled as a convex
function of the debt to export ratio (DTX) and the debt interest to export ratio (DIX).
These variables are traditionally employed as indicators of a debtor's ability to
borrow and service debt obligations respectively. The instrument set is accordingly
extended to include these variables and their squared terms.
Instrument set D provide an alternative specification of the variables which are
thought to correlate with the credit ceiling multiplier. In this case a vector of
macroeconomic variables and creditworthiness indicators are employed and are
chosen on the basis of evidence presented from previous econometric analyses of the
debt repayment problems of developing country borrowers and their ability to borrow
on international capital markets, see for example McFadden et. al. (1985),
Hajivassiliou (1987) and Lensink and van Bergeijk (1991). For reasons of
parismony, the vector of chosen variables is restricted those which have received
some statistical support in these previous analyses. That is: real GDP growth
(RGDPG), real GDP per capita (RGDPC), the investment / GDP ratio (IGDP), the
debt to income ratio (DTY), the debt service to export ratio (DSX), the reserves to
import ratio (RESM), a cumulative indicator of IMF history (IMF) qnd a cumulative
indicator of debt reschedulings (RESCH).
The results of the GMM estimation and testing are presented in Tables IV.2 to IV.3.
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Table IV.2
GMMEstimation and Testing ofthe Extraction Euler Equation
with Unconstrained and Constrained Sub-Samples: I
Estimation Method: GMM-A GMM-A GMM-B GMM-B
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Po 0.4393 0.3348 0.4385 0.1058
P.
(0.0898) (0.0828) (0.0829) (0.1238)
0.0351 0.1349 -0.0130 -0.0428
P2
(0.0566) (0.0737) (0.0829) (0.0454)
0.0035 0.0059 0.0034 0.0036
P3
(0.0019) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0048)
-0.0036 -0.0039 -0.0009 -0.0095
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0048) ((0.0060)
P< 3.3590 -11.670 3.1245 19.468
Ps
(6.1003) (8.5937) (13.947) (23.723)
-0.0019 -0.0039 0.0096 -0.0381
(0.0070) (0.0091) (0.0152) (0.0250)
Pa 1.6667 0.1130 1.3004 -0.8306
(0.6469) (0.9275) (0.9466) (1.6342)
P7 0.0711 -0.0643 0.0939 -0.1783
(0.1202) (0.1406) (0.1755) (0.2303)
Ps -2.6253 0.3296 -2.2957 1.7124
(0.6471) (1.2269) (1.0102) (0.7883)
Specification Tests:
J-Statistic: x2(df) 15.07 (65) 21.77 (65) 17.69 (70) 23.33 (70)
Newey Test: x2(df) 0.124 (5) 0.262 (5)
Serial Correlation -1.468 -1.365 -1.467 0.084
(P=0.142) (P=0.172) (P=0.142) (P=0.932)
Functional Form 2.666 1.338 2.033 0.693
(P=0.264) (P=0.512) (P=0.362) (P=0.707)
P 0.810 0.684 0.427 0.454
Sample Period 1973-89 1973-89 1973-89 1973-89
No. ofObservations 918 595 918 595
Notes: Cols (ii) and (iii) give GMM estimates of the first differenced equation using instrument set A
with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (MA(1)) consistent asymptotic standard errors in
parentheses. Cols (iv) and (v) report results for instrument set B. See main text and chapter appendix
for details on reported specification tests, p is a IV goodness offit measure and Is computed as the
minimised value of the GMM criterion divided by the sum ofsquared residuals (see Pesaran, 1990)
and then multipliedfor reporting purposes by N, the number ofcross-sectional units. Values closer to
zero are interpreted as higher goodness offit.
Concentrating initially on the results obtained with the basic instrument set (A), it is
noteworthy that for the unconstrained sub-sample all the estimates are correctly
signed. This contrasts both the constrained sub-sample estimates with GMM-A and
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the OLS and LSDV results in Table IV. 1. Of these correctly signed parameters the
estimates of P0, P2, P6, P8 are statistically significant at less than the 5 % level which
suggests a dominate role for lagged extraction and its interaction with the interest rate
in explaining current levels of extraction. The interest rate in of itself appears to have
no role, whilst the anticipated stock depletion effect is not supported since P7 is not
statistically different from zero. With regard to the specification tests, the over-
identifying restrictions imposed in estimating the model are overwhelmingly not
rejected by the chi-squared statistic (J-statistic = 15.07 (65), whilst the diagnostic
tests for serial correlation and functional form indicate the respective nulls cannot be
rejected.
One indication that the unconstrained Euler equation is inappropriate for the
constrained sub-sample would be an observation of incorrectly signed parameter
estimates with higher standard errors. This would suggest correlation between the
instruments used in estimation and the error residuals. With GMM-A for the
constrained sub-sample there is some evidence of this with p)5 p4, P7 and P8 all
signed contrary to expectation. Moreover, again with reference to a 5 % level, only
the autoregressive parameter P0 can be regarded as statistically significant (t-ratio >
2.00). Any basis for interpreting these observations as a rejection of the orthogonality
of the instruments is undermined, however, by the J-statistic. Although higher than
the corresponding figure for the unconstrained sub-sample, the value of 21.77 is
again overwhelmingly within the acceptance region for the ,null. Like the




GMMEstimation and Testing ofthe Extraction Euler Equation
with Unconstrained and Constrained Sub-Samples: II
Estimation Method: GMM-C GMM-C GMM-D GMM-D
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Po 0.4366 0.1116 0.4331 0.3667
p,
(0.1021) (0.1208) (0.0790) (0.0671)
0.0003 -0.0414 0.0563 0.0487
(0.0817) (0.0435) (0.0538) (0.0420)
P: 0.0025 0.0018 0.0022 0.0036
P3
(0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0016) (0.0172)
-0.0010 -0.0069 -0.0020 -0.0051
P4
(0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0020) ((0.0023)
-2.9272 22.936 -0.8641 19.660
Ps
(12.719) (20.344) (4.3519) (8.2550)
0.0069 -0.0312 0.0008 -0.0132
(0.0147) (0.0229) (0.0064) (0.0101)
P6 1.3318 -0.6664 1.8028 -0.6342
(0.9313) (1.6130) (0.5615) (1.5780)
P7 0.0906 -0.1613 0.0754 -0.4470
Ps
(0.1724) (0.2293) (0.6255) (0.1182)
-2.2978 1.47406 -2.7349 2.04174
(0.9997) (2.1397) (0.5632) (0.8098)
Specification Tests:
J-Statistic: x2(df) 18.62 (74) 23.84 (74) 18.85 (78) 25.36 (78)
Newey Test: x2(df) 1.554(4) 0.777 (4) 1.664 (8) 1.912 (8)
Serial Correlation -1.455 0.081 -1.478 0.028
(P=0.146) (P=0.934) (P=0.138) (P=0.978)
Functional Form 2.010 1.258 2.260 3.520
(P=0.366) (P=0.533) (P=0.322) (P=0.172)
P 0.484 0.482 0.484 0.532
Sample Period 1973-89 1973-89 1973-89 1973-89
No. ofObservations 918 595 918 595
Notes: Cols (ii) and (iii) give GMM estimates of the first differenced equation using instrument set C
with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (MA(1)) consistent asymptotic standard errors in
parentheses. Cols (iv) and (v) report results for instrument set D. See also notes tollable IV. 2.
Turning now to the estimates once the instrument set is extended to include "debt"
instruments, Tables IV.2 and IV.3 indicate the theoretical prediction that the
unconstrained Euler equation should be rejected for constrained observations is not
supported. For each of the instrument sets B, C and D a chi-square test of the
moment restrictions (denoted as Newey test) imposed on the debt instruments does
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not reject the null of orthogonality for either the unconstrained or constrained sub-
samples. In Table IV.2 for GMM-B this statistic tests restrictions on CGDP and four
interaction terms, in Table IV.3 the statistic for GMM-C tests the validity of
overidentifying restrictions imposed on DTX, DIX and their squared terms, whilst
for GMM-D the Newey test is defined in terms of the vector defined above. As with
GMM-A the diagnostic tests with these extended instrument sets indicate no
problems with serial correlation or functional form.
One interesting consequence of introducing the "debt" instruments is with regard to
the constrained sub-sample estimate of (34. With the basic instrument set this
parameter is negatively signed, but postively signed for instrument sets B, C and D.
Indeed with this latter set of instruments the interest rate parameter becomes
statistically significant at the 5 % level. Thus by extending the set of debt instruments
used in estimation it appears that an interest rate effect is observed, reflecting perhaps
the greater information content provided by a wider set of creditworthiness indicators
which are correlated with the interest rates offered to problem debtors. Interpreting
this evidence as support for the basic hypothesis under investigation would however
be unwise given the greater balance of evidence which provides little basis for
concluding that the unconstrained Euler equation represents a mis-specified model
for constrained observations.
Table IV.4 presents additional information on the adequacy of thq Euler equation
model with the results from tests of parameter restrictions for both sub-samples.
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Table IV.4
Tests ofParameter Restrictions with GMMEstimates: Unconstrained and
Constrained Sub-Samples
Unconstrained Observations
Parameter Restriction: (i) GMM - A (ii) GMM - B (iii) GMM - C (iv) GMM - D
p = o 83.88 (9) 30.82 (9) 31.49 (9) 88.28 (9)
(P=0.000) (P=0.000) (P=0.000) (P=0.000)
p4= ps= p = p7= p = o 39.55 (5) 11.02(5) 11.73 (5) 51.44 (5)
(P=0.000) (P=0.051) (P=0.039) (P=0.000)
ps= p = p7= p8= 0 38.56 (4) 10.70 (4) 10.56 (4) 48.63 (4)
(P=0.000) (P=0.030) (P=0.032) (P=0.000)
P2=-P3=-Ps 0.20 (2) 0.78 (2) 0.50 (2) 0.40 (2)
(P=0.906) (P=0.678) (P=0.777) (P=0.817)
P=-P7,P=-P3=-P5 17.22(3) 5.63 (3) 5.64 (3) 25.26(3)
(P=0.000) (P=0.131) (P=0.131) (P=0.000)
Time Dummies 12.21 (17) 3.86(17) 3.16(17) 12.95 (17)
(P=0.787) (P=0.999) (P=0.999) (P=0.740)
Time Dummies: 82 - 89 9.32 (8) 2.24 (8) 1.57(8) 7.85 (8)
(P=0.316) (P=0.972) (P=0.992) (P=0.448)
Mineral Dummies 1.24 (5) 0.774 (5) 1.02 (5) 1.47 (5)
(P=0.941) (P=0.979) (P=0.961) (P=0.916)
Constrained Observations
Parameter Restriction: (i) GMM - A (ii) GMM - B (iii) GMM - C (iv) GMM - D
p = o 89.94 (9) 16.04 (9) 13.78 (9) 107.30 (9)
(P=0.000) (P=0.066) (P=0.130) (P=0.000)
p4= ps= p6= p7= p8= 0 5.41 (5) 3.61 (5) 3.32(5) 16.93 (5)
(P=0.368) (P=0.607) (P=0.651) (P=0.005)
Ps= P6=P7= P,= 0 2.88 (4) 3.56 (4) 3.13(4) 16.21 (4)
(P=0.578) (P=0.469) (P=0.537) (P=0.003)
P2= - P3= - Ps 0.44 (2) 1.91 (2) 1.56(2) 0.98(2)
(P=0.801) (P=0.386) (P=0.458) (P=0.614)
P1= - Pt . P2= - P3= - Ps 1.31 (3) 2.62 (3) 2.17(3) 6.44 (3)
(P=0.726) (P=0.454) (P=0.539) (P=0.092)
Time Dummies 7.36(17) 7.61 (17) 7.24(17) 14.77(17)
(P=0.978) (P=0.974) (P=0.980) (P=0.612)
Time Dummies: 82 - 89 6.62 (8) 3.69 (8) 3.45 (8) 10.62 (8)
(P=0.578) (P=0.884) (P=0.903) (P=0.224)
Mineral Dummies 1.93 (5) 1.30(5) 1.18 (5) \ 1.74 (5)
(P=0.859) (P=0.935) (P=0.953) - (P=0.884)
Notes: All reported statistics are computed as GMM wald tests distributed X" with degrees offreedom
in parentheses. See Newey and West (1987b) for details.
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Common to both the unconstrained and constrained sets of observations is the failure
to reject zero restrictions on the time-specific and mineral-specific dummy variables.
The latter finding with respect to mineral group effects would suggest that
controlling for general fixed effects by first differencing eliminates (as expected) any
differences in intercept terms associated with mineral groupings. With respect to time
effects, Table IV.4 also indicates that a zero restriction on year effects post 1982, i.e.
the "debt crisis" period, is likewise not rejected.
A test of the joint significance of (3 rejects the null of a zero restriction on all
parameters, though the rejection is strongest for the unconstrained sample. For
constrained observations joint significance is weaker, particularly with instrument set
C. This accords with the observation from Tables IV.2 and IV.3 that the Euler
equation parameters are relatively less well determined with constrained
observations.
Two further sets of restrictions on the parameters were also considered. The first is a
test of a zero restriction on the coefficient vector (P4,P5,P6,P7,P8)' which correspond
to the rate of interest on foreign debt and its interactions with other Euler equation
variables. Table IV.4 also reports a test of the significance of the interaction terms
alone. Testing the significance of these variables provides one indication of the
extent to which the intertemporal approch to the modelling of resource supply is
appropriate. In the case of unconstrained observations these parameters are always
statistically significant at the 5 % level or less, though it is evident from Table IV.4
that this statistical significance is determined primarily by the interaction terms. The
role for the interest rate itself as noted above is generally weak. Of further note, the
estimated signs on the unconstrained group coefficients imply the expected negative
relationship between extraction and the interest rate along the optimal path.36 The
36Recall for instance some of the discussion in chapters 2 and 3.
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significance of these parameters is not evident with the constrained sub-sample,
except in the case ofGMM-D where as noted previously from Table IV.3 the interest
rate parameter is itself strongly significant. In general the signs on these parameters
for the constrained group are not entirely consistent with expectation.
The second set of restrictions of interest are those that can be placed on the reduced
form parameters; recall the discussion in 4.3.2. The restrictions on the parameters
associated with prices and the interaction with the interest rate, i.e. (32 = -P3 = -p5, are
not rejected for either sub-sample. However, these restrictions when considered
jointly with the restriction P, = -p7 can be rejected for the unconstrained sample with
instrument sets A and D. Rejection for B and C is only possible at the weaker p-value
of 0.13. In combination these findings indicate that there are grounds for rejecting the
restriction P[ = -P7 which is suggested by the Euler equation model. For the
constrained sample the corresponding parameter restrictions cannot be rejected, but
any support this may provide for the Euler equation model is tempered by the general
observation that most of the relevant constrained parameter estimates are not
statistically different from zero.
The discussion to date has noted that the estimates for the unconstrained and
constrained samples provide only very weak support for any rejection of the Euler
equation model in the case of constrained observations. The J-statistics and, more
notably, the results of the Newey test, clearly support the orthogonality of the "debt
instruments" for both samples. The only contrary evidence is perhaps the generally
poorer performance of the model with the constrained group of observations,
particularly with regard the sign and statistical significance of the parameter
estimates. Table IV.5 presents the results from formal testing of parameter constancy
between the two sub-samples as outlined in 4.3.2. It is clear that the null of stability
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in the coefficients over the two sub-samples is easily accepted. In short, there is no
reason to presume structural differences between the two samples.
Table IV.5
GMM Tests ofParameter Stability:
Unconstrained v Constrained Sub-Samples
Instrument Set X2(df)
GMM-■A 19.25 (96)
GMM -B 20.56 (101)
GMM -C 22.44(105)
GMM D 24.62 (109)
Notes: See main text and chapter appendixfor details on test statistic.
To summarise, the evidence presented above strongly supports the conclusion that
the Euler equation model cannot be rejected for constrained observations. In light of
this, and to assess to the general adequacy of the model further, the Euler equation
was re-estimated using the full sample of observations. These results are presented
and discussed below.
4.4.2 Estimation and testing ofthe extraction Euler equation with the full sample.
Tables IV.6 to IV.8 present the estimation results and Wald tests of parameter
restrictions obtained with the full sample. In Table IV.6 the resultssof the OLS and
LSDV estimations reveal similar findings to those obtained with thb sub-samples.
For example, the OLS estimate of [30 is consistent with the upward bias associated




Estimation and Testing of the Extraction Euler Equation: Full Sample

























































Notes: Col. (i) reports OLS estimates of levels equation. Col. (ii) reports LSDV estimates of levels
equation. Col (iii) gives GMM estimates of the first differenced equation using instrument set A with
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (MA(1)) consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
See main textfor details on reported specification tests.
In general the GMM estimation results suggest an improved performance for the
Euler equation model with the full sample. In Table IV.6 the results with instrument
set A indicate the majority of the parameter estimates to be statistically significant,
with only (3j incorrectly signed. Notably the coefficients on the price variables are
>
well determined, as is P7 which corresponds to the stock depletion effect. Of further
note, the interest rate parameter is postively signed, but is not statistically different
from zero. With regard to the reported specification tests the J-statistic and the
Newey test respectively support the validity of the over-identifying restrictions used
in estimation and the moment restrictiosn imposed on the sub-set of debt instruments.
The tests for serial correlation and adequate functional form, as with the
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unconstrained and constrained sub-samples, indicate the respective nulls cannot be
rejected. In terms of goodness of fit the p measure indicates a substantial
improvement when the Euler equation model is estimated with the full sample of
observations. These findings are similarly observed when the instrument set includes
additional debt instruments, see Table IV.7. In addition Table IV.7 also reveals better
determined estimates of P8.
Table IV.7
GMMEstimation and Testing ofthe Extraction Euler Equation with Debt
Instruments: Full Sample
Instrument set: (i) GMM - B (ii) GMM - C (iii) GMM - D
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Po 0.6057 (0.0688) 0.6320 (0.0695) 0.6527 (0.0732)
p. 0.0204 (0.0284) 0.0159 (0.0271) 0.0119 (0.0269)
P2 0.0102 (0.0030) 0.0094 (0.0028) 0.0096 (0.0027)
P3 -0.0115 (0.0033) -0.0105 (0.0031) -0.0105 (0.0030)
P4 2.7405 (8.3466) 4.1716 (7.8122) 6.7649 (6.3638)
P5 -0.0171 (0.0093) -0.0151 (0.0087) -0.0154 (0.0085)
PS 0.7648 (0.5303) 0.9042 (0.5358) 0.9204 (0.5511)
Pt 0.2450 (0.1047) 0.2431 (0.1039) 0.2033 (0.0985)
P8 -1.3561 (0.6597) -1.4976 (0.6585) -1.4254 (0.6367)
Specification Tests:
J-Statistic: x2(df) 21.38 (70) 22.59 (74) 23.75 (78)
Newey Test: x2(df) 2.027 (5) 1.084(4) 1.326 (8)
Serial Correlation -1.557 (P=0.115) -1.580 (0.114) -1.611 (P=0.107)
Functional Form: x2(2) 3.656 (P=0.161) 3.520 (P=0.172) 3.527 (P=0.171)
P 0.347 0.374 0.356
Sample Period 1973-89 1973-89 1973-89
No. ofObservations 1513 1513 1513
Notes: See notes to Table IV.2
Table IV. 8 reports the Wald statistics associated with tests of restrictions on the Euler
equation parameters. These results reinforce the earlier findings obtained with the
unconstrained sub-sample. A zero restriction on all of the Euler equation parameters
is rejected at p-value = 0.000, whilst the sub-set of parameters which correspond to
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the interaction terms with the interest rate are highly significant. The two set of
restrictions on the reduced form parameters, as with the sub-samples, are supported,
though once again the individual restriction p, = -P7 can be rejected. The time period
and mineral group dummies are again observed to be insignificant.
Table IV.8
Tests ofParameter Restrictions with GMMEstimates: Full Sample
Parameter Restriction: (i) GMM - A (ii) GMM - B (iii) GMM - C (iv) GMM - D
p = o 154.57 (9) 182.12(9) 192.31 (9) 188.96 (9)
(P=0.000) (P=0.000) (P=0.000) (P=0.000)
P4= P5= P6= P?= P8= 0 12.35 (5) 13.80 (5) 13.61 (5) 12.35 (5)
(P=0.030) (P=0.017) (P=0.018) (P=0.030)
P5= PS= P7= P8=0 10.57 (4) 13.13 (4) 13.22 (4) 12.21 (4)
(P=0.032) (P=0.011) (P=0.010) (P=0.016)
P2=-P3=-P5 1.43 (2) 0.76 (2) 0.57 (2) 0.62 (2)
(P=0.490) (P=0.685) (P=0.751) (P=0.733)
P=-P7,P=-P=-P5 3.40 (3) 6.03 (3) 6.71 (3) 6.35 (3)
(P=0.334) (P=0.110) (P=0.082) (P=0.096)
Time Dummies 17.02(17) 16.36(17) 16.22 (17) 16.63 (17)
(P=0.453) (P=0.499) (P=0.508) (P=0.480)
Time Dummies: 82 - 89 11.55 (8) 11.11 (8) 10.99 (8) 11.58(8)
(P=0.173) (P=0.196) (P=0.202) (P=0.172)
Mineral Dummies 1.46 (5) 1.61 (5) 1.33 (5) 1.31(5)
(P=0.918) (P=0.901) (P=0.932) (P=0.934)
Notes: All reported statistics are computed as GMM wald tests distributed jf with degrees offreedom
in parentheses. See Newey and West (1987b) for details.
One negative feature of the estimates detailed in Tables IV.6 to IV.7 is that the
dynamics implied by the parameter estimates for QiM and Qit.2 are not consistent with
the theoretical model. In particular the positive sign on P2 should imply that P0 is
%
positive and greater than 1. Whilst the former expectation holds, the latter is clearly
rejected. Note further the expectation that P0 be greater than 1 reflects the
introduction of adjustment costs. If the incorrectly signed (and insignificant, see
Table IV.7) estimate of P, can be interpreted as a rejection of adjustment costs then
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the Euler equation model would predict that (30 equals unity zero. A test of (30 = 1 is
overwhelmingly rejected for all GMM estimates.
One further gauge of the Euler equation model is to consider the implied estimates of
the structural cost parameters. Some computations of these estimates and their
associated standard errors are presented in Table IV.9. Whilst the structural
parameter estimates have the anticipated sign, they are in general poorly determined.
Table IV.9
Structural costparameter estimates: Full Sample









































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Variance covariance matrix of the structural cost parameters
computed as v(§) = (35((3)/9p)|p_- - v(p) - (S5(p)/5(3)jp_-. See Pesaran and Pesaran (1991).~f{3)
is a test of5, = 5, = 53 = 0. Structuralparameter estimates obtained by assuming 8~' = P2, and estimate
of5. based on P8.
>
%
The estimates presented in Table IV.9 are based on the reduced form estimates
reported in Tables IV.6 and IV.7. Throughout (32 is used to identify 0-' and 53 is
identified using the reduced form parameter pg which is motivated by the observation
that this reduced form parameter was correctly signed in Tables IV.6 and IV.7. Given
the restrictive nature of these computations the figures are only to be regarded as
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illustrative. Although there is some variation in the estimates reported in Table IV.9
the general pattern is consistent. The parameter 8, is negative, with the others
positive. This negative sign for 5, as noted earlier in Section 4.2 can be interpreted as
an indicator of increasing returns in extraction. Note throughout however that 51+83
has the opposite sign since 53 > |5,| which give the choice of functional forms would
imply increasing marginal costs in extraction. Less ambigious is the depletion effect
on extraction costs. In line with expectation 52 is positive implying that costs increase
with cumulative extraction and therefore depletion (i.e. falling reserves). Moreover
the estimates of 82 can be considered the best determined of the structural parameters
since it is only this parameter which approaches statistical significance at the 5%
level, see GMM-A column. Considered jointly however, the Wald tests reported in
Table IV.9 would not reject a zero restriction on the structural cost parameters at the
conventional 5 % level.
4.5 Conclusions.
This chapter has outlined and implemented the GMM approach to the estimation and
testing of a theoretical Euler equation for exhaustible resource extraction. This
econometric analysis has focused on the testing of the predictions derived from the
theoretical model of chapter 3. The central hypothesis under investigation stated that
the Euler equation derived under the assumption of unconstrained foreign borrowing
should be rejected for constrained borrowers. For the purposes of the analysis a
%
sample of constrained observations was defined in terms of information on the
accumulation of debt arrears.
The main findings from this chapter were that an empirical specification of the
unconstrained Euler equation could not be rejected by using a number of GMM
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specification tests for either unconstrained or constrained observations. The latter
finding provides evidence to reject the hypothesis that problem indebtedness has
been a factor influencing developing country mineral production. In general the
evidence provided in this chapter indicates mixed results for the Euler equation
approach to resource use. Though there was no strong evidence that interest rates
have a direct influence on extraction, a consistent finding was the statistical
significance of variables interacting with the rate of interest which may suggest some
empirical merit of the Euler equation model. Against this, the estimated dynamics
were not supportive of the Euler equation specification and estimates of the
underlying structural cost function parameters were poorly determined. Further
reflections on these findings are reserved for chapter 7 which concludes the thesis.
Appendix
Asymptotic properties of the GMM specification tests.
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Pagan and Vella (1989) note that many of the diagnostic test statistics commonly
employed in econometrics can be expressed as tests of suitably defined moments
restrictions. The GMM specification tests reported in chapter 4 exploit this basic
principle. For the purposes of this appendix it will suffice to outline a generic
expression for the test statistic, its asymptotic variance and then indicate how the
statistic is applied to specification testing in practice.
Let the moment restrictions of interest be defined by E(m(wi,90))= 0 where
m(w; ,90) has dimension p x 1 and 90 is a k x 1 parameter vector. It is then natural to
test these restrictions by determining whether the sample analogue
f = N-'7,:m(Wi,9>s statistically different from zero. This necessitates knowledge of
the sample variance.
The Asymptotic Variance ofVNt .
The derivation of the asymptotic distribution of x employs the standard assumption
that the GMM estimator 9 is VfV consistent. Hence, the asymptotic variance of VNt
can be obtained from a Taylor series expansion of m(wj ,§) around 90. This gives:
dm I
(a4.1) VNt = Vn(n_1y m(wj ,90))+ p limN-1 —i- (9-.90)+op(l),V N->co ok) J
where op(l) indicates that higher order terms are assumed to converge to zero as N
—» oo. Theorem 3.1 in Hansen (1982) establishes the asymptotic distribution of
Vn (§ - 90) to be:
(a4.2) Vn (e - 90 n(o, (gwg'X1 gwvwg' (gwg' )"')
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where g denotes the k x r matrix of derivatives plimN "'Z,dg,/3e, gj is a r x 1
N-»oo
vector ofmoments used in GMM estimation, V is the variance-covariance matrix of
gj, i.e. E(gjg;) and W is a suitable GMM weighting matrix. Hansen (1982) also
shows the optimal W is in fact E(gig'j) . (A4.2) implies:
(A4.3) Vn (e - e0)=(gwg' )"' gw(n-"2 £i§i)+op (l).
Substituting (A4.3) into (A4.1) gives:
(A4.5) 7N? = VN(N-'Xm(w,.9j) + [p7mN-lX-^LJ<GWG')"lGW(N-KXig.).
or equivalently:
(A4.6) = i : p limN"1Y ^VgWG' )"' GW
N->=o 1-1, QQ J
N-l"Xinii










where V__ = lim E and likewise for Vmg, Vgg. Using
(A4.7) it is then possible to assert:
(A4.8) VNt->^(0,AVA'),
dm. A
where A = i plimN'1Y-i- (GWG')"'GW1—1, QQ Note also that for
computational purposes AVA' can be written as:
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(A4.9)
AVA' = V„„ +2(ptilimN-l2iani/89)(GWG')"lGWV1.
+(pijlimN-|^ani/a9)[(GWG')JGWV>|W'G'(GWG')"l](pHlimN'(^i3mi/oe)
Computing the Specification Tests.
From this generic framework for the GMM specification testing, the tests for
functional form and serial correlation are computed as follows. The test for
functional form is based on the moment restrictions E(z'iVi) = 0 where Z. has
dimensions t x 2 with the columns corresponding to squares and cubes of the fitted
values of the dependent variable. The reported statistic is then computed as a chi-
square test. The test for serial correlation follows Arellano and Bond (1991) with the
sample restrictions frr defined as V'V _2 where V. is a t x 1 vector ofGMM residuals.
The test for parameter constancy proceeds along similar lines. Specifically, m; = gi
where g, is the prediction analogue of ZjV. The residuals in this case refer to the
constrained group prediction errors computed using parameter estimates obtained
with the unconstrained sub-sample. The test statistic is then based on the sample
moments t = N"1^ 2 g; where N2 denotes the constrained group sample size. The
reported test statistic is chi-square with the degrees of freedom equal to the number
ofmoment restrictions employed in estimation. This statistic uses the expression for
the asymptotic variance of ^/N~x given in Ghysels and Hall (1990). That is:
f
(A4.10) AVA' = V22 + k(^hmN2-|^i5g,/50)(GWG')",(^limN;1^5g,/ae)
where k = N2/N, and is assumed to be a constant which requires the assumption that
the sub-sample sizes increase equi-proportionally.
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Data Appendix: Sample, Variable Definitions and Sources.
a) Sample
Table IV.10
Structure and characteristics ofthe country-minerals panel
Country Debt
Export
Group Bx Cp Ir Ld Tn Zc
1. Algeria SDT XF 0 0 1 1 0 1 3
2. Argentina SDT XP 0 0 1 1 1 1 4
3. Bolivia SDT XP 0 1 0 1 1 1 4
4. Brazil SDT XD 1 1 1 1 1
•
6
5. Chile MDT XP 0 1 1 1 0 1 4
6. Columbia MDT XD 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
7. Egypt SDT XS 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
8. Ghana SDT XP 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
9. Guyana SDT XP 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
10. Honduras SDT XP 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
11. India MDT XD 1 1 1 1 0 1 5
12. Indonesia MDT XD 1 1 0 0 1 0 3
13. Jamaica SDT XS 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
14. Korea (South) LDT XM 0 0 1 1 0 1 3
15. Malaysia LDT XD 1 1 1 0 1 0 4
16. Mauritania SDT XP 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
17. Mexico SDT XD 0 1 1 1 1 1 5
18. Morocco SDT XD 0 1 1 1 0 1 4
19. Myanmar SDT XP 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
20. Niger SDT XP 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
21. Nigeria SDT XF 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
22. Papua New Guinea MDT XP 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
23. Peru SDT XP 0 1 1 1 1 1 5
24. Philippines MDT XD 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
25. Rwanda SDT XP 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
26. Sierra Leone SDT XD 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
27. Thailand LDT XD 0 0 1 1 1 0 J
28. Tunisia MDT XD 0 0 1 1 0 1 3
29. Turkey MDT XD 1 1 1 1 0 1 5
30. Venezuela MDT XF 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
31. Zaire SDT XP 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
32. Zambia SDT XP 0 1 0 1 0 1 3
33.Zimbabwe SDT XP 0 1 1 0 si 0 3
Totals 10 15 19 16 T4 17 91
Key to World Bank Debtor and Exporter Classifications.
SDT - Severely Indebted; MDT - Moderately Indebted; LDT - Less Indebted.
XD - Diversified Exporter; XF - Exporter of Fuels (mainly oil); XP - Exporter of Non-Fuel Primary
Products; XM - Exporter of Manufactures; XS - Exporter of Services.
Key to Mineral Codes:
Bx - Bauxite; Cp - Copper Ore; Ir - Iron Ore; Ld - Lead Ore; Tn - Tin; Zc - Zinc Ore.
Notes: Source for classifications is the World Debt Tables 1993-1994
b) Variable Definitions and Sources
i. Euler Equation variables
Qit : Defined as an index of mineral production with 1968=100. The use of an index
measure was to avoid scaling problems across different types of mineral. Data was
obtained from World Mineral Statistics which is published annually by the British
Geological Survey.
Xit: Defined as cumulative mineral production and computed as Xit = ^'_0Qis with
X0 = 0. Annual production data from World Mineral Statistics for the period 1952-
1989 was used to construct the time series for cumulative production with
observations for 1968-1989 used in the empirical analysis. Again this variable is
expressed as an index with 1968 = 100 to standardise the scale for this variable.
NPmt : Nominal mineral prices obtained from commodity price data tables in
International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Various Issues). Where it was relevant
these nominal prices were converted to US Dollars per metric tonne. The price data
used was : Copper (112), Iron Ore (223), Lead (112), Tin (112), Zinc (112). In the
case of Bauxite (336) the time series was only available to 1987. To keep the mineral
samples comparable, the series for Aluminium (156) was used as proxy for Bauxite
prices on the grounds that Aluminium represents Bauxite in its produced form.
Converted to index with 1980=100.
XPt: Defined as the annual index of export prices of industrial countries (1980=1.00)
%
which was used as the deflator for nominal variables in the econometric model. Data
was obtained from International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Various Issues).
Pt : Defined as the real price per metric tonne of a mineral and computed from Pt =
NPt / XPt. For empirical analysis expressed as an index (1968=100).
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iJt : Average nominal rate of interest on external debt commitments. This is a
weighted average nominal rate as used in World Bank's World Debt Tables 1993-94
(WDT). The rate of interest is averaged over all types of external debt by source (i.e.
Private or Official debt) with the weights determined by the proportion of private or
official debt out of total committments.
ijt : Real rate of interest on debt computed as :
rjt =ijt -7^ .where nt =(XP.-XPt-i)/XPt-i.
D'l_, : Dummy variable indicating when borrowing constraints are binding and used
to split sample. Arrears infomation used in construction of indicator was sum of total
interest and principal arrears. If the annual change in this figure is positive the
dummy variable takes the value 1. WDT provided source for arrears data.
ii. Debt Instruments
CGDP: Consumption share of GDP % (1985 international prices). Source is Penn
World Tables Mark 5.2 (PWT). See Summers and Heston (1991) for discussion and
details.
DTX: Total external debt to exports % (US dollars). Source is WDT.
s
DIX: Total debt interest payments to exports % (US dollars). Source is"WDT.
RGDPC: Real GDP per capita in constant dollars using Chain Index (1985
international prices). Source is PWT.
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RGDPG: Annual rate of growth in real GDP (1985 international prices). Computed
using RGDPC and Population data in PWT.
IGDP: Investment share of GDP % (1985 international prices). Source is PWT.
DTY: Total external debt to Gross National Product (U.S. dollars) %. Source is
WDT.
DSX: Total debt service to exports (U.S. dollars) %. Source is WDT
RESM: Gross foreign currency reserves relative to imports (U.S. dollars). Expressed
in terms of monthly equivalent, i.e. how many months of imports can be financed
from reserves. Source is WDT.
IMF: Cumulative dummy indicator of IMF history. Based on annual observations
which take value 1 if the country draws upon IMF funds. Source is WDT.
RESCH: Cumulative dummy indicator of rescheduling history. Based on annual
observations which take value 1 if the country is observed to reschedule principal and
/ or interest payments. Source is WDT.
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Chapter 5
External indebtedness and the causes of deforestation: a theoretical model.
5.1 Introduction
Recent estimates suggest that deforestation in tropical countries has increased
markedly during the 1980s (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United
Nations (FAO), 1993). During this same period many developing countries
experienced to a greater or lesser extent macroeconomic problems associated
with the burden of external indebtedness. The contemporaneous nature of these
two observations has led some authors to conclude that these debt problems
provide an explanation for the observed increase in deforestation. In support of
these conclusions there is empirical evidence pointing to statistically
significant (cross-sectional) covariance between measures of deforestation and
indicators of external indebtedness. This evidence has not, however, been
particularly strong or robust. A more detailed overview of some of this
conflicting empirical evidence is reserved for the next chapter which provides
an econometric analysis of the debt-deforestation relationship. In this chapter
the focus is on this relationship from the perspective of economic theory. A
simple theoretical model of forest use by an indebted economy is presented
with the aim of analysing the relationship between external indebtedness and
deforestation. This analysis whilst of interest in itself, also provides the
conceptual framework and testable hypotheses which are considered in chapter
6.
A link between the issues of deforestation and external debt has been
popularised with the advent of "Debt-for-Nature" swaps conducted between
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conservation groups and developing country governments (see Hansen. 1989;
Deacon and Murphy, 1995 for detailed discussion of these debt swaps). Such
swaps have enabled some developing countries to reduce a (typically small)
part of their outstanding debt in exchange for a committment to forest
conservation.1 Whilst "Debt-for-Nature" swaps may represent a novel
instrument for achieving a measure of debt relief and environmental
conservation, there has been no universal presumption that external debt
burdens may be a contributory factor to the depletion of tropical forests.2
Hansen (1989) and Shilling (1992), for example, present arguments which are
sceptical about a debt-deforestation link, whilst proponents of the argument
(e.g. George, 1989, 1992) appear convinced that debt and deforestation are
casually related. One aim of the model presented in this chapter is to clarify
some of the issues in the debate about the debt-deforestation relationship which
hn practice the contractual agreement between the parties to a swap will involve the purchase
of some of the outstanding external debt(typically at a discounted price on the secondary debt
market) by an external agency (to date mostly conservation groups, e.g. World Wildlife Fund).
The developing country is then required to convert the sums received into domestic currency
bonds which are, by the contract, allocated to conservation programs. To give some examples:
the first ever debt-for-nature swap was negotiated between Conservation International and
Bolivia in 1987. This involved the purchase of $650,000 of Bolivian debt (x% of total
outstanding) in exchange for resource (forest) conservation measures. These included re¬
defining the legal status of the land in the Beni Biosphere Reserve and the designation of three
buffer zones around the reserve. The Bolivian government subsequently reneged on its
committments by granting timber concessions in the buffer zones. As noted by Deacon and
Murphy (1995) this first swap foundered on its failure to create enforement incentives and its
focus on the output of the swap. i.e. the ambigious objective of a "sustainable development" in
the reserve. More recent swaps have been of a larger magnitude and clearer with regard to
enforcement. Costa Rica has been the most prolific swapper conducting 4 deals between 1988-
1992 wth the debt swapped totalling $54.6 million. Poland reached agreement with the Paris
Club of creditor nations in 1992 which involved the swap of $3 billion of Polish debt in return
for environmental concessions. Deacon and Murphy (1995) have documented that between
1987 and 1992, 34 swaps have been agreed by 19 debtors and worth (in terms of debt) $1,460
million.
2It is now U.S. policy to promote such swaps (Public Law 101-240; U.S. Congress, December
19, 1989), though industrial country governments and institutions such as The World Bank and
The International Monetary Fund have refrained from accepting the idea of a debt-
deforestation link. Of additional note is empirical evidence presented in Deacon and Murphy
(1995) indicating that debt for nature swaps are more prevalent in countries with severe debt
servicing problems.
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has in the main been conducted in terms of a "widespread sensibilization (of
the existence, direction and magnitude of the relationship) without
corresponding amounts of analysis." (von Moltke, 1990, quoted in Kahn and
McDonald, 1990, p.l)
The rapid removal of forest cover which has been observed and widely
reported in recent years, particularly in tropical regions, represents a major
example of environmental degradation in developing countries. Concern over
deforestation has been evident at a number of levels : in the terms of Repetto
(1988) from local villagers to national governments. This diversity of interest
points to the multi-faceted nature of the deforestation issue, which itself stems
from the myriad of functions forests, and especially tropical forests, can serve.
An illustration is given by Pearce,
"...tropical forests are the homeland ofmany indigenous peoples,...;they
provide the habitat for extensive fauna and flora (biodiversity),...; they
supply hardwood timber, and other forest products such as fruit, nuts,
latex, rattans, meat, honey, resins, oils, etc. ; they provide a recreational
facility (e.g. "ecotourism") ; they protect watersheds in terms of water
retention, flow regulation [of] water pollution, and organic nutrient
cleansing ; they act as a store of carbon dioxide so that,...., carbon
dioxide is released, and a cost ensues, if deforestation occurs,...; and
finally they also provide a possible regional micro climatic function."
(Pearce, 1991, p. 241)
Associated with these functions are a range of economic values or benefits
generated by forest resources. The environmental economics literature
concerned with the valuation of environmental goods and services has
highlighted that these benefits often go beyond those reflected in market
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prices.3 In the case of tropical forests total economic value would include the
following:
• Direct Use values : timber production, forest products, recreation.
• Indirect Use values : watershed protection, nutrient cycling, micro
climatic functions, carbon storage, ecosystem resilence from
biodiversity.
• Non-Use values : existence values arising from bequest motives
(Krutilla, 1967); notions of stewardship; instrinsic value of forests.
• Option value4 : the "risk premium" associated with preservation of
future but uncertain benefits.
Taken together these values would also constitute, as a corollary, the total
economic cost of deforestation.
This range of values and functions associated with tropical forests heightens
the concern that current levels and rates of deforestation may entail very high
economic costs in the present and future. In recognition of this, the
3This is not to say market prices should not reflect this range of benefits, but merely to note
that frequently in the case of environmental resources market prices rarely reflect the full
marginal social benefit of a resource. The consequence, of course, tends to be under-provision
of the resource or service. Also, in the case of forestry resources the range of functions they
serve means a number of competing uses for the resource. However, rarely do market prices
for direct uses such as logging incorporate the full social opportunity cost of logging activity
as the benefits of conserving the resource, e.g. ecological functions such as carbon storage, are
non-monetary. Moreover, these public good benefits have national and global dimensions. An
individual country benefits from the watershed protection functions of forest resources, whilst
the carbon sink function has global benefits in the the form of absorbing carbon dioxide (a
major greenhouse gas).
4There is an extensive literature on option value, see for example Bishop (1982). Option value
is defined as the difference between option price (i.e. the state independent payment which
leaves an individual indifferent between having and not having an uncertain benefit with
certainty. When supply of a resource is uncertain, but future demand is certain (e.g. tropical
forests as argued by Pearce, 1989) then OV will be positive assuming risk aversion. However
the sign is generally indeterminate with the introduction of different attitudes to risk and
demand uncertainties.
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deforestation issue and the appropriate policy response has been at the forefront
of recent attempts at global environmental management.5 This concern has also
been matched by an growing economics literature on deforestation. Repetto
and Gillis (1988) provide a comprehensive survey of the impact of public
policies on the forest resource with ten case-studies.6 Mahar (1989) and
Binswanger (1991) have provided further analysis of deforestation in the
Brazilian Amazon (see also Barbier, 1989 and Pearce, Barbier and Markandya,
1990). More recently Brown and Pearce (1994) have presented an overview of
the issues with a range of studies which provide econometric and case-study
evidence on the causes of deforestation.7
The economic literature on the causes of recent deforestation has emphasised
that many of the benefits (costs) of forest resources (deforestation) are not
reflected in existing market prices for land and timber. Hence, over-use of the
forest resource results from a range of market failures. In addition many of
these market failures have government policy as their origin (see Repetto and
Gillis, 1988; Panayotou, 1992). Market failure and policy failure constitute the
5For example, the Tropical Forestry Action Plan was launched in 1985 under the auspices of
FAO, the United Nations agency with responsibility for monitoring global forest resources.
More recently, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992
at Rio de Janeiro has emphasised again the need for international co-ordination to combat
deforestation. This was evident in a Statement of Forest Principles and provisions in Agenda
21, the Climate Change convention and the Biodiversity Convention aimed at forest
preservation. A consequence of the Rio conference was a review on forestry issues under the
auspices of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development which is expected to conclude in
1997. In 1993 the International Tropical Timber agreement (which^ established the
International Tropical Timber Organisation to protect the future of the tropical timber trade
and conserve forest ecosystem) was the subject of re-negiotation. Developing country
producers (e.g. Brazil, Malaysia) wanted all tropical timbers to be covered by the agreement.
This met with resistance from consumer countries.
6The countries included are Brazil, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Liberia,
Ghana, Gabon, Ivory Coast and the United States.
7A variety of approaches are evident in this volume. For example, cross-sectional regressions,
empirical studies of single countries or regions and analysis of related issues, e.g. the tropical
timber trade.
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underlying causes of the deforestation problem. They manifest themselves in a
range of outcomes which have to date been be viewed as the proximate causes
of deforestation, i.e. excessive logging, slash and burn agriculture, shifting
cultivation, population pressures (see for example Allen and Barnes, 1985).
The idea that external debt burdens may contribute to deforestation also reflects
market and policy failures. The policy failure view of the debt-deforestation
linkage has a number of possible interpretations. Firstly, a high level of
external indebtedness may be an indicator of macroeconomic mismanagement
by the debtor. For example trade and fiscal policies which resulted in over¬
valued exchange rates and fiscal deficits were associated with the increased
levels of indebtedness in many of the already highly indebted Latin America
countries (Sachs, 1989). Consequently the need to meet higher debt-servicing
through increased export of natural resources may be rooted in underlying
macroeconomic imbalances created by inappropriate government economic
policies. A second line of argument is that government policies which
encourage deforestation may themselves originate from the financial pressures
generated by high debt burdens, e.g. Burgess (1992), Capistrano and Kiker
(1990, 1995). For example, credit subsidies to agriculturalists encourage the
conversion of forested land to pasture. The rationale for this type of policy it is
argued is the desire to increase the production of tradable commodities which
through export generate valuable foreign exchange for debt servicing. Equally,
domestic production may supplant imports with the same effect. The results
presented in this chapter provide an analytical basis for why these incentives to
encourage forest conversion might exist for a "problem debtor".
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At the level of market failures the analysis presented in chapters 2 and 3
highlighted that imperfections in international capital markets may create
incentives for a resource-exporting economy to increase the extraction or
depletion of natural resources. Recall for example the models presented by
Rauscher (1989, 1990) which address the optimal use of an environmental
resource by an indebted economy (see chapter 2). By assuming interest
payments to be a convex function of the level of outstanding debt to reflect risk
premia, Rauscher demonstrates that the incentive to increase depletion arises
because higher extraction reduces the cost of indebtedness by reducing the
stock of debt.8 An alternative interpretation of imperfect international capital
markets was provided in chapter 3. In this model imperfections arise from
credit ceilings, i.e. upper limits on the supply of new debt. An incentive to
increase resource depletion arises since the generated liquidity provides the
constrained debtor with a means of alleviating the costs associated with capital
market imperfections. The model presented in this chapter emphasises the
market failure interpretation of the debt-deforestation link and follows the
approach already adopted in chapter 3. The model considers a small open
economy which produces and trades a commodity which uses forest inputs.9
The role of indebtedness in the model emerges with constraints on the
economy's ability to borrow foreign capital. In other words the economy is
8 Consider for example the facts of the 1980s debt crisis. In the 1970s relatively lax lending
policies allowed the accumulation of high levels of debt. In the early 1980s debtors faced rises
in real interest rates driven by economic conditions in lender economies. The real cost of their
outstanding debt correspondingly rose and thus the cost of being highly indebted. Rauscher's
model suggests the optimal response is increased resource depletion.
9Examples, using FAO categories, would be Sawlogs & Veneer Logs, Sawnwood, Wood-
based panels and Plywood. The percentages of total world exports for these commodity
categories attributable to developing countries in 1990 (1980) were: 41.9% (57.3%), 62.6%
(65.9%), 42.8% (29.1%) and 72.9% (58.2%) which is suggestive of a move to value-added
wood exports over the last decade. In terms of Total Forest products (which includes wood
pulp, newsprint, paper) the percentage of world exports accounted for by developing countries
was 13.4% (16.6%).
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faced with a liquidity "squeeze". Even in the case where interest payments are
increasing in outstanding debt (i.e. the Rauscher assumption) deforestation is
shown to vary with debt only when the economy faces binding constraints on
its foreign borrowing.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents an
overview of recent data on forest resources and their rate of change, i.e.
deforestation, to provide some background and context to the model and
analysis outlined in sections 5.3 and 5.4. In section 5.3 equilibrium solutions
with unconstrained and constrained borrowing are derived, whilst section 5.4
presents a comparative statics analysis for both cases. The key findings are that
deforestation is positively related to debt and negatively related to credit
ceilings only in the constrained case. A mathematical appendix provides
details of these and other results. The chapter concludes with a summary of the
main findings and highlights the relevance of the model to previous empirical
investigations of the debt-deforestation link.
5.2 The global forest resource and its rates of change: an overview.
Since the early 1970s data on land-use patterns, including the extent of forested
land, has benefited immeasurably from satellite imagery and remote sensing
technology. Landsat 1,2,3,4 and 5 have been providing satellite images since
1972. The NOAA AVHRR satellites have been operational since 1979.
Importantly, as the technology has progressed so the precision of the forested
land data has also improved. For example, Landsat 3 did not have enough
resolution to discriminate between forest vegetation and the vegetation of
cropland. Its successor Landsat 4 however was 2.5 times more powerful.
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Nevertheless despite the improving technology, over the last few decades
estimates of the global forested area have shown considerable variation. Table
V. 1 gives an illustration of this variation with recent estimates varying between
3,700 and 6100 million hectares.
Table V.l
Estimates of the Global Forest Resource.
Source: Forest Category Area (Million Ha)
Zon & Sparhawk (1923) Forest Area 3031
FAO (1946/1937) Forest 3650
Haden-Guest et al. (1956) Forest 3914
FAO (1963) Forest Land 4126
Persson (1974) Forest Land 4030
Closed Forest 2800
Eyre (1978) Total Forest 6050
Global 2000 (1975) Closed Forest 2563
Barney (1980) Open Woodlands 1200
Matthews (1983) Forest 3927
Woodland 1200
Total 5237
WRI (1986) Total Wooded Area 5228
FAO (1987) Forest & Woodland 4087
Source : Mathers (1990)
One source of the variation lies with the definitions employed by each estimate
(as reflected by the non-uniformity of the categories adopted).10 This problem
remains evident with current data sources. For example the most recent
estimate for total global forest resources is 3400 million hectares in 1990
(World Resources Institute (WRI), 1994). This figure is based on FAO data for
76 tropical countries which cover 98 % of tropical land area (FAO, 1993) and
UNECE / FAO data for forests in temperate zones (UNECE/FAO, 1993).11
10The classification used by FAO is the most widely adopted. This defines the following :
Forest and Woodland is land under natural or planed stands of trees and may include land
earmarked for future reforestation; Closed Forest is land with a forest cover, with tree crowns
covering more than 20 per cent of the land area; Open woodland comprises land with tree
crown cover of 5-20 per cent of the surface area.
"UNECE is the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
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Each data-source adopts different definitions of forests reflecting respective
differences between forest eco-systems in tropical and temperate zones.
Another difficulty arises with changes in measurement methodologies over
time. This is evident with the 1990 Forest Resources Assessment undertaken
by FAO in tropical countries (see FAO, 1988 for detail on the methodology of
the 1990 Assessment. A summary is also provided in WRI, 1994). These
definitional and measurement issues become even more important when
referring to the extent and rate of deforestation.
5.2.1 Estimates ofthe Rate ofDeforestation.
Despite the recent concern over deforestation and controversial claims that
present trends will lead to outright elimination of tropical forests, forests and
woodlands continue to cover around 40 % of the earth's land surface.12 This
area is approximately 3.5 times greater than the area devoted to crop
production (Repetto, 1988). In addition to this Mathers (1990) states that
around 80 % of the pre-agriculturalist forest area remains intact. This
observation however says little about the distribution of forest decline.
Whereas the vast tracts of boreal forest in the former Soviet Union remain
largely intact, in other regions, particularly tropical, the forest resource is
undergoing unprecedented change.13 Repetto (1988) notes that in the post-1945
period there has been a discernible shift in deforestation activity from
\
industrialised countries to the developing world.14 Between 1950 and 1983, for
12Examples of these projections are: Guppy (1984), using figures from Lanly (1982), who
suggested 2057 as the date for the demise of the tropical rainforest. Myers (1983) was only
willing to give tropical forests 38 years before elimination.
13 WRI (1994) provides a 1990 figure for forest cover in the former Soviet Union 1990 of 755
million hectares or 22.2 % of the estimated global total. Average annual deforestation between
1981-90 is only 0.2 % compared to 0.8 % for tropical forests.
14 Around half of remaining closed and open forests are to be found in developing countries.
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example, Forest and Woodland in Central America fell by 38 % and in Africa
by 24%.
Documentation of deforestation in tropical countries gathered apace in the late
1970s and 1980s as the benefits of satellite imagery and remote sensing
technology were utilised. Three of the early contributions are worthy of note as
they reveal the role of different definitions in producing conflicting estimates.
They are respectively the FAO Production Yearbooks, a study conducted by
Lanly (1982) on behalf of FAO / United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) and an American National Academy of Science contribution carried
out by Myers (1980).15 It can be noted that though differences arise as to
magnitudes of deforestation, in all three sources there is agreement on the
general trend towards contraction of the tropical forest resource. Table V.2
gives some illustrative figures from each of the sources. The FAO Production
Yearbook figures are based on the average annual percentage change in Forest
& Woodland (see footnote 7) over the period 1968-78 with 1968 as the base.
Lanly is calculated as the average annual percent change of closed broad-
leaved, coniferous or bamboo forest between 1976-80. Myers adopts the
average annual percentage change in tropical moist forest and includes all
forms of forest conversion including logging.16
15Note that the FAO Production Yearbook data differs from the data obtained from the Forest
Resources Assessments undertaken by the same organisation. The Production Yearbooks give
annual figures for Total Forest and Woodland. The FAO assessments have recently been in
collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme and produce estimates of the
forest resource at five yearly intervals, e.g. 1980, 1985, 1990. Deforestation can then be
estimated by the change in the forest resource in the interval between two assessment
observations. It is this latter FAO data source which is employed to construct the measure of
deforestation used in the econometric analysis presented in chapter 6.
I6Tropical moist forest includes evergreen or partly evergreen forests, wetland and mangrove
forest but excludes deciduous dry forest.
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Table V.2
Three Estimates ofTropical Deforestation in the 1970s
Region: FAO Production Lanly(1982) Myers(1980)
All Countries -0.53 - 1.52 -2.0
Africa -0.77 - 1.52 -2.5
Latin America -0.62 - 1.46 -0.3
Asia -0.21 - 1.59 - 1.8
Source : Allen & Barnes (1985)
The figures in Table V.2 provide an indication of the discrepancy between
estimates of rates of deforestation based on different definitions of the forest
resource. The difference is starker when expressed in terms of hectares
deforested. Lanly (1982) estimated 7.5 million hectares of tropical forest were
disturbed annually, whereas Myers suggested a figure of 22 million hectares.
Much of the discrepancy is accounted for by the definitions adopted. The FAO
Production Yearbook figures strictly do not compare since both closed and
open forests are included in the definition.17 The difference between Lanly and
Myers is accounted for in the main by the respective interpretations of
deforestation. Lanly (1982) is based on what can be termed the "quantitative"
view. That is deforestation is recorded as the complete and permanent removal
of forest cover, in this case of closed tropical forests. Myers by contrast adopts
the "qualitative" definition of deforestation activity which incorporates all
types of forest resource depletion, including marked modification, fundamental
transformation or outright removal of the resource. Thes motivation for
attempting to measure in this qualitative manner lies with the impoverishment
of forest ecosystems which can arise with major disturbance rather than
removal. Hence the inclusion of forest affected by logging in the Myers study.
17In Allen and Barnes (1985) Spearman rank correlations are used to confirm a closer
association between the figures based on closed forest (Lanly and Myers) and to also confirm
the weaker association between the FAO Production Yearbook data and the closed forest data.
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Repetto (1988) identifies the qualitative depletion of the tropical resource
which can arise from logging. Between 30-50 per cent of an area of forest can
be destroyed or damaged during selective logging for commercially valuable
species.18 This can often be sufficient to impoverish soils and impede forest
regeneration.
The most recent estimates of deforestation in tropical countries are provided by
FAO (1993). These estimates are based on the 1990 Forest Resource
Assessment already mentioned and compared with estimates of forest cover
from FAO's 1980 assessment. The estimates are based on a "quantitative" view
of deforestation:
"Annual deforestation refers to clearing offorest lands for all
forms of agricultural uses and for other land uses such as
settlements, other infrastructures and mining. In tropical
countries this entails clearing that reduces tree crown cover to
less than 10 %>. As defined....deforestation does not include
other alterations such as selective logging (unless the forest
cover is permanently reduced to less than 10 %), that can
substantially affect forest soil, wildlife and its habitat, and the
global carbon cycle. " (World Resources Institute, 1994, p. 312)
Table V.3 summarises some of this data by region.
18The phenomenon of selective cutting is know as "high-grading". Gillis (1988a) provides a




Geographical Region Average Annual Deforestation
Extent ( OOP's ha) % Change
World -0.8
Africa -0.7
West Sahelian Africa 295 -0.7
East Sahelian Africa 595 -0.8
West Africa 591 -1.0
Central Africa 1140 -0.5
Tropical Southern Africa 1345 -0.8
Asia -1.2
South Asia 551 -0.8
Continental South East Asia 1314 -1.5
Insular South East Asia 1926 -1.2
The Americas -0.7
Central America & Mexico 1112 -1.4
Caribbean Sub-Region 122 -0.3
Tropical South America 6174 -0.7
Source: World Resources Institute (1994)
These estimates of deforestation during the 1980s suggest an increase in the
rate of forest resource depletion. The 1980 FAO assessment estimated tropical
forests were decreasing at an average annual rate of 0.58 % or 11.3 million
hectares per year. This compares with an average annual rate of 0.8 % in Table
V.3. In terms of the extent of forest loss this rate is equivalent to 15.4 million
hectares which represents an approximate increase in the average annual
reduction in tropical forests of 37 %. Such comparisons are problematic given
the different methodology of the 1990 assessment. Howqver, even with
comparisons using revised 1980 data the conclusion remains that the rate of
deforestation increased in the 1980s (see FAO, 1990).
19The data refers to change in total forest. Detail on the regional classifications can be found in
World Resources Institute (1994).
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5.3 A model of deforestation in an indebted economy.
Despite the measurement and definitional difficulties associated with
monitoring trends in deforestation, awareness of deforestation, particularly
tropical deforestation, undoubtedly increased during the 1980s. This prompted
a considerable economic literature addressing the causes of deforestation. One
feature of this extensive and wide-ranging literature, as briefly noted in the
Introduction to this chapter, has been the general absence of analytical
modelling of the deforestation problem.20 Deacon (1995) considers the role of
public policies in deforestation from the analytical perspective, but lacks any
econometric estimation or testing.21 He presents a simple general equilibrium
model of an economy producing and trading two goods; one is produced with
forest inputs, whilst the other is produced only with non-forest inputs. The
focus in Deacon's paper is on the impact of government policy (analysed
through different types of taxes) on deforestation. In this chapter Deacon's
general framework is extended to incorporate the indebtedness situation of the
economy. This is achieved by relaxing his assumption that trade must balance.
Since the focus in this chapter is on the relationship between deforestation and
indebtedness, this extension to Deacon's model does not incorporate the policy
/ tax variables which provide the basis for his analysis of the impact of
government policies on deforestation.
20This is particularly true of some of the empirical work which has lacked a foundation in
explicit economic theory. There are some examples where an attempt has been made to
remedy this. See for example Kahn and McDonald (1990, 1995) in the context of debt and
deforestation and Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1994) in the context of Thailand.
21Of note however is the comment by Deacon that "A second intent (of his paper) was to
propose a general framework that may prove useful in organising future empirical work on
deforestation" (Deacon, 1995, p. 17)
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The model is static in nature. Thus the focus is necessarily on long run
relationships which is consistent with the available data on deforestation. In
addition, most empirical deforestation studies have utilised cross-sectional
data.22 A further institutional justification for a static model is that prevailing
systems of land tenure and timber concessions may mean that the objectives of
agents are defined over a very limited number of time periods. This is
particularly relevant in situations where the nature of property rights for land
are such that land titles are conferred only for agricultural use (see for example
discussions in Southgate and Pearce, 1988 and Southgate, 1991).23 As a
consequence the user cost of forest resource use can be treated as external to
the decisions of private agents. Given this institutional constraint the future
flow of forest services that is foregone as a result of deforestation is not seen as
a cost by private agents. Similarly in the context of logging, Repetto and Gillis
(1988) document at length examples of inefficient timber policies where
royalties and fees levied on logging companies have fallen short of true
stumpage values which, it is argued, encourages loggers to maximise short run
rents. A more general institutional reason for treating the user cost as external
is that, especially in the developing country context, forests can be regarded as
a free access resource.24 In an environment where the forest and its services are
22Kahn and McDonald (1990, 1995) present a dynamic theoretical model linking debt and
deforestation, but estimate their empirical model with cross-sectional data when time series
data would seem appropriate. Annual time-series data on Forest and Woodlands from the FAO
Production Yearbooks is available and could be used to construct time-series for deforestation.
However the reliability of this data has been seriously questioned. See Mathers (1990) for a
discussion.
23There is a sizeable literature addressing the specific issue of land tenure regimes and their
impact on deforestation. For a formal exposition see Mendelsohn (1994); empirical evidence is
presented in Southgate et. al. (1991) and Deacon (1994) and Hecht and Cockburn (1990)
provide a discussion in the context of the Brazilian Amazon.
24Capistrano and Kiker (1995) note that about 90 % of closed broadleaved tropical forests are
state-owned.
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public goods and the appropriate regulatory framework is absent, private agents
have no incentive to internalise the cost that their use of the forest resource
(e.g. to collect fuelwood) imposes on current or future generations.25 It follows
therefore that the model is not concerned with the socially optimal use of a
forest resource since domestic imperfections (market and policy) which give
rise to external costs are embedded in its structure.26 With these considerations
in mind, the model is focused on what Deacon (1995) terms the "unregulated
(private) equilibrium" level of forest resource use.
5.3.1 Domestic production possibilities and the balance ofpayments
Consider an economy which produces and consumes two goods denoted by X
and Y. The good X is produced with forest inputs, whilst Y is not. Thus very
loosely X can be thought of as a primary commodity and Y as a manufactured
good. Whilst for present purposes it is convenient to think of X as a single
good it could equally define a vector of commodities produced with forest
inputs. The production ofX is described by the function:
(5.1) X = X(L\P),
where X(.) is a strictly concave production function, Lx is the labour input and
P denotes the forest input. The interpretation of this latter input depends on the
s
25Southgate et. al. (1991) cite Ecuador to illustrate the absence of effective regulation of forest
use in the developing country context. As of 1987 a staff of only 119 permanent and seasonal
forest rangers were available to patrol over 4 million hectares of Ecuadorian national parks.
26 In this case society's objective function would preferably be defined in terms of social
welfare over time to allow investigation of the intertemporal trade-offs in forest use. An
example where preferences are specified in this manner is Barrett (1992) which considers the
issue of environmental preservation within an optimal growth framework. The issue addressed
by Barrett concerns the conditions under which an environmental resource (e.g. rainforest) is
preserved or developed / depleted (i.e. deforestation). The intertemporal framework is also
adopted by Ehui, Hertel and Preckel (1990) in an analysis of forest resource depletion.
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nature of X. In the context of an agricultural commodity P would define the
land input to production obtained by forest clearance. If X represents wood
production then P would represent the input of timber harvests.
It is assumed that there is a strict trade-off between direct use of the forest
resource (i.e. as an input in the production of X) and alternative uses.27 If F
denotes the stock of standing forests then P and F are constrained by P+F=l,
which captures the idea of the trade-off.28 This constraint is obvious when P
would denote forest clearance intended for agricultural purposes. It is less clear
when P would denote the fraction of forested land which is harvested for
timber. However, it can be noted that increasing the volume of timber
harvested will increase the length of time a given area of land is not forested
and therefore reduce the flow of forest services.29 Assuming the flow of forest
services to be proportional to the stock of standing forest, then F can also be
viewed as the fraction of forested land providing forest services (other than
direct inputs for the production of X). The constraint on the use of the forest
will remain F=l-P, implying a strict trade-off between forest services and
logging. This relates to the discussion in Section 5.2 where it was noted that
27As noted in the Introduction to this chapter examples of alternative uses would be recreation
(e.g. eco-tourism), watershed protection, carbon storage and nutrient cycling. These uses can
be viewed as examples of the flow of services obtained from the stock of forests.
28Thus F is the fraction of forested land maintained as standing forests and P is the fraction
which is cleared.
29The volume of timber (V) at a given time t will be a function of the tinje interval since the
previous harvest. If the previous harvest was at time s, then V is a function of t-s. Deacon
(1995) notes that if this growth relationship is concave then increasing I5 (which requires
increasing V/(t-s), i.e. the harvest per period) is obtained by decreasing the interval t-s. The
fraction of time forest services are provided and the average volume of timber on the land are
both reduced. This latter point is particularly relevant to tropical forests which provide a wide
range of eco-system and climatic functions. Moreover, Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1994) note
that minimum felling and rotation cycles (i.e. t-s) for tropical forests are around 35-50 years.
Logging practice in tropical forests has rarely been consistent with this kind of cycle.
Deforestation in Cote D'lvoire is a good example of significant forest clearance and therefore
decline in the flow of forest services attributable to excessive harvests (see Gillis, 1988b).
171
once an area of forest is logged and the land is no longer capable of
regenerating natural forest cover depletion of the forest is qualitative (i.e. the
extent of forest services) and eventually quantitative (i.e. the extent of forest
cover).
The conversion of forested land incurs two types of cost. The first, user cost, as
already mentioned is not considered since the model is static. The second type
of cost is the opportunity cost of physically clearing forest areas. The
"production" of P requires inputs which are assumed to be only labour and is
described by:
(5.2) P = P(Lp)
The good Y is also produced using labour and the production function is
similarly:
(5.3) Y = Y(Ly),
with total available labour constrained by:
(5.4) Lx+Ly+Lp = 1.
This restriction on available labour defines the economy's production
possibilities. Assuming the production functions in (5.2) and (5.3) to be
linearly homogenous then the constraint on labour is equivalently:
(5.5) (YLLX+YLPL-'P)+Y=Yl,
where yl, PL are the respective marginal products of labour in the production
of y and P. Deacon (1995) terms (ylLx + YlPl'p) the private costs to the
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economy of producing X with YL and YLP~' defining the effective prices for
inputs used to produce X.
The economy can choose to consume X and Y or engage in trade with the
outside world. Assuming a small open economy implies relative prices of the
commodities are treated as given. Unlike Deacon's model it is not assumed that
trade in X and Y must balance. Specifically, the economy is assumed to be a
net debtor with interest payments determined by the convex function h(D),
with D denoting the inherited stock of debt which for the purposes of analysis
is assumed to be exogenously given.30 Flows of capital are for simplicity the
supply of new debt B and the repayment of principal R. The balance of
payments can then be defined as:
(5.6) B- R- h(D) = yra - yxe,
where y is the real world price ofX, xe = X - xc, ym = yc -Y and xc (yc) denotes
domestic consumption of good X (Y). Where xe > 0 and ym > 0 the economy is
a net exporter of good X and net importer of Y. Conversely, xe < 0 and ym < 0
characterises a net importer of X and net exporter of Y. The case of primary
interest is where the economy is a net exporter of X which is the good
produced with forest inputs. Moreover xe > 0 and ym > 0 broadly describe
economies with comparative advantages in forest and agricultural products, a
characteristic which is, in the main, observed in developing" economies. Eq.
(5.6) simply states that the current account determines the demand for new
debt. This demand is satisfied if the borrower faces unconstrained lending. If
30The convexity assumption reflects factors such as default risk which are a particular feature
of sovereign borrowing. Thus the marginal cost of external debt is increasing in the level of
debt reflecting a higher probability of default.
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the borrower is viewed as a "problem" debtor by international lenders then
there may in fact exist limits to this ability to borrow. In other words there is an
upper limit or ceiling on B.31 This constraint takes the form:
(5.7) B* - B>0,
or using (5.6),
(5.8) B* - R - h(D) - ym + yxe > 0.
The inequality in Eq. (5.8) will hold with equality when the credit ceiling
binds.
5.3.2 Unconstrained and constrained equilibria
The economy must choose the domestic consumption levels of X and Y which
maximise utility. This objective is represented by a strictly concave utility
function denoted by:
(5.9) U = U(x°,yc, F),
and the properties Ux > 0, Uy > 0, UF > 0, Uxx < 0, Uyy < 0, UFF < 0 and Uxy =
Uvv > 0.32 The inclusion of F, the forest resource, as an argument in they\
objective function (5.9) arises from utility which is derived from the flow of
services provided by standing forest, e.g. forest products, watershed protection,
*
biodiversity. The social optimum for this problem would involve maximising
(5.9) with respect to the choice variables xc, yc and F subject to the constraints
31This is analogous to the constraints considered in chapters 2 and 3. For justification of the
existence of these constraints see the discussion in chapter 2.
32Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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describing the economy's production possibilities (5.4) and the balance of
payments, i.e. (5.6) and (5.8). From the perspective of social costs and benefits
this would ensure that the social marginal benefit of forest clearance is equated
with the social marginal cost. However, as already noted, there are good
reasons for treating the cost of foregone forest services arising from forest
clearance (i.e. the user costs) as external to individual private agents. In an
unregulated equilibrium arising from open access use of the forest resource, F
is regarded as fixed in the choice problem faced by private agents. The bar
above F in the objective function denotes the fact that utility is maximised with
the flow of forest services taken as given by private agents.
The choice problem facing private agents can be considered in two steps (see
Deacon, 1995). Firstly, the efficient mix of inputs used in the production of X
is determined and then second, the levels of consumption which maximise
(5.9). In the first element of the choice problem the economy seeks to minimise
the private cost of producing X. More formally the problem can be stated as:
where it has been assumed that YL = a and YLP[j' = n. Let X denote the
Lagrange multiplier on the production function constraint. Given the
assumption of a strictly concave production function the first order conditions
are sufficient to minimise (5.10). With respect to labour and forest inputs these
*
conditions are:
(5.10) Min aLx+rcp s.t. X = X(Lx,p),
(5.11)
(5.12)
a - kXL = 0,
7t - LXp = 0.
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From these first order conditions the cost-minimising factor demands can be
derived as:
(5.13) Lx = Lx(a,7r,X),
(5.14) P = P(a,7t,X).
Using (5.13) and (5.14) the private costs of producing X can be re-expressed in
terms of the cost function:
(5.15) C = C(a,7t,X),
where the derivatives ofC(.) with respect to a and ti give (5.13) and (5.14) and
costs are positive and increasing in X.
The second component of the choice problem can now be considered. The
problem is to maximise (5.9) subject to (5.8) and the (private) cost-minimising
solution for producing a given quantity of X. Inserting (5.15) into (5.5) and
noting Y s y° - ym domestic expenditure on Y can be written as:
(5.16) yc =a-C(a,7T,X) + [B-R-h(D) + yxe],
where (5.6) has been used to substitute for imports of Y. Substituting (5.16)
into (5.9) and noting xc s X-xe the problem is to choose the levels of X and
xe which maximise (5.9) subject to (5.8). The Lagrangian for this problem is
given by: y
I = u(x-x\a-C(a,7i,X) + [B-R-h(D) + yxeLF)
(5"17) / , / \ \+p(B -R-h(D)-ym+yxe),
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and for the primary case of interest where the economy has its comparative
advantage in X, the associated first order conditions are (subscripts denote
partial derivatives):33
(5.18) d£/dX = Ux-UyCx=0,
(5.19) af/dxe=-Ux+Uyy + py<0; xe>0; xe(di/dxe)= 0,
(5.20) d£/d\i = B' -R- h(D)- ym + xe > 0; p > 0;{d£/d\i) = 0.
Eq. (5.18) implies that:
(5.21) U(/Uy =C,(a,iu,X),
i.e. in equilibrium the marginal rate of substitution in consumption is equated
with the marginal cost of producing X. Assuming trade in X is non-zero then
(5.19) must hold with equality. Eq. (5.20) then identifies two possible
situations which are dependent on the foreign borrowing regime faced by the
economy. Firstly if the credit ceiling is slack then (5.20) would imply p = 0.
The first order condition (5.19) is then Ux/Uy =y for xe > 0 (or xe < 0, see
footnote 30) which in combination with (5.21) gives:
(5.22) Cx = Y,
which simply states that with unconstrained foreign borrowing in equilibrium
the marginal cost of X is set equal to its (real) world price. The second case
33The converse case of holding comparative advantage in Y whilst being a net importer ofX
can be considered in (5.17) with the modification that the choice variables are now X and -xe.
(5.18) remains unchanged, whilst (5.19) becomes:
dlfo(-xe) = Ux - Uyy - py < 0; - xe > 0; - xe (<3f/<5(-xe)j)= 0.
(5.20) is modified to the extent that ym < 0 and xe < 0. Of note is the fact that the equilibrium
(i.e. first order) conditions are invariant to the signs on net trade in Y and X. It is with the
comparative statics that the assumptions about the signs of ym and xe make a difference to the
results. This is highlighted in Section 5.4 below.
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arises when the credit ceiling binds and therefore p > 0. (5.19) and (5.21) now
imply:
(5.23) C,=T(l + (i),
where p = p/Uy The interpretation of (5.23) remains that in equilibrium the
marginal cost of X is set equal to the marginal benefit of X, but unlike (5.22)
the marginal benefit is no longer simply the given world price of X when
foreign borrowing is constrained. The additional component to the marginal
benefit given by yp. indicates that the production of X brings an extra gain
when the economy faces a binding credit ceiling. This is simply the additional
liquidity benefit of X which arises because the economy is unable to use net
borrowing to finance the current account. The multiplier p. measures the
marginal increment in the objective function obtained if the binding borrowing
constraint were to be relaxed by one unit. Thus p can be interpreted as the
shadow price of scarce foreign exchange and yp can be viewed as a measure of
the extra shadow value of producing X in a constrained borrowing regime.
Where xe > 0 this extra benefit arises from export, whilst for the case of xe < 0,
the extra liquidity benefit of producing X is obtained by the substitution of
domestic production for imported X.
Comparing (5.22) and (5.23) it is evident that the equilibrium level ofX will be
higher when the credit ceiling is binding. Since y(l + p)> yy marginal costs
must be greater in a constrained borrowing regime, implying equilibrium
production of good X is higher given costs are convex in X.34
34The reasoning here is analogous to that presented in Section 3.4 of chapter 3.
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5.4 External indebtedness as a cause of deforestation: comparative static
analysis.
5.4.1 The case ofunconstrainedforeign borrowing
In an unconstrained foreign borrowing regime, the first order conditions (5.18)-
(5.20) implicitly define equilibrium solutions for X and xe as functions of the
exogenous variables a, n, y and the inherited stock of debt, D. That is:
X= X(a,jc,y,D)
—e 'i n \X =x (a,7t,Y,Dj.
In combination with the (constant output) factor demand for forest inputs
(5.14) the equilibrium solutions (5.24) can be used to analyse the effect of
marginal changes in the exogenous variables on deforestation as represented by
converted forested land P.
The focus of the analysis in this chapter is on the relationship between
deforestation and debt which is reflected in the results presented below. An
appendix to this chapter outlines these results in detail and provides analysis of
the effect of marginal changes in the real price of X, y, and the input prices a
and 7t.35
>
By the definition of an unconstrained borrowing regime, deforestation must be
independent of any credit ceiling B*. Thus any relationship between debt and
35These results for the unconstrained and constrained cases, thought not of primary interest for
the moment prove useful for the empirical analysis considered in chapter 6
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deforestation in an unconstrained economy will depend on any effect that a
change in the stock of debt has on forest clearance. To assess this relationship it
is essential to consider the effect that changes in D have on equilibrium
production and trade in X.36 These effects are summarised by Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. In an unconstrained borrowing regime: i) net exports (imports) ofX
are increasing (decreasing) in D and ii) production ofX is independent ofD.
Proof. See Appendix.
The first part of Lemma 1 presents an intuitive result. Where an economy holds
a comparative advantage in X (i.e. net exports are positive) a higher stock of
debt implies higher export. This must follow from the balance of payments
expression (5.6) since, ceteris paribus (i.e. given levels of B, R and ym), a
higher stock of debt increases interest repayments which are met by increased
export of X. The converse applies for the case where comparative advantage
lies in Y. Net exports of X are thus negative (net imports positive) and again,
ceteris paribus, (i.e. given levels of B, R and ym), higher interest repayments
are met by reducing imports of X. The second part of Lemma 1 is perhaps the
most interesting result. It suggests that even if interest payments are increasing
in the stock of debt, in an unconstrained borrowing regime production of X
does not change with changes in the stock of debt. This finding can be related
to the equilibrium condition for unconstrained borrowing (5.23). In (5.23) the
marginal benefit of producing X is given by y, its exogenously determined
36This becomes evident below.
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world price. Since this exogenous price is unaffected by D, production
decisions at the margin are likewise unaffected by D.
With production of X independent of D the following proposition about the
relationship between debt and deforestation can now be stated.
Proposition 1. When a debtor faces unconstrained foreign borrowing, the
equilibrium level offorest conversion is independent of the stock ofdebt.
Differentiating (5.14) with respect to D gives:
(5.25) 5P/5D= (dP/ax) 5X/5D.
Lemma 1 established dX/SD = 0 and it follows in (5.25) that 5P/SD = 0.
This result has a simple intuition. For a given change in the level of inherited
debt, the debtor will have to meet increased interest charges or equivalently,
ceteris paribus, face a deterioration in the current account. From eq. (5.6) it can
be seen that the current account balance can be thought of as the demand for
new (net) borrowing (B - R) In an unconstrained borrowing regime the
observed level of new borrowing is demand determined (see McFadden et al.,
1985; Hajivassiliou, 1987). Thus in this framework the unconstrained debtor is
able to meet the increased interest payments with an offsetting inflow to the
capital account which avoids the need to, say, increase export of X and
therefore inputs of P. At first sight (5.25) would appear to be at odds with the
findings in Rauscher (1989, 1990) which show that when interest payments are
a convex function of debt, the optimal time paths for debt and resource use are
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not independent. This result holds however in an intertemporal context where
the shadow value of resource stock is incorporated into the equilibrium
conditions and intertemporal efficiency requires the rate of increase in the
marginal productivity of the natural resource to equal the rate of interest on
debt less the marginal rate of regeneration (for renewable resources).37 The
assumption that the marginal cost of debt is increasing in the stock of debt
ensures that the time paths of resource use which satisfies this efficiency
condition cannot be independent of the level of debt. Proposition 1 differs from
Rauscher's finding precisely because intertemporal efficiency is not considered
by decision-makers and in the context of forest use in developing countries (as
already noted earlier in this chapter) the assumption of short time horizons
would appear reasonable.
5.4.2 The case ofconstrainedforeign borrowing
When foreign borrowing is constrained to the credit ceiling B* the optimal
solution to (5.18), (5.19) and (5.20) is given by the implicit functions :38
X = X(a,7t,y,D,B*)
(5.26) xe = xe(a,u,y,D,B*)
P = M\a»ItjYjD,B*)
>
(5.26) suggests that the indebtedness situation of a debtor economy in a
constrained borrowing regime may be related to equilibrium forest clearance
37In the present model the marginal productivity of the natural resource would correspond to
the term dX/dP.
38Note that the implicit functions applicable in the constrained regime are assumed to be
continuously differentiable in the credit ceiling B".
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through two channels. The first is the stock of debt which has been shown not
to influence forest clearance when borrowing is unconstrained. The second is
the level of the credit ceiling itself. Changes in this credit ceiling can be
interpreted as making the liquidity "squeeze" for constrained debtors tighter or
slacker. The former is obviously of most interest since it would capture the
type of liquidity crisis which has recently faced many problem debtors. As in
the case of unconstrained borrowing the analysis for the constrained borrowing
case focuses on the relationship between deforestation and the economy's
indebtedness as measured by D and B*. Analysis of the effects of marginal
changes in y, a and 7t with constrained borrowing is detailed in the Appendix to
this chapter.
a) The effect ofdebt on deforestation.
As with the case of unconstrained borrowing the first step in determining the
relationship between the stock of debt and deforestation in a constrained
borrowing regime is to consider the effect a marginal change in D has on
equilibrium production ofX. This is summarised by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. In a constrained borrowing regime equilibrium production ofX is
increasing in D.
Proof. The details are reserved for the Appendix to this chapter. In the
appendix it is shown that:
183
(5.27) dx/oD= -y(u„ -CxUwXa/SD)/|H| > 0,
where X denotes equilibrium production of X and subscripts denote partial
derivatives (which are evaluated at the optimal values determined by the first
order conditions). The determinant of the bordered Hessian, |H|, is positive
which follows if the bordered Hessian is negative definite at the optimum and
therefore sufficient for a maximum (see chapter appendix for details). Given y
> 0, TL <0, > 0 and TL > 0 and 5h/5D >0 the numerator in (5.27) is
unambiguously positive and therefore 5X/5D is unambiguously positive.
Thus in contrast to the unconstrained case, when an economy is faced with
binding constraints on foreign borrowing an increase in the level of inherited
debt will imply a rise in equilibrium production of X. This difference can be
related to the equilibrium conditions given in (5.23) and (5.24). It has already
been noted above that (5.23) implies production decisions at the margin depend
on the exogenously determined price y. The condition (5.24) shows that with
constrained borrowing the marginal benefits of production depend additionally
on p. and Uy, neither of which are independent of the stock of debt given the
solutions in (5.26). Thus with constrained borrowing, productions decisions at
the margin are influenced by D. In addition this result holds irrespective of
whether the economy is a net exporter or net importer ofX. This arises because
the additional liquidity benefit of producing X in a constrained borrowing
regime is evident in both trade situations. In the case of themet exporter the
*
incremental increase in production benefits the economy with the earning of
scarce foreign exchange, whilst for the net importer domestic production
substitutes for imported X (details are provided in the Appendix).
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Given Lemma 2, the effect of a marginal change in debt on equilibrium forest
clearance is summarised by Proposition 2
Proposition 2. IfP is a normal input in the production ofX equilibrium forest
conversion is increasing in the inherited stock of debt when a debtor country
faces a binding credit ceiling.
Defining P to be a normal input implies SP/SX > 0 and therefore the sign of
3P/3D in a constrained borrowing regime is determined by sign{5X/SD}.
Lemma 2 established this positive in a constrained borrowing regime and it
follows 3P/5D >0.
This relationship between deforestation and levels of debt in constrained
borrowing regimes is entirely an output effect. A marginal increase in the
inherited stock of debt increases production of X and so long as P is a normal
input the derived demand for deforestation increases. Combining Propositions
1 and 2 it can be concluded that the hypothesis of a positive association
between deforestation and debt should only be anticipated in "problem" debtor
economies, i.e. economies which face binding credit ceilings.
b) The effect ofcredit ceilings on deforestation
The level of the credit ceiling provides another source for the relationship
between deforestation and indebtedness in a constrained borrowing regime. A
fall in the credit ceiling will effectively increase the burden of a given level of
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indebtedness in the sense that the domestic resource cost of servicing
outstanding foreign liabilities increases. This is established more formally with
Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. In a constrained borrowing regime equilibrium production ofX is
decreasing in the credit ceiling B*.
Proof: Details are provided in the appendix. Here it is sufficient to note that:
(5.28) ax/SB' = y(u„ - C,UW)/|H| < 0,
The determinant of the bordered Hessian, |h|, as noted above is positive since
the second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied. The numerator in
(5.28) is unambiguously negative since y > 0 and therefore the derivative
dX/SB* is unambiguously negative.
With respect to trade in X, the marginal effect of a change in the credit ceiling
in a net exporter is given by (again see appendix for details):
(5.29) SxVSB* = — 1/y <0.
In the case of a net importer the sign in (5.29) is reversed.
(5.28) and (5.29) show that if the liquidity "squeeze" tightens through a fall in
the credit ceiling, then equilibrium levels of X and its export (import) must
increase (decrease). The interpretation of these results would be that for
constrained debtor countries the more severe is the liquidity crisis or the lower
is their creditworthiness (measured by the level of the credit ceiling) then the
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greater is the reliance on domestic sources of international liquidity to finance
the balance of payments. Moreover it can be shown that the relative
magnitudes of the production and trade effects imply that domestic
consumption of X must fall as a result of a fall in the credit ceiling (see
Appendix).39
The consequences that this effect of a change in the credit ceiling has for
deforestation are summarised by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If P is a normal input in the production of X then for
constrained debtors a fall in the credit ceiling will imply an increase in the
equilibrium level offorest conversion.
For a marginal change in a binding credit ceiling, the effect on forest
conversion is given by:
(5.30) 5P/5B' = (<9P/dx)<3X/SB* < 0.
As in the case of a change in debt, the sign of 3P/3B' is determined by
sign fex/dB'}. Lemma 3 has shown dX/SB* <0 and it follows cP/3B* < 0.
Thus the liquidity "squeeze" which increases domestic production ofX leads to
an increase in the derived demand for forest inputs so long as P is a normal
input. Also, as with the effect of changes in debt, this result holds for net
exporters and importers ofX.
5.5 Conclusions
39The same is true for the effects on production and trade arising from a marginal change in D.
See details in Appendix to this chapter.
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This chapter has considered the relationship between external indebtedness and
deforestation from an analytical perspective. A static model of deforestation in
an indebted economy was outlined based on a general model of deforestation
presented in Deacon (1995). This model presented a stylised representation of
an economy which trades a commodity produced using forest inputs and
produces and trades another commodity which uses only non-forest inputs. The
economy is assumed to be a net debtor with interest payments increasing in the
stock of debt. In addition, net foreign borrowings may be used to offset any
current account deficit. The economy is considered to be a "problem" debtor
when its ability to borrow on international capital markets is constrained. That
is, it faces a binding credit ceiling. It was shown that compared to a "no debt
problem" situation defined by the absence of binding lender constraints on the
ability to borrow foreign capital, the equilibrium production of goods which
require forest inputs would need to be higher when such constraints bind. The
effect of reductions in this credit ceiling and the economy's inherited stock of
debt were analysed and it was shown that the equilibrium level of forest
conversion varies inversely with the credit ceiling for a problem debtor and is
positively related to the inherited stock of debt. Of further note is the finding
that when the credit ceiling does not bind equilibrium forest conversion is
independent of the economy's stock of debt.
\
To conclude, this chapter has provided some analytical insight concerning the
idea that the problems of external indebtedness and deforestation are related. A
second aim of the model as mentioned above was to provide a framework
which would permit econometric analysis of the link. In some ways this is
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perhaps the crucial element of the discussion about the debt deforestation link.
Whilst the analytical model confirms some of the simple intuition which
underlies the debt-deforestation hypothesis it cannot address the magnitude or
significance of the relationship. The analytical model emphasises the
importance of what might be called "debt regimes". That is, a regime
characterised by unconstrained lending and another regime defined by binding
credit ceilings. The analytical results suggest the testable empirical hypotheses
that deforestation is orthogonal to debt and credit ceilings for unconstrained
countries, but not for constrained countries. Almost all of the existing empirical
investigations of the debt-deforestation hypothesis have ignored this distinction
by assuming that under the alternative debt and deforestation are correlated for
all (sample) countries.
A more general econometric issue concerns the appropriate specification of
regressors in a reduced form expression for deforestation. Some studies of the
debt link specify models where debt measures are included along side variables
such as timber production and agricultural output as independent variables, e.g.
Burgess (1992).40 The theoretical model presented in this chapter emphasises
that such variables are choice variables (i.e. both could be considered proxies
for X) which are functions of prices (input and output) and under certain
circumstances, the indebtedness situation of the economy. Thus the theoretical
model provides a rationale for questioning on econometric grounds empirical
specifications which include endogenous choice variables (e.g. timber
production, agricultural production) alongside debt variables as independent
rcgressors.
40These variables have also used as regressors in more general empirical analyses of the causes
of deforestation, e.g. Allen and Barnes (1985), Southgate (1991).
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Finally, given the emphasis placed on unconstrained and constrained debt
regimes in this chapter an approach to the estimation and testing of the debt-
deforestation hypothesis which differs from existing empirical studies would
appear appropriate. Instead of hypothesising that the conditioning set of
regressors in a model of deforestation should, under the alternative, include
debt variables for all sample observations, the alternative approach to the
econometric analysis of the debt-deforestation would focus on testing for
differences between constrained and non-unconstrained sub-samples.
Equivalently, the alternative hypothesis would be that it is appropriate to
include debt variables as conditioning regressors only for the sub-sample of
constrained observations. These econometric issues are pursued further in the





This appendix sets out the workings for the conditions used to prove Lemmas
1,2 and 3 in the main text. Comparative static results for variables not
discussed in the main text, i.e. a, n and y, are also presented for both borrowing
regimes in this Appendix.
I. Comparative statics with unconstrained borrowing.
With unconstrained borrowing the first order conditions (5.18) and (5.19)




where a bar over a variable denotes an optimal value and xe > 0 denotes a net
exporter of X and -xe > 0 denotes a net importer. Analysis of the comparative
static properties of the system of equations in (A5.1) is possible if the second
order conditions for a maximum are satisfied. These conditions are satisfied
given the concavity of the utility function and the convexity of the cost
function. More precisely the second order conditions are satisfied if the
Hessian matrix of second order partial derivatives is negative definite at the
optimum defined by the first order conditions. Differentiating (A5.1) with





df/dx2 d2l/dXdxe~ "H„ H12"
_d2l/dxedX d2t/d(xe)2_ -H21 H22.
H„ = (u„ — -2UxyCx +uwc>)
HI2 = H!,=(-U„+(t+CX)U„-TCXU„)
H2!=(u„-2u>(r+u„r!)
The determinant of the Hessian is given by |H| = HnH22 - R2]2 which is
positive if the second order conditions are met. Since (A5.1) implies Cx = y, it
is useful to note that it follows H1I=H22-UyCxx and H,2=-H22. The
Hessian determinant can thus be expressed as:
(A5.3) |H| = -UyCxxH22,
which is positive as required given H22 < 0. Since the Hessian determinant is





It is easy to show that the case of the net importer of X similarly satisfies the
implicit function theorem. In this case
H12 = H21 = (Uxx -(y + Cx)(Jxy + yCxUyy)and H12=H22. Note however that this
still implies |H| = -UyCxxH22 > 0.
Ii. ProofofLemma 1.
Totally differentiating (A5.1) with respect to D whilst bearing in mind the
implicit solutions (A5.4), noting the definitions of xcandyc imply
4'Symmetry of the cross-partial derivatives is used in all derivations.
dxc/dD = 5X/dD - dxe/3D and 5yc/dD = - 3h/3D + y 3xe/5D
then dividing the result by dD gives in matrix form:
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-Cx 3X/3D and
where hD denotes 3h/3D.
The effect of a marginal change in inherited debt on equilibrium export is,
using Cramer's Rule, given by:
where the unconstrained equilibrium condition Cx = y has been used in the
derivation of (A5.6). Thus in an unconstrained borrowing regime net exports of
X are increasing in D. Since the case of a net importer can be defined as xe < 0,
(A5.6) also implies that net imports are decreasing in D.
Applying Cramer's Rule to solve for 3X/5D in (A5.5) gives:
Using Cx=y and H2I=-H22 which holds with unconstrained borrowing
(A5.7) implies 3X/3D = 0. Thus in an unconstrained regime equilibrium
production ofX is independent of D.
(A5.7)
i>d(hq(uw -U„cx)t h21(u,„ -u„r))
1
193
Iii. The effect of a change in the output price y on equilibrium forest
conversion.
Differentiating (5.14) with respect to y gives:
(A5.8) dP/dy = (d?/dx)dX/&y,
where the sign of this derivative is determined by the sign of dXJdy since P is a
normal input. Analogous to the case of the input prices, the marginal effect of a
change in y on equilibrium production of X can be found by differentiating the
unconstrained equilibrium condition. The resulting expression is:
(A5.9) dX/dy = 1/C^ > 0,
which implies equilibrium forest conversion is increasing in the output price of
X. Moreover this relationship holds irrespective of the trade situation. Thus for
net exporters and importers of X an increase in the world price for this good
will lead to increased deforestation. Intuitively, the same marginal change in y
would be expected to increase equilibrium exports in the net exporter case and
decrease equilibrium imports in the net importer case. Of interest is the finding
that in each of the cases the magnitudes involved with these trade effects imply
that domestic consumption ofX falls. Again this is intuitive since the increase
in the price ofX should see substitution in consumption towards good Y. To be
more precise about these trade effects, after totally differentiating the system
(A5.1) for the net exporter and importer cases with respect to y and using the



















Comparing (A5.10) with (A5.9), the increase in net exports is greater than the
increase in production implying a marginal increase in y leads to a fall in





A similar comparison between (A5.ll) and (A5.9) reveals that the fall in
imports is greater than the additional domestic production which again implies







Iiii. The effect of change in the input prices a and n on equilibrium forest
conversion.
The effects of marginal changes in a and n on equilibrium forest conversion
can be found by substituting (A5.4) into (5.14) and differentiating with respect
to the input prices. This gives the expressions:
(A5.14) dP/dcc = SP/Sa + (d?/dX)dX/da,
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(A5.15) dP/dn = 3PjdTi + (d?/dX)dX/dn.
(A5.14) gives the effect that a marginal change in the price of the other input,
labour, has for forest conversion. The effect has two components. The term 3P/
da captures the substitution effect of a change in relative input prices and is
necessarily positive. The second term is an output effect which given the
normality of P depends on the sign of dXJda. This is easily shown to be
negative if labour is also a normal input in the production of X. Differentiating
the unconstrained equilibrium condition y - Cx - 0 with respect to a gives:
(A5.16) dX/da = -CXot/Cxx < 0,
since by duality CXa = 3Lx/3X which is positive if Lx is a normal input. Thus
the input and output effects work in opposite directions. An increase in the
price of labour inputs leads to substitution towards input P thereby increasing
forest conversion for each unit ofX which is produced. The output effect arises
since a higher price for labour inputs increases the overall marginal cost of
producing X which will imply a shift in demand away from X to Y. Reduced
demand for X will correspondingly lead to lower demand for forest inputs and
therefore reduced deforestation. Consequently, the overall effect of a change in
a is ambiguous.
A change in the price of forest inputs, k, is not however ambiguous. In (A5.15)
the own input price effect dP/dn is necessarily negative, whilst the sign of dXJd
ti can be obtained in an analogous manner to (A5.16) giving:
(A5.17) 3X/3tt = -CXK/CXX = (3P/3X)/Cxx < 0.
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Assuming P is a normal input ensures the output effect is, like the substitution
effect, negative implying that an increase in the price of forest inputs
unambiguously reduces deforestation.
II. Comparative statics with constrained borrowing.




B* - R - h(D)- ym + yxe = 0.
As with unconstrained borrowing the assumptions of a concave utility function
and convex cost function ensure satisfaction of the second order conditions for,
in the case of a binding credit ceiling, a constrained maximum. This is easily
checked by considering the Bordered Hessian matrix which is negative definite
if the second order conditions are satisfied. Differentiating (A5.19) with respect
to the X, xe and p gives in matrix form:
(A5.20)
d2t/dX2 d2t/dXdxe d2l/dXd\i H„ H12
H = d2l/dxedX d2e/d(xey d2£/dxsd[i = H2| H22
_ d2l/d\xdX d2l/d[idxe d2ild\i2 . 0 y
where the elements Hy have already been defined by (A5.2). The determinant
of the Bordered Hessian is thus:
(A5.21) H| = -y2HU,
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which is positive as required since Hn <0. Applying the implicit-function
theorem the optimal values of X, xe and p. can be defined by the implicit
functions:
X = X(a, 7t, y,D,B*)
(A5.22) xe = xe(a,7t,y,D,B*)
For a net importer it is easy to show that the Bordered Hessian is given by:
-h12 0
(a5.23) h = -h21 h22 -Y
0 -Y 0
with |h| = -y2Hn > 0.
Hi ProofofLemma 2
Totally differentiating (A5.19) with respect to D, using the implicit solutions
(A5.22) and then dividing the result by dD gives in matrix form:
(A5.24)
h12 0 cX/<3D~
h21 h22 Y 5xe/SD =















In the net importer case the change in equilibrium production is identical to










Hence in a constrained borrowing regime equilibrium production of X is
increasing in D.B
The trade effects of a marginal change in D for the net exporter and net


















Two points can made with respect to these trade effects. Firstly, in both cases
they are larger in absolute terms than the magnitude of the marginal change in
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production. It is sufficient for the argument to illustrate this with the net




where (j)1 = -CxUxy < 0 and cj)2 = (cxUxy -U^Cx +UyCxx^)> 0 Given the
signs on (Jq and <j)2 the term <j)1/<t)1-<t>2 must be less than 1 which implies the
equilibrium change in production is less than the equilibrium change in the
level of X traded. In other words, a marginal increase in the stock of inherited
debt also leads to a decrease in the domestic consumption of X. The second
point concerns the relative size of the trade effects in constrained and
unconstrained borrowing regimes. Again using the net exporter case to
illustrate, the marginal effect on trade of a change in D for the unconstrained






3D J V0] +02 J
where 0, defines Uxy - Uyyy > 0 and 02 defines Uxy - Uxx/y > 0. The signs on 0
,and 02 indicate the term 0,/0,+ 02is positive and less than 1. Thus (A5.30)
supports the intuitive idea that the trade effect of a change in D is larger in a
constrained borrowing regime.
Ilii. ProofofLemma 3 ,
Totally differentiating (A5.19) with respect to B* and dividing through by dB*
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(A5.32) and (A5.33) establish that equilibrium production and export of X are
both decreasing in the credit ceiling B*.B
For the case of the net importer analogous reasoning to that employed in Hi for
changes in D shows that dX/dB' is identical to (A5.32) and dxm/dB' = 1/y > 0
Furthermore the first observation in Hi about the magnitude of the trade effects
are replicated for the case of the credit ceiling. That is:
(A5.34)
3X 8x"
3B' Y^i-O dB* v<(>i -<t>2y
which implies a fall in the credit ceiling leads to a decrease in domestic
consumption of X. Likewise in the net importer case, the fall in imports
implied by a decrease in the credit ceiling outweighs the increase in production
ofX and so domestic consumption ofX declines.
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Iliii. The effect of a change in the output price y on equilibrium forest
conversion.
With unconstrained borrowing it was found that a marginal increase (decrease)
in y would increase (decrease) equilibrium production of X irrespective of the
balance of trade in X (i.e. net exporter or importer). In addition the intuition
that an increase (decrease) in this price would increase (decrease) exports or
decrease (increase) imports was confirmed. By contrast, in a constrained
borrowing regime the production and trade responses to a marginal change in y
are notably different. Consider first the effect on equilibrium production of X
in the net exporter case. Totally differentiating (A5.19) with respect to y and










_ xe _ -ve
dy y +ve











_ xm _ -ve ^
<9y y +ve
Thus in a constrained borrowing regime it is the trade effects which now have
the same sign and the production effects which differ for the net exporter and
net importer cases. So for a marginal fall in y production and export increase in
a net exporter, whereas the same change faced by a net importer implies
increased import and decreased production of X. These latter effects for the
case of the net importer are less counter-intuitive than those for the net
exporter. A fall in the price of X makes it more attractive to consume, but less
so to produce, and since the production effect is a proportion of the trade effect
(i.e. (A5.38) and (A5.39) imply <3X/dy = -(<3xm/dy)(<(),/<)>, -<j>2)) there must be
a net increase in domestic consumption. (Conversely, an increase in y implies a
net decrease in domestic consumption). In other words, the demand effect
outweighs the supply effect.
The effects for the net exporter are perhaps less obvious. Two factors in
combination help explain these results. These are the nature of the balance of
payments constraint when credit ceilings bind and the structure of the choice
problem. The binding ceiling on B in effect imposes a "target" for the current
account since net foreign borrowing is no longer free to balande any level of
current account deficit. Moreover, the choice variables available to decision¬
makers are by construction X and xe which become the instruments for
achieving this target and crucially, when the ceiling binds the choices over X
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and xe become constrained choices. This idea is interestingly exactly the
"target revenue" explanation suggested by Gilbert (1986, 1989) for the negative
correlation he found between aggregate developing country debt-servicing
levels and primary commodity prices. (See earlier discussion in chapter 4).
This negative correlation arose, he suggested, because debt-servicing
constraints forced debtors to raise foreign exchange revenue regardless of
prevailing relative prices. Thus a fall in primary commodity prices would lead
to increased export in the attempt to achieve revenue targets. So if a
constrained debtor must finance through export the target
yxe = T = ym + R + h(D) - B*, a C, % fall in y requires a C, % increase in xe to
ensure foreign exchange revenues are maintained. Note therefore that (A5.37)
implies an own price elasticity for exports of - 1. One final point is that as
found with previous results the increased export which comes from a fall in y is
divided between changes in production and consumption. Since (A5.36) and
(A5.37) combine to give dx/dy = -(3xm/3y)((t>, /(j),-<j)2) domestic
consumption ofX can be shown to fall as a result of a decrease in y.
Iliv. The effect of changes in the input prices a and 7t on equilibrium forest
conversion.
With unconstrained borrowing it was noted that the effect of marginal changes
in a and n on equilibrium forest conversion were respectively ambiguous and
negative. In the case of constrained borrowing these same findings emerge only
if the effect of an input price change on marginal cost is assumed to be large.
By duality this equivalently requires the output responsiveness of the input
demands to be high. Since the partial effect of changes in the input prices on
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equilibrium forest conversion are easily established (see discussion in Iiii. of
this Appendix), the overall change in forest conversion from a change in input
prices depends on the output effects dXJda and oXJort. In the constrained
borrowing case these effects can be evaluated from the matrix system of
equations:
"h„ 0 dX/d\\i r
(A5.40) h21 h22 y dr/d\y =





where vj/ denotes a or n.
Solving for dXJd\\i (v|/ = a, n) gives:
dX
_ -y2c, _ c,(A5"41)
p \m W •d\\i H Hn
where c, = (l - UyCXl|/. The expression dXJd\\i is negative
(as with unconstrained borrowing) if Cj is shown to be positive. The first part
of c, will be negative since - Uxy + UyyCx < 0 and (1 - CJ > 0. Note in
particular with the latter that Cv denotes in fact the cost-minimising factor
demands (5.13) and (5.14) in section 5.3.2. ;(i.e. Ca = Lx and = P). The
identities P+F=l and Lx + LY + Lp = 1, see section 5.3.1, ensure (1 - Ca) > 0
and (1 - CJ > 0. The second part of C[ is positive assuming nonnal inputs since
by duality CXa = SLX/3X and CXk = 5P/5X. Assuming these terms to be
relatively large c, can then be assumed to positive. Additionally these
conjectures could reflect decreasing returns to each factor input if a given
change in X is associated with a proportionately greater change in factor inputs.
This is worth noting since the first part of c, tends to zero as Lx or P tends to
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one. That is when the greater proportion of the labour force is involved in the
production ofX and when the majority of forested land has been converted. In
both cases it would be reasonable to assume the existence of decreasing
returns. For example, where P was a relatively high proportion of total land,
any further forest conversion would be of marginally productive land. This has




External indebtedness and the causes of deforestation:
an econometric analysis
6.1 Introduction and Related Literature.
This chapter presents an econometric analysis of the relationship between
external indebtedness and the deforestation of tropical forests in a sample of
developing countries. The empirical model and the approach to estimation and
testing is guided by the analytical model of deforestation in indebted
economies presented in chapter 5.
The hypothesised link between indebtedness and deforestation is the most
commonly cited example of a debt-resources link and has been the focus of a
small but growing body of empirical research. Perhaps the least rigorous
analysis of the hypothesised association between debt and deforestation is
presented in George (1992). With a descriptive analysis of the respective
rankings of developing country debtors and deforesters she concludes:
Third world countries where significant stands of tropical
forests remain also have significant debt burdens, either in
absolute terms or relative to size of their economies and to their
capacity to pay.
- Third world countries that deforested the most or the fastest in
the 1980s were also, on the whole, the largest debtors.
- In a number of smaller countries with less significant forest
reserves deforesters were also the most heavily indebted.
- Countries with the highest "debt service ratios" or subject to
the highest levels of IMF "conditionality" also tend to be the
largest and fastest deforesters." (George, 1992, p 8-9)
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Given the nature of the analysis it would be dubious, to say the least, to infer
anything conclusive about a debt-deforestation link.1 The issue has however
been subjected to somewhat more rigorous statistical analysis in a number of
recent econometric studies which have attempted to establish whether there is
in fact the statistical association George seems to have assumed. In general
these studies have reached conflicting conclusions.
Evidence rejecting the debt-deforestation link can be found in Capistrano and
Kiker (1990, 1995), and Shafik (1994).2 Capistrano and Kiker, (hereafter
C&K), (1990, 1995) present results from an analysis of the influence of
international economic conditions on forest depletion over the period 1967-85.
The basis for their thesis is that international macroeconomic conditions have
been influential in shaping domestic policies towards forest use: "Government
policies...are not created in a vacuum" (C&K, 1990, p.4). A cross-section of 45
developing countries was examined over four distinct time periods; 1967-71,
1972-75, 1976-80, 1981-85.3 Each period was characterised by a set of stylised
international economic conditions: 1967-71 as the end years of the Bretton-
Woods fixed exchange rate regime; 1972-75 as a period of grain shortages, the
oil price hike and increasing external borrowing; 1976-80 as a period of high
'George clearly believes deforestation and debt to be correlated on the basis of these
observations, but no statistical tests of correlation are actually presented. Calculation of
Spearman rank correlations using the two sets of data cited by George revealed correlations of
0.53 and 0.486 between the debt and deforestation rankings. The former is,significant at the
5% level for a two-tailed test and the latter significant at the 10% level.
2A study by Gullison and Losos (1993) is also of note in this context. Their statistical analysis
looks at the explanatory power of debt variables in explaining the time-series variance in
timber and beef exports for nine different Latin American countries. In this region timber
production and cattle-ranching have been commonly cited as factors behind deforestation.
They conclude that debt does not influence these export variables, but these conclusions are
hampered by sample sizes of only 10 observations
3Pooling over the four time periods was also considered by Capistrano and Kiker, but this was
deemed inappropriate given evidence of structural change in the estimated parameters.
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commodity prices and more oil price increases with the beginnings of world
recession in its latter years; 1981-85 a period in which world economic activity
was in general depressed with many developing countries experiencing real
increases in their debt burdens. The measure of tropical forest depletion
adopted by C&K is based on the area of closed broad-leaved forest disturbed
by industrial logging.4 This they argue correlates strongly with the areas of
deforestation. However, whilst they correctly argue that logging can be an
indicator of the first stages of deforestation, in many countries industrial
logging does not significantly contribute to the deforestation process (Burgess,
1992). For example, Brazil is by far the largest deforester in terms of area but
industrial logging is generally considered to be relatively unimportant
compared to the demand for agricultural land.
In the empirical model estimated by C&K the ratio of external debt servicing to
total exports provides the primary measure for the debt burden hypothesised to
be positively correlated with forest depletion. This variable is found to be
significant only in the 1972-75 period and is negatively correlated with forest
depletion. The time period may provide an explanation for this finding.
International credit particularly towards the mid 1970s was becoming more
readily available to developing country borrowers at very low (even negative)
real rates of interest. This readily available and cheap source of capital could
\
thus substitute for liquidated forest capital. Intuitively, to the" extent that the
debt service to export ratio reflects an increased reliance on foreign capital, a
negative correlation between debt and forest depletion could be anticipated.
More formally, the theoretical model presented in chapter 5 would also predict
4Closed broad-leaved forests comprise approximately 97 per cent of closed tropical forests.
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this effect since it was established that 3P/3B* <0, i.e. a relaxation of credit
ceilings would imply a fall in equilibrium levels of forest conversion.
Moreover, the late 1960s and early 1970s have been identified as a period of
constrained international lending (see Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981 and Kharas,
1984) which means the subsequent international lending in the mid 1970s
could be interpreted as an increase in credit ceilings. However, of note is the
consistently negative coefficient C&K find for the debt-service ratio in all
periods, including 1981-85 when debt service burdens were rising sharply.
In addition to the debt-service ratio, C&K also consider a version of their
model where international competitiveness (measured by real exchange rate
devaluations) is allowed to interact with a dummy variable indicator of the
international credit status of countries. This dummy is defined using World
Bank debtor classifications taking the value one for highly indebted countries
and zero for all others. The hypothesis here is that the effect of real
devaluations on forest depletion should be greater for the highly indebted
group of debtors where (presumably) the need for scarce foreign exchange is
greatest. C&K do not reject the null of no difference in the effect of real
devaluations on forest depletion for the highly indebted countries and the rest
of the sample.
The main focus in Shafik (1994) is on the relationship between rates of
deforestation and per capita income levels. This relationship is often interpreted
in terms of a more general question about the link between environmental
quality and the level of economic development, the maintained hypothesis
being that there exists a Kuznets type (i.e. inverted U) relationship between
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environmental quality and levels of economic development.5 In addition the
relationship between deforestation rates and a vector ofmacroeconomic policy
variables, including proxies for indebtedness, is investigated with a fixed
effects regression model over the period 1962-86. Overall, Shafik concludes
that there is no evidence to suggest that macroeconomic variables, including
debt per capita, are significant correlates of deforestation rates based on the
failure to reject zero restrictions on these policy variables.6
Contrary to the C&K and Shafik studies, evidence of a significant and positive
statistical association between deforestation and debt variables can be found in
Burgess (1992) and Kahn and McDonald (1990, 1995). In Burgess a linear
regression model is used to examine the impact of timber production,
agricultural demand, population and government policies on deforestation. In a
tacit acceptance of the C&K view that government policies were shaped by
international economic conditions, the debt-service ratio is taken to represent
the impact of public policy failures on deforestation.7 For a sample of 54
developing countries Burgess finds the debt-service ratio to be positively
signed and statistically significant.8 The model specification and choice of
5Kuznets curves are usually associated with the literature on development and income
inequality. Another example of the environmental interpretation of Kuznets type curves is
Selden and Song (1994) who present an empirical analysis using a quadratic specification of
the relationship between environmental quality (in terms of air pollution) and per capita
income levels. The model and estimation results outlined below are used to discuss similar
propositions in the context of deforestation. >
6The use of annual deforestation data makes these results suspect since .annual series for
deforestation are extremely unreliable (see discussion in section 5.2 of the previous chapter).
7 Repetto and Gillis (1988), Southgate, Sierra and Brown (1991) and Deacon (1994) provide
evidence and discussion indicating that some policy failures can be attributed to solely
domestic factors, e.g. property right regimes, population pressures. Therefore the use of the
debt-service ratio is probably insufficient for capturing the impact of government policies on
deforestation.
8Burgess runs two regressions, one with African and Asian dummies to account for regional
variation and one without. In the former the debt-service ratio is significant at the 10 % level
and at the 5% level in the latter.
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estimation method in this paper are however questionable, casting doubt
therefore on the results. The model includes measures of timber production and
agricultural demand (food production per capita) as independent regressors.
The theoretical model from chapter 5 would indicate however that these
variables should be viewed as endogenous choice variables, which for
"problem" debtors are themselves a function of indebtedness. Given this
endogeneity, ordinary least squares techniques (as used by Burgess) are
inappropriate.9
The empirical investigations reported by Kahn and McDonald (1990, 1995)
(hereafter K&McD) are, unlike the studies mentioned so far, based on an
explicit theoretical model. The economic model linking debt and deforestation
outlined by K&McD uses the optimal growth framework applied to an open
economy context. An important feature of this model is the assumption of a
limit to the extent to which the economy can substitute between current and
future consumption. This gives rise to a set of unconstrained and constrained
optimality conditions (analogous to those presented in chapters 3 and 5).
Solving these conditions for the optimal level of deforestation, they show that
only in the constrained case is optimal deforestation a function of the
economy's indebtedness with this optimal level increasing in the minimum
consumption level and competing uses for output (i.e. investment, government
spending and interest payment on debt).10 A difficulty presented by the
K&McD model is the manner in which the constrained and unconstrained
furthermore, no diagnostics tests are reported in the paper. Empirical investigations of the
debt-deforestation link undertaken by Economics undergraduates at the University of
Edinburgh which have attempted to replicate the Burgess findings tend to reject linear
functional forms and homoscedastic errors.
'"Explicit solutions are made possible by assuming functional forms for an aggregate
production function, e.g. one functional form considered is the Cobb-Douglas.
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solutions are defined. The distinction depends on a binding lower bound on
consumption levels, but as they themselves recognise this bound is not
observable. Consequently their empirical model is conditioned on a set of
socio-economic indicators (e.g. income level dummies, index of development,
population) to control for these lower bounds. Deforestation between 1981-85
is examined in a sample of 55 tropical countries and in just over half of the
reported estimations, the debt variable (debt-servicing) is positively signed and
statistically significant.11 K&McD conclude on the basis of these results that
the null of no relationship between indebtedness and deforestation can be
rejected in favour of the alternative that they are positively correlated.12
The inability to identify the consumption lower bound precludes K&McD from
testing for differences between constrained and unconstrained countries. The
alternative hypothesis therefore states that for all (sample) countries debt
servicing and deforestation are positively correlated, contrary to the theoretical
prediction that the correlation is observed only with constrained countries
under the alternative. In the econometric analysis outlined later in this chapter
these hypothesised differences are the focus of the estimation and testing. The
advantage of the analytical model presented in chapter 5 relative to the
K&McD model is that the constrained and unconstrained equilibrium solutions
are defined in a way which permits the construction of a qualitative dummy
indicator of constrained and unconstrained regimes using apprbqches which are
well established in the international debt literature.13 These indicators as
1 'That is countries lying between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn.
12Their conclusions attach greatest weight to the estimations which exclude choice variables as
regressors (i.e. investment and net change in debt) and instrument (with lagged values) a
government expenditure variable. In these regressions all debt service variables are positively
signed and 3 of 4 are statistically significant at the 5 % for a one-tailed test.
13The approaches are similar but not identical to those discussed in Chapter 4.
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detailed in Section 6.3.1 utilise information on debt arrears. More generally,
the econometric analysis presented in this chapter parallels that of chapter 4
which employed GMM methods. To date, these econometric methods have not
be considered in the debt-deforestation literature.14
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows. The next section outlines the
empirical model of deforestation. Section 6.3 discusses some issues concerning
econometric estimation and testing of the debt-deforestation link. A particular
focus is on the appropriate way to test for the hypothesised debt effect. This
relies on identifying "problem" (constrained) debtors and "non-problem"
(unconstrained) debtors and testing for differences between the two sub-
samples. The methods used to classify debtor countries are outlined at the end
of this section. Section 6.4 discusses the data used in the analysis and presents
the empirical results. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The Empirical Model.
The starting point for the empirical model is the expression for equilibrium
deforestation derived in chapter 5.
14One other paper in this literature which only recently came to my attention is an unpublished
working paper by Murphy (1994). In this paper a simple two period mocfej of deforestation
and external borrowing is outlined to demonstrate the (by now familiar) idea that consumption
and resource use (i.e. deforestation) decisions cannot be separated when borrowers face
imperfect capital markets. In the empirical investigation Murphy seeks to test the hypothesis
that debt and deforestation are correlated for only credit-constrained countries in a sample of
87 developing countries. The findings are supportive of this theoretical proposition with the
1981 debt to export ratio found to be a positive and statistically significant correlate of
deforestation in the 1981-85 period for rescheduling debtors. This approach to the debt-
deforestation hypothesis echoes the approach taken in this chapter. I am grateful to Prof.
Robert Deacon for bringing this paper to my attention.
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In (6.1) deforestation is a function of the endogenously determined vector X.15
For the purposes of the econometric analysis (6.1) can be expressed solely in
terms of exogenous variables using the solutions for equilibrium X given in
chapter 5. That is:
(6.2) summarises in general terms the competing model specifications
considered in this chapter. In most of the existing empirical literature on the
debt-deforestation hypothesis the null specification would be defined by the
function P(a,7t,y) which competes with the alternative P(a,7t,y,D,B*). However,
as already noted above this "alternative" is hypothesised to hold only for
constrained countries. Equivalently, theory suggests the model specification P(
a,7r,y) holds for unconstrained countries under the null and alternative
hypotheses, but is rejected under the alternative for those classed as
constrained. The econometric tests outlined below are constructed in a way
which permits testing of this interpretation of the debt-deforestation hypothesis.
For the purposes of defining the parameterised model it will prove useful to re-
>
define (6.2) in terms of the stock of forests. Recall that land use is constrained
by the condition P = 1 - F, where F defines land maintained as forest. It is then
straightforward to define the equilibrium stock of forests by the function:
(6.2)
(for B* > B)
(for B* = B)
15Note that the unconstrained expression excludes the variable D (i.e. inherited debt) given the
finding in chapter 5 that for the unconstrained case X (and therefore P) is independent of the
inherited level of debt.
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P = { F(a,7i,y) (forB* >B)
lF(a,7r,y,D,B*) (for B'= B),
where previous signs on partial derivatives are now reversed. Specifically,
3F/3D < 0 and 3F/3B* > 0, i.e. for constrained countries the equilibrium level
of forested land is decreasing in inherited stocks of debt and increasing in
credit ceiling levels.
Eq. (6.3) defines the level of forest cover entirely in terms of economic
variables. A more general model would incorporate environmental factors such
as climate, soil conditions and geographical terrain. More precisely , let Mit
denote the level of forest biomass in country i at time t. Following Deacon
(1994) Mit can be described by the separable function:
(6.4) M, =G(E,)H(WI,),
where Ej is a vector of environmental factors which are assumed constant over
time and Wjt is a vector of socio-economic variables in levels to be defined
below. Defining a model of deforestation in terms of forest biomass presents
however an empirical difficulty since available forest resource data typically
measures land area which is forested rather than the volume of biomass.
Moreover, the unit of measurement which is implicit in the theoretical model
summarised by (6.3) is similarly in terms of land area. A simple approach
which overcomes this empirical difficulty with (6.4) and ensures consistency
with the theoretical model is to assume:
(6.5) M^c.F,,
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where Fit is forested land area and Cj is a time invariant measure of biomass per
unit of forest area.16 Using (6.5) the area of forested land can then be defined
by:
(66) F» = [G(E,)/c,]H(w„).
The model of forest cover (6.6) provides a framework for testing the theoretical
propositions of chapter 5 by now assuming that the variables in the vector Wit
include empirical measures of a, n, y and, of primary interest, inherited debt
and the credit ceiling B*. The assumptions made so far imply that cs and Ej can
be treated as country-specific effects which are unchanging over time. Taking
the natural logarithm of (6.6) and first differencing then defines:
(6.7) Djt = ln(F, )- ln(FiH )= ln[H(w„ )]^ In[H(w„_,)]
Dit represents the change in the natural logarithm of forest area between the
periods t and t-1 and therefore defines the rate of change in forest cover. In the
empirical models considered below the dependent variable is specified as the
absolute rate of change in forest cover, i.e. the rate of deforestation. Note
therefore that the expected signs on the relationships between Dit and the
variables of interest are restored to the sign of the comparative static results
from chapter 5. In addition, given that these theoretical propositions have been
derived within a static model the empirical model is assumed^to hold over the
longer run and the empirical investigation focuses on the cross-sectional
dimension of (6.7). The econometric analysis reflects this feature of the
theoretical model with the use of a quinquennial rather than annual model.
,6This assumption will imply a quantitative definition of deforestation. Recall the discussion in
section 2 of chapter 5.
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Thus for example the rate of deforestation over the period 1981-85 is defined
by the absolute value of ln(Fi85) - ln(Fi80).17
An econometric model can be obtained from (6.7) by choosing a functional
form for the function In H(Wit). A general functional form can be obtained with
a second order Taylor series expansion of In H(Wit) about the point In W = 0.






k m v31n wk51nwn
lnwkt Inw t,
with all derivatives evaluated at In Wit = 0. Imposing symmetry on the cross-
partial derivatives and defining the derivatives in (6.8) as parameters, the





0O..-1 +5Xt-i lnwk,i,t-. +0-5ZZskm,t-I lnwk it_, lnwm .t_,
k m
+sit»
where sjt accounts for random influences on deforestation satisfying E(s) = 0
and a variance-covariance matrix defined by E(ss') = Q. If the slope parameters
17The use of this approach also reflects the available data on deforestation. Note that dividing
by five would provide the average annual rate of deforestation. However since the number of
periods in the model would simply re-scale the dependent and explanatory variables by the
same constant, no gaan is achieved by expressing the model in terms of average annual values.
Additionally, as noted in chapter 5, measurement methodologies have changed over time. The
econometric analysis presented below is based on data from the 1990 FAO Assessment which
has where possible also revised data from earlier assessments (e.g. 1980) in line with new
methods of measurement, see FAO (1990), FAO (1993).
18This is of course the transcendental logarithmic, i.e. translog, functional form which has the
properties of nesting other functional forms, e.g. Cobb-Douglas, and providing a second order
approximation to any arbitrary function. This functional form has been employed extensively
in econometric analysis.
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in (6.9) satisfy the restriction of constancy over time then the econometric
model is equivalently:
(6.10)
Dit = 4) +2a (in wk,i. - InWk .t_,y 0.52X ^ln wk., J - (inwkJ )
+°-5ZS5km(lnwk it lnwm it -lnwk it_, lnwm it_,)f sit,
k m
where <j) = 90t - 0Ot_I defines an intercept term. (6.10) expresses the rate of
deforestation as a linear function of the rates of change in the explanatory
variables, for k = m the rate of change in quadratic terms and for k ^ m the rate
of change in their interactions. In the empirical analysis these parameter
restrictions are tested and cannot be rejected (see empirical results reported in
6.4.2). The presence of interactions between the variables in the vector Wit
moreover allows for potential non-linearities (in variables) which have not
been investigated to any real extent in previous debt-deforestation literature.19
In particular the inclusion of quadratic terms allows for tests of Kuznets type
relationships between deforestation and the explanatory variables in W.
6.3 Econometric Estimation and Testing.
The idea that financial pressures or borrowing constraints may influence the
behaviour of economic agents has been investigated in other contexts. A
notable example of this has been the empirical literature on optimal investment
decisions made by firms where there is the possibility of financial / borrowing
,9Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1994) do however estimate a translog model with provincial
level data in an econometric analysis of deforestation in Thailand but can not reject the nested
Cobb Douglas specification. Murphy (1994) also investigates and rejects a quadratic debt term
in his debt-deforestation analysis.
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constraints (see for example Whited, 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994). The
distinction made in this literature is that for firms who do not face financial
constraints optimal investment behaviour should satisfy the appropriate
investment Euler equation. This can be defined as the null specification for the
firm investment model. For firms who are faced with financial constraints then
the null Euler equation should be violated as optimal investment behaviour is
now also a function of these constraints. Thus recalling the earlier discussion in
chapter 4, if A defines a vector of instruments which correlate with the
financial constraints, then it is expected that for financially constrained firms:
(6.11) E(A'e)*0,
where s defines the error term in the null specification of the econometric
model. In other words the null error term is not orthogonal to A indicating that
the null model is mis-specified. This focus on the orthogonality between the
error in the econometric model and the sets of instruments used in estimation is
central to the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach to estimation
and testing which has been widely employed in the Euler equation literature.20
The key point from this brief resume of ideas already presented in chapters 3
and 4 is that testing for the presence of financially constrained choices using
GMM techniques relies on testing for differences in behaviour between
unconstrained and constrained agents. The theoretical modeTpf deforestation
presented in chapter 5 suggests that the role of indebtedness can also be
investigated by testing for differences between constrained and unconstrained
20The error in the econometric model is usually assumed to arise from rational expectations
forecast error in these models. Thus by the assumption of rational expectations it is expected
that any forecast error is orthogonal to the information set used by agents.
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countries. For example, the hypotheses of primary interest state that for
unconstrained countries deforestation is independent of debt and credit
ceilings, whereas this orthogonality is violated for constrained countries.
Testing these propositions is thus equivalent to testing a null specification in
which zero restrictions on debt related variables are valid for unconstrained
countries and no differences are observed between unconstrained and
constrained countries.21 In the context of GMM estimation this can be
interpreted as testing the validity of extra over identifying restrictions which
arise from a specification where it is assumed that deforestation is orthogonal
to variables correlated with constrained borrowing regimes or "problem"
indebtedness. That is, the null specification is defined by the condition that
deforestation is orthogonal to debt and credit ceilings.
Suppose initially therefore that in (6.10) the vector of explanatory variables
excludes variables correlated with constrained borrowing regimes. That is the
vector Wit is restricted to empirical proxies for a, n and y. For notational ease,
hereafter f(Wit,Wit.,) denotes the translog specification of the explanatory
variables and p defines the vector of slope parameters. In addition, the vector
of debt related variables (i.e. empirical measures of inherited debt and credit
ceilings) is denoted by A. A more succinct way of writing the null specification
of (6.10) for time period t is thus:22
N
(6.12) D{ =<j) + f(Wit Wjt_1)p + si i = 1,...,N
2'The latter of course implies that the same zero restrictions are valid for constrained
countries.
22It is worth emphasising at this point that the econometric analysis considers only cross-
sectional relationships. Accordingly, any reference to time periods or time-subscripts is used to
discriminate between different cross-sections.
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Identification of the parameter vector p in the GMM methodology relies on the
conditional moment restrictions E(e; |l; 0. where I; defines in this context the
information set for observation i. For any row vector of observations z{ e Ij5
with dimension q these conditional moments can be re-written as the q
unconditional moments:
(6.13) e(z( £>, -♦-f(wi„Wi,Jp])=0.
A GMM estimator of the parameters in (6.12) is then obtained from the sample
counterparts to (6.13). That is:
(6.14) ^T2:(d- -♦-ffr,W^)^ ^z's-0
where Z=(z,', ,z^) is a n x q matrix of instruments and s is a n-vector with
typical element s( = Dj -<j) - f(Wit Wit.,)'p.
If the parameter vector P is allowed to vary between the cross-sections t and t-1
then there are 2p parameters to be estimated where p refers to the dimension of
the vector W).23 Accordingly, if the instrument vector zx is defined by (f(Wit)
fCWit.0) then there are q = 2p sample moments available to identify the 2p
parameters in the null specification (6.12). In other words the null model is
exactly identified. If the restrictions Pt = PM are imposed then only p
parameters need to be estimated, in which case the model is over identified
with the number of over identifying restrictions also equal"to p. With 2p
moment conditions to solve for only p parameters, the sample moments in
(6.14) can be used to define a criterion function which is minimised to obtain
23There are of course in total 2p+l parameters if the intercept is included. The discussion
focuses on the slope coefficients since it is with these parameters that the over identifying
restriction used in the GMM estimation arise.
222
GMM estimates. Hansen (1982) has shown efficient GMM estimates are
obtained by minimising the quadratic form:
(6.15) s'Z(Z'QZ)_1Z'e,
where Z'QZ is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the empirical
moments.24 Recall that Q is defined as E(es'). If it is assumed that the variance-
covariance matrix of the errors satisfies Q = cr2In where In is a n x n identity
matrix then the minimisation of (6.15) uses Z'QZ = Z'Z If this is relaxed to
allow for, say, conditional heteroskedasticity of an unknown form then a
consistent estimator for Z'QZ following White (1980) is used in the
minimisation of (6.15).25
Two approaches can be used to test the debt-deforestation hypothesis within
the GMM framework outlined above. The first approach involves testing for
mis-specifications in the null model (6.12). More specifically, this approach
tests the validity of extra over-identifying restrictions which arise from
excluding debt related variables as explanatory variables, but including them as
instruments. In terms of sample moments this implies the extra restrictions:
1 N 1
(6.16) —YA'.s. =—A'e = 0,^ ;
Ntr N
where A; = (Ait Ait.[) is a 1 x r vector containing observations on variables
correlated with inherited debt and credit ceilings.26 A total-of p + r over
24The scaling factors 1/n for the empirical moments and 1/n2 for the variance-covariance
matrix of the moments cancel out to give (6.15).
25White's estimator of Z'QZ in this context would be given by X"=i sfz[z; where £; is an
initial consistent estimate of s(. These initial estimates are usually obtained by setting Q = In.
26Note that in A the debt instruments may be, but not necessarily, specified in the same way as
f(W). It is easier to think them as being specified in a similar manner to W, particularly when
the exclusion of debt related variables from the set of explanatory variables is relaxed.
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identifying restrictions are then implied when the instruments zt = (W) A;) are
employed in the estimation of (3 in (6.12). The validity of these restrictions can
then be tested with Hansen's test of over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen,
1982). This x2 test statistic is simply the minimised value of the GMM criterion
(6.15) with p + r degrees of freedom.27 However this general test for mis-
specification is testing the validity of all p + r moment restrictions. Testing for
mis-specifications in the null model arising from the use of debt related
instruments should really focus on the validity of the set of r moment
restrictions defined by (6.16). A further point is that the empirical proposition
under investigation states the null that the restrictions in (6.16) are true for both
unconstrained and constrained observations, whilst under the alternative they
remain valid for unconstrained, but not constrained observations. One way of
testing for this type of mis-specification is to partition the vector of moment
conditions defined in (6.16) and test for, in the terms of Newey (1985), mis-
specification which given a priori information can be restricted to a subset of
"contaminated" instruments. In the present context it is maintained a priori that
for constrained observations debt related instruments are "contaminated" in the
sense of exhibiting covariance with the error term under the alternative. Thus,
if u denotes unconstrained and c constrained the matrix of debt-related
instruments A can be partitioned as (Au Ac). The instrument matrix Z = (Wt Wt_
, A) can itself then be partitioned as (Z, Z2) where Z2 = Ac Under the
alternative therefore the mis-specification takes the form:28
27[n Hansen (1982) this statistic is actually defined as N times the minimised criterion. This
arises because Hansen defines the GMM criterion as (n 'e'z)l> '(n 'z'e) where
® = hT'Z'es'Z is a consistent estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the empirical
moments. Multiplying the criterion by N offsets the use of N_l rather than N"2 with ®. Use of
(6.15) is numerically equivalent.
28Note here that it is being assumed that the p over-identifying restrictions which arise from
parameter constancy are valid.
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(6.17) e(Z',e)= 0 and e(Z'2s)= c.
Following Newey (1985) a GMM test statistic for mis-specifications of this
nature in linear models can be computed as:29
where s is a vector of GMM residuals obtained under the null, R is a n x rc
matrix defined by (In-Z1(Z,'Z1)-1Z!')Z2 and Z = Z'(Z'Z)-1 Z'X with X containing
the set of regressors for the null model.30
This first approach to testing the debt-deforestation hypothesis focuses on a
null specification which maintains deforestation to be orthogonal to debt
related variables for all observations. A rejection of the null specification based
on the specification tests noted above would suggest that the conditioning set
of regressors for constrained countries should include debt-related variables. A
second approach to testing would therefore interpret the moment restrictions in
(6.16) as akin to zero restrictions on the parameters which capture the influence
of debt related variables on deforestation. GMM versions of the classical
Lagrange Multiplier, Wald and Likelihood ratio hypothesis tests of zero
restrictions on parameters have been presented in Newey and West (1987b) and
are employed in the second approach to econometric testihg of the debt-
deforestation hypothesis. This can be summarised in terms of the model:
29That is, linear in parameters. Note also that this is an alternative to the Hausman type test for
the validity of a subset of the vector ofmoment restrictions which was discussed in Chapter 4.
30Note that r is the number of columns in Z,.C 2
(6.18)
225
(6.19) D, =<t> + f(wilW,l_l)p+g(A„ A,t.1)V+rg(A( A,.,),/ +Ei
where rc is a dummy indicator of constrained countries (to be defined
explicitly below) and the restriction v|/c = 0, if satisfied suggest no differences
are observed between constrained and unconstrained countries. In terms of the
null hypothesis suggested by the theoretical model from chapter 5 this
restriction could be more fully specified as v|/° = v|/ = 0.
6.3.1 Constrained vs unconstrained regimes
The preceding discussion has outlined an approach to the econometric testing
of the debt-deforestation hypothesis which tests for the violation of the
assumption of orthogonality between debt-related variables and the null model
error for constrained (country) observations. A prerequisite for the
implementation of this approach to econometric testing is a method for
discriminating constrained from unconstrained observations. Until now the
distinction between these two country types has depended upon an
unobservable binding credit ceiling. The difficulty presented by specifying the
hypotheses in these terms, as suggested above, is resolved by defining the
dummy variable rc which is an indicator of binding credit constraints. This
dummy indicator is defined using established approaches in the international
debt literature (see for example McFadden et al., 1985; Hajivassiliou, 1987).
The starting point for the approach is to observe that in international lending
the actual (i.e. traded) supply of new loans is either the notional demands of
borrowers or the constrained supply permitted by lenders.31 Crucially, the
3'This is based on the idea that international capital markets are non-walrasian, i.e. quantity
rather than price is more prevalent in the determination of equilibrium trades because of risks
arising from imperfect information about the creditworthiness of borrowers and default risks
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observed level will be the minimum of these two possible determinants. If Bd
denotes the notional demand from the borrower then B = min {Bd, B*}. Thus if
a borrower is constrained then their notional demand (determined by the
current account) must be greater than the actual supply of new loans.
This situation, as noted by, Hajivassiliou (1987) corresponds to a regime of
"moderate excess demand". The question is how this "moderate excess
demand" is manifested in an observable manner. One indicator which has been
identified is the accumulation of debt arrears. The intuition for this is
straightforward. In any given period a debtor must balance its international
payments; any deficit on the current account must be matched by the required
capital inflow. If this inflow is constrained by credit ceilings then debtor
countries will draw upon "involuntary" loans by allowing debt servicing
obligations to fall in arrears. This idea can be related to the balance of
payments with the expression:
(6.20) Bd =R + h(D)+yra-yxe + AA = B + AA,
where AA denotes the change in arrears, R+h(D) is debt-servicing and ym - yxe
is the trade balance.32 If B=Bdthen clearly AA=0, but if B=B* then B<Bd. For
(6.20) to hold with equality when lending constraints bind it is therefore
required that AA > 0.33 Thus the dummy indicator of binding constraints can be
based on: Tc = 1 if AA < 0; Tc = 0 ifAA < 0 >
which are a feature of sovereign lending. For more detailed analysis on these general issues see
Eaton (1993) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
32 This modifies the balance of payments expression used in Chapter 5. See also similar
reasoning employed in Chapter 4.
33The illustration is obviously simplistic in the sense that currency reserves have been ignored
in the expression for the balance of payments. If included it could be argued that the change in
reserves would meet any shortfall in international liquidity or indeed the current account
would adjust. As noted previously in Chapter 4, Hajivassiliou assumes the (political) cost of
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6.4 Data and empirical results
6.4.1 Data
In the empirical investigation the debt-deforestation hypothesis is examined for
the periods 1981-85 and 1986-90. The dependent variable in each model is
defined as the change in the natural logarithm of forest cover which is
approximate to the rate of deforestation. The data on forest cover used to define
the dependent variable was obtained from World Resources Institute (1994)
which itself summarises data available from the 1990 Forest Resources
Assessment published in FAO (1993) and data for forest cover in temperate
zones published in UNECE / FAO (1993). Table VI. 1 presents summary
statistics for deforestation in the full sample and unconstrained / constrained
sub-samples. For the full sample of 55 countries mean deforestation shows a
slight increase over 1986-90 compared to 1981-85. More notable is the spread
around the 1986-90 mean which is associated with a standard deviation of
0.1358 compared to a figure of 0.0647 in the previous five year period.
Comparing the two sub-samples, in the 1981-85 period the difference in means
is relatively small. In the 1986-90 period mean deforestation is higher in
constrained countries. Moreover there is greater cross-sectional variability in
deforestation for this group. One final observation from Table VI. 1 is the
relative size of the sub-samples. In the 1981-85 period the arrears indicator
deviating from targets for current account and foreign currency reserves are such that the
regime of moderate excess demand is characterised by arrears accumulation. One further point
is that current account adjustments would require changes to production and consumption
plans which are likely to involve lags, whereas arrears accumulation is the immediate result of
a non-action.
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classifies 67 % of the observations as constrained. This figure rises to 73% of
sample observations in the period 1986-90.
Table VI.l




std. dev N mean
1986-90
std. dev N
Full Sample 0.0646 0.0647 55 0.0725 0.1358 55
Unconstrained 0.0664 0.0616 18 0.0513 0.0926 15
Constrained 0.0637 0.0671 37 0.0804 0.1491 40
Notes:
1. Deforestation is defined at the rate ofchange in totalforest area between 1981-85 and
1986-90. Data source on forest area is World Resources Institute (1994).
2. The Unconstrained and Constrained sub-samples are classified respectively by Debt
arrears. Data source for debt arrears is World Debt Tables 1993-94.
The vector of explanatory variables for the empirical model would ideally
include measures for a and 7t which recall represent the unit opportunity costs
to the economy of labour and forest inputs used in the production of good X.
Obvious aggregate measures for these variables are however typically
unavailable in the developing country context. In most econometric analyses of
the causes of deforestation it has been practice to include income and
population variables as regressors, e.g. real per capita income and population
growth or density (see Allen and Barnes, 1985; Southgate, 1991, and Deacon,
1994). To the extent that cross-sectional variation in a and n will reflect
differences in technology, the structure of the labour force and-more generally
levels of economic development, income and population variables may be
adequate proxies.
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In some deforestation studies measures of inffastructural development have
also been considered as explanatory variables. For example the extent of the
road network may be positively associated with deforestation since a more
extensive transport network may imply easier access to areas of virgin forest
and lower costs in bringing commodities to the marketplace (see Southgate,
Sierra and Brown 1991 and Panayotou and Sungsuwan, 1994). Again this type
of consideration could be broadly viewed as a technological / level of
economic development factor which may influence differentially the marginal
productivity of inputs across countries. It may be difficult, however, to
disentangle the cross-sectional variation in infrastructural development from
that of the general level of development as proxied by income levels.
Consequently empirical proxies for what might be termed domestic influences
on deforestation are restricted in this analysis to population and income
measures. One other domestic factor which it could be argued is a determinant
of cross-sectional variation in deforestation is the nature of property right
regimes for forested land. The difficulty here is the lack of obvious measures of
property right regimes at the aggregate level. Deacon (1994) uses political
measures such as military governments, civil unrest and constitutional changes
to proxy situations of ownership insecurity, whilst at a more disaggregated
level, Southgate, Sierra and Brown (1991) incorporate the effect of insecure
land tenure on deforestation within Ecuador. Such considerations are however
omitted from the present analysis, though it might be argued that where
systems of land tenure are responsible for population movements into areas of
virgin forest some measure of population pressure in rural areas may capture
some aspect of the institutional reality governing land use decisions. To reflect
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this the population measure used in the empirical analysis is defined as rural
population in millions (RPOP) which was estimated using information on total
population and urban population obtained from the World Bank's Socio-
Economic Indicators 1990-91. A further motivation for this choice of
population variable is that changes in rural population rather than total
population would reasonably be expected to be more closely related to land use
changes at the agricultural frontier. The income variable (RY) is defined as the
level of real gross national product per capita and is denominated in U.S.
dollars (1987 prices.
In the case of the unconstrained equilibrium the other predicted explanatory
variable was the given world price of good X, y. Assuming this price to be
denominated in U.S. dollars there are two relevant dimensions to the
relationship between deforestation and dollar prices. The first is that changes in
dollar prices have consequences for deforestation through the output effects
derived in chapter 5. The second consideration is that changes in the value of
the dollar may also have consequences for deforestation, again through the
output effect of these changes. Thus for example a real depreciation of local
currency relative to the dollar would be anticipated to encourage the allocation
of factor inputs to the production of traded commodities implying for countries
with comparative advantage in X increased forest clearance. To allow for this
distinction between dollar prices and the domestic currency* value of goods
traded in dollars the empirical model includes a price variable and an exchange
rate variable. The price measures used are the dollar unit value indices of
agricultural (AP) and timber exports (TP) available in FAO data sources. The
exchange rate variable is defined as a real exchange rate index with base
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1987=100. A common proxy for this real exchange rate is the definition (see
Edwards, 1988):
where e is the nominal bilateral exchange rate with the U.S. dollar, Ps is the
U.S. wholesale price index which is a proxy for the foreign price of traded
goods and PDom is a domestic price index which is usually interpreted as a
proxy for the domestic price of non-traded goods.34 Increases (decreases) in q
imply real depreciations (appreciations).
The final set of variables considered in the empirical analysis are the indicators
of constrained borrowing regimes and empirical measures for inherited debt
and credit ceilings. The arrears approach indicator is based on annual data on
the change in principal and / or interest arrears which is grouped into five year
periods, e.g. 1981-85, 1986-90. If this change in arrears is observed to be
positive then an annual dummy indicator takes the value 1, zero otherwise.
Over a five year period if the proportion of non-zero values for the dummy is
greater than 50 % then the observation (country) is classed as constrained over
that period.35
The theoretical results from chapter 5 suggested that the inherited stock of debt
and the level of the credit ceiling were determinants of deforestation when
credit constraints were binding. These theoretical variables are made
34The choice of proxy for the domestic price index was constrained by data availability. In
most cases the the consumer price index was used, but where not available the domestic GDP
deflator index was employed.
35In practice if0.2*^ D, s > 0.4 the country is classed as constrained.
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operational for the purposes of the empirical analysis by defining the debt
variables in terms of the debt to export ratio (DTX) and proxying B* with a
variable defined in terms of the total level of arrears expressed relative to total
debt (ARDT). The first variable DTX, or some variant e.g. debt service to
exports, has been the most common proxy for debt burdens in the debt-
deforestation literature. In the empirical specifications considered below DTX
is "lagged". This reflects the premise of the theoretical model that is the
inherited stock of debt which was relevant in the comparative static analysis for
constrained regimes. This also ensures that debt can be considered exogenous
in the empirical model. It means, for example, that in the model for
deforestation between 1986-90, the 1985 and 1980 values for DTX enter as
regressors. If the model parameters can be restricted to be equal over time then
growth in DTX over the period 1981-85 is hypothesised to be correlated with
deforestation over 1986-90. Empirical proxies for credit ceilings have not been
considered elsewhere in the debt-deforestation literature. The motivation for
defining the empirical measure for credit ceilings in terms of arrears has
already been alluded to in the discussion of 6.3.1. Moreover, as noted
previously in chapter 4 Hajivassiliou (1987) contends that information on debt
arrears provides valuable information about the severity of credit ceilings. Put
simply, manipulation of the balance of payments constraint in 6.3.1 showed
that arrears accumulation could be anticipated as a consequence of binding
borrowing constraints. Intuitively, the lower the level of the"ceiling then the
greater the anticipated recourse to arrears accumulation.36 Thus the total level
of arrears, appropriately scaled with respect to the level of debt, may
reasonably be expected to reflect cross-variation in credit ceilings. Note also
36There would be a limit here of course, since as Hajivassiliou makes explicit lenders will
equally have a limit on permitted arrears accumulation.
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that the assumed inverse relationship between credit ceilings and arrears
accumulation will imply that the theoretical proposition SP/oB* < 0 is replaced
by the empirical hypothesis that for constrained countries cov(D, ARDT) > 0.
Again to ensure exogeneity the arrears variable is specified in terms of the
observation at the beginning of the relevant period. The World Debt Tables
1993-94 provides the data for the debt variables used in the empirical analysis.
DTX is obtained directly from this source whilst ARDT is constructed by
defining total arrears as the sum of interest and principal arrears on external
liabilities to official and private creditors. This sum is then expressed relative
to total external debt. An appendix to this chapter provides summary statistics
for the explanatory variables for the full sample and the constrained /
unconstrained sub-samples along with more detail on the variable definitions.
6.4.2 Empirical results 37
The empirical analysis starts with a general translog specification for a basic
deforestation model which excludes any debt variables. Two issues are of
interest in these initial investigations. The first concerns the validity of the
parameter restrictions Pt = (3t_l5 which state the null hypothesis that the
parameters of the model are constant over different cross-sections. A
convenient test of these restrictions is to employ a GMM version of a Lagrange
Multiplier test (see Newey and West, 1987b) based on estimation of the
restricted model, i.e. with Pt = PM. In the case where the instruments used in
2 2
estimation are defined by zx = {lnwkit, lnwkiM, Inw kit, Inw kit.1, lnwkit lnwmit,
lnwkit_, lnwmit.[} under the alternative of Pt* Pt., the model is exactly identified.
37The estimations and computations were obtained using SHAZAM version 7.0.
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Newey and West (1987b) have established that where the unrestricted model is
exactly identified the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic based on a restricted
model is equivalent to Hansen's test of over-identifying restrictions (see also
Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Thus the J-statistic can be used to test the
restrictions Pt= Pn-38
With the second question the specific issue of interest is to determine whether
zero restrictions on the parameters for non-quadratic interaction terms in the
translog specification are valid. GMM equivalents of the LM test statistic were
computed to test these restrictions in the basic deforestation model In the
period 1981-85 the value for this statistic was % = 0.195 and for the 1986-90
2 ,
period the value was x = 0.427, both with 10 degrees of freedom. Thus the
zero restrictions on the these parameters cannot be rejected. Thus in the
remainder of the empirical analysis all non-quadratic interaction terms were
excluded from the estimating equations and instrument sets.
38The reasoning for the equivalence of these test statistics in this case is reasonably intuitive.




(a) The basic deforestation model
Table VI.2 reports the estimates for the basic deforestation model. Two GMM
specification tests are reported for each cross-section. First, the J-statistics
report the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and the associated p-
values clearly indicate these restrictions cannot be rejected. Moreover, as
outlined above, these statistics can be interpreted as tests of (3t = PM. The
second set of tests are with respect to functional form. Following the testing
procedures outlined in Pagan and Vella (1989) the validity of the adopted
functional form is examined by testing a set ofmoment restrictions which take
the form E(zjS;) = 0, where Zi denotes a 1 x p row vector. The functional form
tests are based on sample equivalents of these restrictions (i.e. N"l^^iZ'isi)
with the elements in Z defined by powers of the fitted values obtained after
estimation. The results report a f statistic for Z. = (d2 D?) where Di denote
fitted values of the dependent variable. Individual "t"-statistics are also
reported.39 The set of results in Table VI.2 indicate that the moment restrictions
with respect to functional form cannot be rejected: a finding which is replicated
in all the reported results, see Tables VI.4 and VI.6.40 A final general
observation from Table VI.2 is the adequacy of the fit of the estimated models.
The R2 measure and the estimated standard error of the residuals indicate the
explanatory power of the basic model to be low.41
\
39These are properly interpreted as pseudo t-statistics as they do not folloXv the student's t-
distribution, but are asymtotically distributed as N(0,1).
40CoIumn (ii) for 1981-85 provides some weak evidence of a mis-specified functional form,
but this can perhaps be taken as further support for the inclusion of the quadratic terms in
column (i).
41In the context of IV estimation it is well known that R2 is not an appropriate criteria for
model selection (Pesaran and Smith, 1990). However it remains common practice, even in IV




GMM estimation ofthe basic deforestation model.
N = 55
Dependent variable:












































































































































Notes to Table VI.2:
I The weighting matrix Z'QZ is computed using White's estimator Z"=iE^z[zi and a degrees
of freedom correction factor n/n-k. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in
parentheses. See White (1980).
2. The set of instruments used is z.-{l, regional dummies, InTP, InTP,,, lnAPt, InAP, r Inq f
lnqu.„ lnRPM, InRPInRY,,,. lnRY„v InTPf InTPInAP),, InAPInq), "lnq),_„ InRPf,,
InRP2,, InRY2, InRY),_2}
3. J-statistic denotes Hansen's test ofover-identifying restrictions. See Hansen (1982)
4. Tsq denotes the pseudo t-statistic associated with squaredfitted values in functionalform test.
xcb denotes cubedfitted values. See Pagan and Vella (1989) for details on the test statistic and
the computation of its variance.
5. Wald tests the hypothesis of a zero restriction on quadratic terms see Newey and West
(1987b).
6. R2 computed as 1 - (s.e.eJ sd)2, where s.e.e is the standard error of the residuals and sd is
the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Residuals are computed from
Si = Pi ~ */PGMM
Columns (i) and (ii) in Table VI.2 report the parameter estimates for the 1981-
85 cross-section. The significant explanatory variables are rural population
growth (RPG) and growth in real per capita income, where growth refers to the
rate of change between 1976-80. This follows other cross-sectional studies (e.g.
Deacon 1994) which have found that the anticipated relationship between
population and income variables are observed when these explanatory variables
are "lagged" which in this context refers to the previous five year period. The t-
values for the coefficients on the log linear terms are respectively 3.75 (p <
0.01) and -2.07 (p < 0.05). Table VI.2 also reports a test of a zero restriction on
quadratic terms included in the basic specification. For 1981-85 a Wald test of
these restrictions gives i1 = 12.27 (p = 0.03) which indicates that the
restrictions implied by the null hypothesis can be rejected. On close inspection
of the t-values however, only the quadratic terms for KP and RY are
*
individually significant. The coefficients on the quadratic terms provide useful
information about the nature of the non-linear relationship between
deforestation and the explanatory variables. In the literature on the relationship
between income levels and environmental quality interest has centred on the
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estimated turning points of the quadratic relationship. Similar observations can
be offered in this analysis about the relationship between the explanatory
variables considered here and the rate of change in forest cover, based on an
estimate of the implied turning point which is computed for variable wk using
PWk, the estimated coefficient on the log linear term and the parameter estimate
for the quadratic term (3 2 using the expression (3™ = -(3w /2(3 2. Thus toWk k Wk / Wk
illustrate, the estimates of 1.0992 for [3w , and -0.0909 for (3 2 imply a concavek wk
relationship between deforestation and rural population. The estimated turning
point implied is 6.04 which recall refers to the turning point when the variables
are defined in natural logarithms. Taking the antilog, therefore, gives a rural
population turning point of 422 (millions). A similar computation for the
income turning point gives a figure of 162.54 (real U.S. dollars) for a convex
relationship, i.e. deforestation is increasing in real per capita incomes for levels
above $162.54. In the rest of the analysis the discussion about turning points in
quadratic functions is confined to the relationship between deforestation and
the debt variables since this is the main relationship of interest. Moreover in
these cases standard errors are computed for these turning points which allow
hypotheses about the turning points to be tested.
The only other variable in col (i) which approaches statistical significance is
timber prices (t = 1.44). If quadratic terms are dropped then the t value for
timber price growth is 2.52 and therefore the timber prite parameter is
statistically significant at p < 0.05. However it has already been noted that the
parameter restrictions implied by dropping these terms are rejected. A final
point about the estimates for the 1981-85 period is that the estimated model
includes dummy variables to allow for unobserved heterogeneity between
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groups of countries. The estimates on the African and Asian country dummies
are small in magnitude and not statistically different from zero. Thus the null of
a common intercept for all countries cannot be rejected for the 1981-85 model.
Cols, (iii) and (iv) in Table VI.2 provide the equivalent estimates for the period
1986-90. Interestingly these results suggest some very different features to the
causal explanation for deforestation over 1986-90. For example the restriction
on the quadratic terms cannot now be rejected (Wald = 6.25, p=0.28) and the
estimates of the log-linear model in col (iv) indicate that movements in real
exchange rates over 1986-90 (t = 3.2) and to a lesser extent agricultural prices
for the same period (t= 1.49) are determinants of deforestation over 1986-90.
Also of note is the statistically significant and negative estimate for the RP
coefficient in both cols, (iii) and (iv). This combined with the results already
highlighted would appear to suggest an element of structural change in the
casual explanations for deforestation in the early 1980's and late 1980's. A
further pointer to this is the significance of the African country dummy in
1986-90. This apparent structural change was investigated with a test of
parameter stability.42 The test statistic is distributed under the null as %2(13)
42The test for parameter stability between the cross-sections 1981-85 and 1986-90 is
constructed using a D-statistic (GMM equivalent of the Likelihood ratio test, see Newey and
West, 1987b) which is distributed under the null x2(p)> where p is the number of parameter
restrictions. In essence this tests whether it is appropriate to pool over cross-sections. Let Xs
denote the n x p regressor matrix for the sth cross-section and similarly Ps is the p x 1







X8l-85 0 P 81—85
_S86-80_ _ ^ 86-90 _ . 0 X 86 - 90_ 1oo■oooca.̂
The instrument matrix Z is defined to be block diagonal, i.e. Z = diag(Z818S Z86,0) and likewise
Z is the block diagonal weighting matrix defined by:
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with a computed value of 46.807 (p=0.0004). Stability in the parameters
between the cross-sections is therefore rejected.
(b) Testingfor debt effects
The empirical literature on debt and deforestation has almost universally
investigated the relationship with the alternative hypothesis that debt variables
and deforestation are correlated for all sample countries. The empirical
propositions which arise from the theoretical model of chapter 5 and the
discussion in 6.3 of this chapter suggest that the alternative hypothesis should
be constructed in a way that discriminates between constrained and
unconstrained countries. However, to provide a ready comparison with existing
literature the effect of debt variables was investigated initially without
distinguishing between constrained and unconstrained observations. The results
of the estimation and testing of the deforestation model which includes debt
variables but does not discriminate between type of borrower are presented in
Tables VI.3 and VI.4 below.
(Z'QZ) 0
0 (Z'QZ)8m
The GMM estimator in the unrestricted case is obtained by minimising:
[Z'EU] 2"'[Z,EU]
and then for the restricted estimation minimisation is subject to the constraint that the
parameter vectors for each cross-section are equal. The test statistic is then computed as the
difference between the restricted and unrestricted Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions.
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Table VI.3




Test of debt moment
restrictions: x2(df) 18.02 (8) 10.64(8)
P-value 0.026 0.22
Test of zero restriction on
debt coefficients: x2(df) 7.86(4) 1.11(4)
P-value 0.097 0.89
Notes: The instrument set is extended to include lnARDTt ylnARDTt 2,lnDTXt fnDTX^ 2,
lnARDT1^i,lnARDTit 2, lnDTlft l, InDTJC^,.
In Table VI.3 tests for misspecification in a model which imposes moment
restrictions on debt instruments are reported. In both periods the J-statistic
suggests that the complete set of over identifying restrictions cannot be
rejected. Focusing on the debt moment restriction alone the evidence suggests
that these restrictions are rejected for the 1981-85 period. This finding is
supported by a test of a zero restriction on the debt variable coefficients
estimates which is reported in Table VI.3.43
43Note the numerical equivalence of the difference between the restricted model J-statistics in
Table IV.3 and the unrestricted value in Table IV.4, which defines the GMM equivalent of the
likelihood ratio test and the Wald tests reported in Table IV.3. This equivalence for the type of

















































1. J-statistic is test of over-identifying restrictions in the unrestricted model with debt
variables.
2. See also notes to Tables VI.2 and VI. 3.
For the 1981-85 period the coefficients associated with the linear terms for the
debt variables are both positive, with DTX statistically significant (t-value =
2.01). Together with the estimates on the quadratic terms, there is evidence of a
concave relationship between debt variables and levels of deforestation. For
DTX, since only this variable is statistically significant the estimated turning
point is 181.8 %. This compares with, for example, a full sample mean of
171.5 % which suggests, ceteris paribus, the mean DTX observation is on the
44The negative figure for the adjusted R2 is an artifact of the inclusion of insignificant
explanatory variables and the model's low explanatory power. The unadjusted R2 is 0.256. The
insignificance of the debt variables and quadratic terms would indicate that for 1986-90
column (iv) in Table VI.2 is a preferred specification.
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part of the quadratic relationship in which deforestation increases with DTX.
Examination of the constrained and unconstrained sample means for DTX
shows that for 1980 the former is 211.47 % and the latter 132.96 % which
implies the sub-sample means are either side of the turning point in the
unanticipated direction. This would suggest that the distinction between these
type of observations is indeed potentially important. In the 1986-90 period the
parameter estimates for ARDT are reasonably close to those for 1981-85, but
again a zero restriction cannot be rejected. With respect to DTX the estimated
coefficients which have the reverse signs relative to 1981-85 are, like ARDT,
not significantly different from zero. Thus there is some evidence of a debt
deforestation relationship over the period 1981-85, but the hypothesis that
deforestation is orthogonal to debt variables over 1986-90 cannot be rejected.
One final point on this extension to the basic model is that the findings in Table
VI.2 are robust to the inclusion of the debt variables. The findings of a concave
relationship with rural population and a convex relationship with real per capita
incomes in 1981-85 are again observed, with parameter estimates close to those
in Table VI.2. The marginal significance of timber prices is also observed
again with t = 1.78 for the (log)linear term and t = -1.61 for the squared term.
Moreover as reported in Table VIA the Wald test still weakly rejects a zero
restriction on quadratic term parameters. This finding of robustness to the
inclusion of debt variable is likewise found for 1986-90,\where the real
%
exchange rate is the only strongly significant explanatory variable (t=2.75) for
the log linear term and t=-l .98 for quadratic term).45 Finally, a test of
45There is an argument that this finding could be debt related since real exchange
depreciations have been an element of the structural adjustment programmes undertaken
throughtout the 1980s. Recall earlier discussion in Section 6.1 with respect to the Capistrano
and Kiker (1990 and 1995) studies
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parameter stability between the cross-sections again indicates structural
change. The test statistic (see footnote 39) under the null is with a
computed value of 33.187 (P = 0.0107).
(c) Testingfor the Absence ofDebt Regimes
This section presents the results of the empirical investigation of differences
between constrained (i.e. problem) debtors and unconstrained (i.e. non-
problem) debtors which are predicted by the theoretical model of chapter 5.
The set of instruments is now extended to include the interaction between the
dummy indicator of borrowing constraints and the explanatory variables. Thus
the statistics in Table VI.5 report tests of the validity of moment restrictions
which restrict the covariance between these constrained group instruments and
the error term of the null model to be zero. A more general point about the
models is that the full set of explanatory variables from earlier sections is not
considered here. Given the findings from Tables IV.2 - IV.4 variables which
were found to be insignificant were dropped from the analysis. For the 1981-85
cross-section this applies to the regional dummies, agricultural prices and the
real exchange rate. In 1986-90 the Latin American dummy, timber prices, rural
population and real income are dropped from the analysis.
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Table VI.5
Testingfor Absence ofDebt Regimes: Specification Tests
1981-85 1986-90
J-Statistic:x2 (df) 211.4(31) 55.29(25)
p-value 0.000 0.000
Test of constrained group
moment restrictions: x2 (df) 116.5(21) 24.02(17)
p-value 0.000 0.119
The evidence presented in Table VI.5 indicates that the moment restrictions
imposed on the constrained group variables are rejected over-whelmingly in
1981-85. For 1986-90 the statistics are to a degree ambiguous with the J-
statistics rejecting the model at p=0.000, but the test of the debt moment
restrictions would reject the null at only a 12 % level of significance.
Parameter estimates for the debt variables from the unrestricted model (see Eq.
6.19) for the periods 1981-85 and 1986-90 are provided in Table VI.6. The
theoretical model from chapter 5 presents the hypotheses that deforestation is
orthogonal to inherited debt and credit ceilings in the case of unconstrained
borrowers, but is not orthogonal for constrained countries. In terms of the
empirical model (6.20) these propositions have two aspects. The first is that the
estimated constrained group deviation should be significantly different from
zero, implying significant differences from unconstrained group parameters.
The second is that the unconstrained group estimates should not, given the
theoretical propositions, be significantly different from zero. Based on the
evidence in Table VI.6 each hypothesis can be examined in turn.
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Table VI.6





















































































1. Wald 1 is test ofsignificance ofconstrained group debt parameters. Wald 2 is test of
significance ofnon debt constrained group parameters, Wald 3 is test ofall constrained group
parameters.
2. See also notes to previous tables
Consider first the relationship between the DTX (ie inherited debt) variables
and deforestation. For the 1981-85 period the unconstrained estimates for the
log linear and quadratic terms are respectively -0.0679 (t=l.25) and + 0.0104
(t=1.63). Given these t-values, the null of a zero restriction on each parameter
cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. By comparison the
constrained group deviations are significantly different from zero (t=2.05 and
t=2.04) and in the anticipated direction. Based on these estimates computing
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the constrained group turning point gives a value of 340.1 % (s.e. = 1.66). This
compares with a constrained group mean for DTX (1980) of 186.1 %. Even
allowing for the standard error in the turning point estimate, 35 from 37
constrained country observations lie to the left (i.e. on the positive slope of the
concave curve) of a 95 % confidence interval around the turning point estimate.
The 1981-85 evidence therefore is supportive of the prediction of the
theoretical model that deforestation is increasing in inherited debt stocks for
constrained observations. With respect to the hypothesis for the 1986-90 period
at first sight the evidence seems contrary to that for 1981-85. For unconstrained
observations there is evidence of a statistically significant concave curve,
whilst the statistically significant constrained group deviations (t= -2.57 for the
log linear term and 2.38 for the quadratic terms) indicate a convex relationship.
The turning point estimates are, however, of note. For the unconstrained group
the concave turning point estimate is 162.3 % (s.e =1.53) which compares with
an unconstrained group mean for DTX (1985) of 261.4 % . In addition 87 % of
the unconstrained group observations lie to the right of the 95 % confidence
interval around the turning point estimate. The convex turning point for the
constrained group by contrast is not significantly different from zero despite a
high point estimate (P™ = 1614.8 % s.e.=1413.3) Thus the hypothesis that all
constrained observations lie on the positive slope of the convex curve cannot
be rejected. This evidence together with that for the 1981-85 period provides an
interesting contrast with the findings in Table VI.4 in which nb. distinction was
made between types of borrower. There DTX variables were found to be
statistically significant, but it was noted that the turning point for the estimated
concave curve meant the mean unconstrained observation was to the left,
whilst the mean constrained observation was to the right. Distinguishing
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between constrained and unconstrained observations, as suggested by theory,
would appear to resolve this anomaly and provide stronger evidence in support
of the predicted debt-deforestation relationship.
The evidence on the credit ceiling hypothesis suggests that both constrained
and unconstrained groups were operating on concave curves with the turning
point estimates (unconstrained: 8.64 %, s.e. 1.20) and constrained: 4.51 %, s.e
1.25) such that 94 % of unconstrained observations and 73 % of constrained
observations were to the left of a 95 % confidence interval around the turning
point i.e. the positive slope of the concave curve. The 1986-90 results reverse
the estimated curves with both constrained and unconstrained operating on
convex curves. Moreover, the constrained group deviations are marginal in
their statistical significance (t-value = 1.73 for deviation from log linear ARDT
parameter and t= -1.55 for deviation from quadratic term parameter). Based on
the estimates for the ARDT variables in the 1986-90 period, the unconstrained
turning point is of 6.15 % (s.e. =1 .26), whilst, for the constrained group it is
9.31 % (s.e. = 59.65). Of interest here is that for a 95% confidence interval
around the unconstrained turning point estimate of 6.15% the majority of
observations for this group (60%) lie to the left of this interval. This
corresponds to the negative slope of the convex relationship between
deforestation and ARDT. In the constrained case, the null of a zero turning
point cannot be rejected. As for the DTX variables in this period, the
hypothesis that all constrained observations lie on the positive slope of the
convex relationship between deforestation and ARDT, cannot be rejected
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Finally, the null hypothesis of no differences between constrained and
unconstrained debtors for the non debt parameters is clearly rejected. Table
VI.6 reports Wald tests of equality restrictions on the non debt parameters for
the two groups. These statistics have p-values of 0.000 for both periods
indicating that the null is overwhelmingly rejected. This finding is consistent
with the predictions from the model in chapter 5. ( See the results outlined in
the appendix to chapter 5).
6.5 Conclusions.
This chapter has presented an econometric analysis of external indebtedness
and deforestation for a sample of developing countries. The basic premise of
the theoretical model presented in chapter 5 receives strongest support when
deforestation over the period 1981-85 is considered. For the sub-sample of
constrained debtors significant differences in debt parameter estimates in a
direction consistent with theory were observed. A general result for this period
is that lagged rural population growth and lagged real income per capita growth
are the most important determinants of deforestation.46
The results provide less support for a debt-deforestation link in the 1986-90
period when the empirical model imposes an equality restriction on the
parameters for unconstrained and constrained debtors.47 More generally the
46It can also be noted from Table VI.6 that the fit of the model with the constrained /
unconstrained distinction is markedly higher in 1981-85 (R2 = 0.4125).
470ne possible explanation for the 1986-90 differences is the effect of policy innovations such
as "debt-for-nature swaps" during this period. These swaps provide a measure of debt relief
and incentives for forest conservation. This was investigated by constructing a "debt-for-nature
swap" dummy variable from data on such swaps documented in Deacon and Murphy (1995).
This variable took the value one if a debt-for-nature swap was observed in 1990 or before. Of
the 55 sample countries this condition was satisfied for Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican
model has very low explanatory power in this period. Allowing for differences
between constrained and unconstrained parameters, as predicted by theory, did
however receive statistical support. With respect to inherited debt, the
estimated coefficients suggests a concave relationship with deforestation for
unconstrained debtors. For the constrained group, the quadratic relationship is
convex. Moreover, the turning point estimates are not sufficient to reject the
hypothesis that the majority of unconstrained countries lie on the negative
slope of the concave curve and the majority of constrained countries lie on the
positive slope of the convex curve. With respect to credit ceilings, the
estimated relationship between the proxy variable ARDT and deforestation is
convex for both constrained and unconstrained debtors. However the evidence
again would not reject the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the
arrears proxy for credit ceilings and deforestation in unconstrained countries.
Nor is it sufficient to reject the hypothesis of a positive relationship between
the aforementioned variables for constrained countries.
Ofmore general note in the 1986-90 period is the evidence of structural change
in the deforestation model. Rural population and real income per capita no
longer provide statistically significant explanations for deforestation in this
period. Real exchange depreciations, however, are consistently found to be a
significant correlate of deforestation. This latter finding is of obvious interest in
_ _____ _ _____ - — - -
>
Republic, Ecuador, Madagascar, Philippines and Zambia. The model from section (b) of 6.4.2
for the period 1986-90 was re-estimated with the debt-for-nature dummy. It is not clear,
however, what sign should be expected for this variable. For example, a negative sign would
indicate, ceteris paribus, deforestation is lower in swapping countries. Equally, from evidence
of a positive correlation between the probability of a swap and debt servicing burdens provided
by Deacon and Murphy (1995), a positive sign might be anticipated given the swap dummy
could identify countries with particularly high debt burdens. The estimated parameter was
0.0314 favouring the latter interpretation, but was statistically insignificant (t-ratio = 0.7284).
Thus, "debt-for-nature" swaps do not appear to have any explanatory power in the 1986-90
cross-section.
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the context of the debt-deforestation link, since real exchange rate
depreciations in the latter half of the eighties have become a component of the
policy response (e.g. structural adjustment programs) to the debt problems
which became evident earlier in the 1980s. This increase in the significance of
real exchange rate adjustments in the explanation of deforestation over 1986-90
may also account for the less conclusive findings with respect to the (lagged)
debt variables in the 1986-90 model.
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DATA APPENDIX
The sample used in estimation is outlined in Table VI.7 below. This table also
indicates the periods in which each country was classified as constrained /
unconstrained according to the Arrears and criteria.
Table VI.7
Countries (n=55) in Sample and Debt Regime Classifications
Constrained Constrained
Country Periods Country Periods
Bangladesh 1,4 Malaysia 0
Benin 1,2,3 Mali 1,2,3,4
Bolivia 2,3 Mexico 2
Brazil 1,2,3,4 Myanmar 4
Burkina Faso 3,4 Nepal 4
Cameroon 2,3,4 Nicaragua 2, 3,4
Central African Republic 1,2,4 Nigeria 2,3,4
Chad 1,2.3 Panama 3
Colombia 3,4 Papua New Guinea 3,4
Congo 1,3,4 Paraguay 3,4
Costa Rica 2,3,4 Peru 3,4
Cote D'lvoire 3,4 Philippines 3,4
Dominican Republic 1,2,3,4 Rwanda 3,4
Ecuador 4 Senegal 0
El Salvador 3,4 Sierra Leone 1,2,3,4
Ethiopia 1,2,4 Somalia 2,3,4
Gabon 3,4 Sri Lanka 2,3,4
The Gambia 3 Sudan 2,3,4
Ghana 2,3,4 Tanzania 1,2,3,4
Guatemala 3,4 Thailand 1,2,3,4
Guyana 1, 2, 3 Togo 2,4
Honduras 2,3,4 Trinidad and Tobago 2,4
India 0 Uganda 1,2,3,4
Indonesia 0 Venezuela 2,3,4
Jamaica 2,3,4 Zaire 1,2,3,4
Kenya 2,3,4 Zambia 1,2,3,4
Madagascar 1,2,3,4 Zimbabwe - 2,3,4
Malawi 4 -
Notes:
1. Codes for debt regimes are : 1 = Constrained in 1971-75 cross-section; 2 = Constrained in
1976-80 cross-section; 3 = Constrained in 1981-85 cross-section; 4 = Constrained in 1986-90
cross-section; 0 = Unconstrained in all cross-sections.
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The explanatory variables (with units of measurement) used in the empirical
investigations are defined as:
RP: Rural Population (millions!
The difference between total population and urban population figures,
(source:World Bank Socio-Economic Indicators 1990-91.
RY: Real Income per capita (US S. 1987 prices')
Defined using data on nominal GNP per capita (source: World Bank Socio-
Economic Indicators 1990-91) and converted to 1987 prices using the U.S.
Wholesale Price Index (source: International Financial Statistics)
AP. TP: World prices for agricultural and timber exports (TJ.S.S)
AP defined using export unit value index (1979-81 = 100) for agricultural
commodities (source: FAO Trade Yearbooks, FAO Quarterly Bulletin of
Statistics). TP defined using export unit value index (1979-81 = 100) for (non
coniferous) Sawlogs and Veneer logs (source: FAO Yearbooks of Forest
Products). Details of the construction of these export unit value indices are to
be found in these aforementioned FAO sources.
With these price variables data was not available for some of the countries in
the sample. In estimation these variables were treated as missing price
observations and the zero-order approach was employed in computations. This
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involves substituting the mean of the available observations for the missing
observations, see Greene (1990) for further discussion.
RER: Real Exchange Rate Index G 987=100)
Defined by (6.21) in main text. (Nominal exchange rate source: World Bank
Socio-Economic Indicators and World Bank Tables). The U.S. wholesale price
index was used to proxy dollar prices. Domestic price indices were proxied by
either domestic consumer price index or domestic GDP price deflator (source:
World Bank Socio-Economic Indicators 1990-91 and World Bank Tables)
DTX: Debt-Export ratio (%)
Defined as total external debt (in U.S. $) relative to export of goods and
services (US $) expressed as a percentage, (source: World Debt Tables 1993-
94)
ARDT: Total Arrears-Debt Ratio (%)
Total arrears (U.S.dollars) obtained as a sum of principal and interest arrears on
liabilities owed to official and private creditors. Official creditors are classed in
terms of multilateral and bilateral lending. Multilateral lending includes loans
and credits from the World Bank, Regional Development banks and other
multilateral agencies. Bilateral lending includes loans from governments and
their agencies (e.g. central banks) and official export credits. Private Creditors
include bonds, commercial bank lending and private export credits. Debt
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defined as total external debt in U.S. dollars (source: World Debt Tables 1993-
94)
Africa. Latin America Dummies
Dummy variables for African (= 1, zero otherwise) and Latin American (= 1,
zero otherwise) countries respectively. Latin American dummy includes
countries in Central America and the Caribbean.
Full sample summary statistics for the years 1980, 1985, and 1990 are
presented in Table VI.8.
Table VI.8
Explanatory variables: summary statistics forfull sample
Variable 1980 1985 1990
RP
mean 21.99 23.89 25.77
std. dev 72.58 78.73 84.98
RY
mean 1090.3 806.31 772.30
std. dev 1288.4 1010.6 812.37
TP
mean 185.04 135.21 191.83
std. dev 108.41 102.50 132.99
AP
mean 102.68 87.93 78.27
std. dev 17.57 22.57 32.70
RER
mean 108.48 121.82 124.49
std. dev 211.18 113.98 • 163.95
DTX
mean 171.50 346.54 448.32
std. dev 98.01 287.48 524.64
ARDT
mean 2.14 4.96 10.92
std. dev 4.97 7.18 15.19
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Table VI.9 presents summary statistics for the unconstrained and constrained
sub-samples on the explanatory variables used in the estimation of the
empirical models. Note therefore that for RP, RY, DTX and ARDT the
statistics refer to the lagged cross-section, i.e. for these variables the 1990
column refers to the 1985 values.
TableVI.9
































































In chapter 1 it was suggested that the hypothesised relationship between
indebtedness and resource use motivated two sets of questions. The first
concerned the economics of a debt-resource link. That is, what kind of
economic rationale could be offered to explain the mechanisms of a debt-
resource link. The second set of questions were with regard to the empirical
validity of the proposition. The economics of the debt-resources hypothesis
were introduced in chapter 2 and then developed in two specific areas. Chapter
3 presented an intertemporal model of exhaustible resource extraction in an
indebted economy, whilst chapter 5 analysed the relationship between the use
of forest resources and external indebtedness within a static optimisation
framework. The empirical significance of the debt-resources proposition was
considered in Chapters 4 and 6 with econometric analysis in the respective
contexts of mineral production (depletion) and deforestation. In the remainder
of this concluding chapter the aim is two-fold. Firstly, to review and provide
some discussion with regard to the insights / answers which chapters 3 and 5
provide with respect to the first set of questions which motivated this thesis and
to reflect on the empirical findings of chapters 4 and 6 which allow for an
assessment of the second set of questions. The second aim is to speculate with
regard to future avenues of research and to consider areas where the analysis
presented in this thesis could be extended. Again this discussion is framed in
terms of the theoretical and empirical dimensions of the debt-resources issue.
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7.1 Reflections on the main findings.
With respect to the economics of the debt-resources hypothesis it could argued
that the intuition which shaped a lot of the early thinking and views on the link
between indebtedness and resource depletion can be formally demonstrated
within the realm of economic theory. One approach to economic modelling is
to view the problems of resource depletion and resource management as
examples of a more general capital asset management problem with an
intertemporal structure. The view of natural resources as capital implies that
within the optimising framework of capital, equilibrium outcomes are
determined by the equality of returns on respective capital assets. This was
clearly expressed with the review of this approach provided in Chapter 2. In
models with more than one asset such as a natural resource and foreign debt
(which can be regarded as a negative asset, so the structure of the problem is in
essence no different) the equilibrium outcome at the margin is to equate the
return to holding natural resource capital with the cost (return) of holding
foreign liabilities. Consequently when the shadow cost of foreign liabilities
increases, thereby changing relative "returns" optimising behaviour would
naturally lead to a re-allocation of existing capital portfolios. For example in
chapter 3 the effect of the presence of binding credit ceilings which increases
the cost of indebtedness can be understood in precisely these terms (recall eqs.
3.21 and 3.22). Thus the liquidity benefit of a unit of resource stock increases
relative to its value as a capital asset.
The theoretical model of deforestation presented in chapter 5 offers a similar
interpretation of the effect of binding credit ceilings, in this case on equilibrium
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forest clearance. In an unconstrained equilibrium the standard efficiency
condition of marginal costs equating price emerged, whilst in the constrained
case this condition was modified to include the additional shadow value of
producing the good requiring forest inputs. Thus the production of this good
brings an extra liquidity benefit for the constrained economy (whether it is a
net exporter or importer) which encourages a higher level of forest conversion.
A notable difference between the analysis of chapter 5 relative to chapter 3 is
that this additional liquidity benefit is not relative to the capital value of the
resource stock. Recall that in chapter 5 the idea of viewing the stock of forested
land as a capital asset was ruled out explicitly. Decisions about the use of
forested land were entirely in terms of current and competing uses for this
resource. Thus is was assumed that the natural resource provided only a flow of
services which could be consumed in the form of direct inputs to production or
indirect uses such as ecological functions. Moreover it was further assumed
that the decision problem facing agents could be narrowed to direct uses for
forested land since various institutional factors could justify treating the stock
and therefore indirect uses as fixed from the perspective of individual agents.
Consequently, a distinction to be noted between chapters 3 and 5 concerns the
role of the discount rate as a determinant of the optimal use of the resource
stock. In chapter 5 the static analysis rules out consideration of the role of the
discount rate. In chapter 3 the interesting result to emerge is that the discount
rate is only relevant to the optimal extraction program in the case where
constraints on foreign borrowing are binding. Akin to the earlier discussion in
chapter 2, the model in chapter 3 demonstrates the standard open economy
result that optimal extraction is independent of the discount rate when capital
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markets are perfect (recall eqs. 3.17b and 3.29). Imperfections in the form of
binding credit ceilings led to (3.27) which included the term
(g^ - p)it+1 (Pt -GQ') in the determination of extraction along an optimal path.
A feature of (3.29) is that it would imply the usual comparative dynamics result
that the rate of extraction along an optimal path is decreasing in the discount
rate (recall for example the discussion in chapter 2). Of further note, however,
is that (3.26) also implies that g^ relative to 5 has interesting implications. The
analysis of chapter 3 focused on the role of a high g^ relative to 5 which was
interpreted in terms of the severity of binding credit ceilings. An alternative
view which can be offered is that where 5 is low relative to gM then faster
depletion will be observed in the constrained case relative to the unconstrained.
Thus a shift of extraction from the future to the present may arise because of
relatively low discount rates in constrained borrowers. In other words,
relatively low discount rates place a burden on future generations (in
constrained economies) in the form of lower stocks of natural resource given
the potential to encourage higher extraction in the present. This to a degree is
contrary to the standard view that it is high discount rates which are prejudicial
against future generations, a theme which has resurfaced in the literature on
Sustainable Development; see for example discussions in Pearce, Barbier and
Markandya (1990), Clark (1991) and Toman (1994).
The role of the discount rate in determining the optimal intertemporal
allocation of costs and benefits is however ambiguous and in the view of Heal
(1993) the discounting debate has mostly been confused. Heal notes the
distinction between the utility rate of discount (i.e. the time rate of preference
used to discount future utilities) and the consumption rate of discount which
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may be defined as:
(7.1) V = P+rl(C)C/C,
where C denotes consumption and r|(C) > 0 is the elasticity of marginal utility
of consumption with respect to consumption. Note therefore that if
consumption grows over time and 5 = 0 the consumption rate of discount is
still positive, but of course may even be negative if consumption growth is
negative. Thus as Heal would argue there is a case for discounting future
consumption if future generations are going to be better off. This latter
outcome of improved consumption possibilities for future generations
moreover results in the long run from the investment activities of current
generations which in an microeconomic framework are motivated by relative
returns. This gives rise to a further ambiguity with respect to discounting in the
sustainability debate since as noted by, for example, Norgaard and Howarth
(1991) if the rate of return on investments (assume for the argument this equals
the discount rate) which generate future environmental costs is low then such
investment is less attractive to current generations which has a benefit to future
generations in the form of lower environmental costs.
The role of the discount rate which emerges in the analysis of chapter 3 may
therefore be interpreted as a further instance of this ambiguity. Moreover the
reason for the ambiguity arises from the fact that future welfare costs are
imposed by binding credit ceilings (relative to an unconstrained situation).
When the (utility) discount rate is low, decision-makers in the present are in
effect asking future generations to bear more of this welfare cost than would be
the case if discount rates were high. Assuming that the existence of a binding
constraint reflects lender assessments of past and present circumstances (i.e.
evidence of unproductive investments, low income growth and even political
uncertainty) then a low discount rate (in relative terms given the analysis)
would suggest that future generations are bearing the cost of actions
attributable to the present. Interestingly this mirrors the logic that high discount
rates prejudice the interests of future generations. The standard argument about
discount rates, as noted above, arises because the future generations are given
less weight in the present value calculation of net benefits. The alternative
interpretation of the analysis presented in chapter 3 suggests that with low
discount rates future generations may carry relatively more weight in the
present value calculation of the welfare cost of constrained borrowing. At the
very least it would appear that the issue of discounting in the management of
natural resources is not simply about discount rates which are judged to be too
high.
Turning to the empirical evidence presented in the thesis, the results of chapter
4 would suggest that the potential problem of relatively low discount rates does
not arise since the null hypothesis of a = 0 was not rejected. Given the
structure of the empirical model this may be equivalently interpreted as the
non-rejection of g^ = 8. More generally, the empirical findings suggest a
contrast between the extraction of minerals and the clearance of forests. Based
on a pooled sample of developing country mineral producers, over the period
1973-1989, the econometric results of chapter 4 would not reject"the hypothesis
that resource extraction was orthogonal to constrained lending regimes.
However, the evidence from chapter 6 supports the idea that the constrained /
unconstrained distinction was important in explaining deforestation in a sample
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of 55 developing countries over the periods 1981-85 and 1986-90.
Two observations on these contrasting results can be made. The first is that the
Euler equation model of chapter 4 was specified in a way that meant debt
variables did not enter the set of instruments. Indebtedness, therefore, was only
relevant to the extent that the debt situation for each i at time t could be used to
classify the associated borrowing regime. In chapter 6 the model framework
permitted an explicit role for debt variables (i.e. DTX, ARDT) under the
alternative. One unanswered question from chapter 4 therefore, is whether the
findings are robust to augmented Euler equation specifications which include
debt variables as explanatory variables.1 A second observation follows from the
assumption that the findings of chapter 4 would be robust to Euler equation
models with debt variables. The failure to reject orthogonality in the case of
minerals is perhaps not unexpected. An important reason for this would be the
different nature of the processes leading to depletion of natural capital in the
case of mineral extraction and forest clearance. Mining, unlike deforestation, is
a capital-intensive activity which means capacity constraints may limit the
ability of mineral producers to adjust extraction levels in response to an
increase in the debt burden. A further point is that in mining, again unlike
forest clearance, property rights are well defined. For resources where the legal
framework is less well established, as with forests in developing countries, it
would seem likely that agents would face less institutional constraints on the
exploitation of natural capital. Thus for a given burden of debt, it may be easier
for the economy to adjust through exploitation of forest resources than
exploitation ofminerals stocks.
1 Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) would be examples of this in different contexts.
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7.2 Future avenues and extensions.
The analysis of the interaction between resource use and indebtedness remains
in its infancy. It is hoped that this thesis has contributed somewhat to extending
both the understanding and analysis of the debt-resource interaction. There are
invariably, however, many issues which still require further study. The
remainder of this chapter is therefore dedicated to outlining some of the more
promising avenues.
(1) Endogenous credit limits.
The analysis throughout has employed the assumption that borrowing limits
are exogenously imposed. An obvious extension of the analysis would
therefore be to relax this assumption. This would undoubtedly create, at the
level of theory, more complex interactions between indebtedness and resource
use. The approach employed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) to study the
endogenous determinants of credit limits may offer scope for extension of the
analysis in this thesis. This question would also offer scope for further
empirical analysis. For example, the issue of endogeneity could be considered
by investigating the hypothesis that stocks of natural capital are a determinant
of developing country access to international capital markets,. This could also
be interpreted as a way of testing the theoretical proposition presented in Mohr
(1988) and Mansoorian (1991) that resource capital provides collateral for
international loans.
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(2) Dis-aggregating the level ofanalysis.
The thesis has presented the debt-resources hypothesis at the macroeconomic
level. There is in effect the representative agent lurking behind much of the
theoretical modelling. But perhaps an interesting question with respect to the
debt-resources issue concerns the mechanisms by which macro-level debt
burdens lead agents operating at the micro-level to increase the exploitation of
natural resources. The question is of further interest since it could be argued
that it is not all clear that individual agents will respond in the "desired"
manner. This could be interpreted in principal-agents terms. Supposing, in this
case, the government is the principal with the objective of maximising social
welfare in a resource-exporting economy. Achieving this objective depends on
the effort of agents at the micro-level responsible for decisions about resource
exploitation. These agents would presumably be interested in maximising their
private returns from their exploitation of resources, not the net social benefits
consistent with the overall maximisation of social welfare. Even if the
economy would benefit from, say, increased resource exploitation in response
to debt constraints, what incentives do private agents have to respond in the
way consistent with the principal's objectives ? The analysis presented in this
thesis has presented the hypothesis that agents do respond in the desired way,
without specifying fully the mechanisms. Moreover, the finding that agents do
not respond to debt constraints would require explanation. The frameworks
considered here do not permit answers in this respect.
(3) Open economy analysis ofthe use ofenvironmental resources.
The questions which motivated this research were framed in terms of the
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standard interpretation of natural resources, e.g. forests, minerals. However, it
would be of interest to consider other aspects of environmental resource
management in the open economy context. For example, investment in
pollution abatement. This could lead to investigations of, for example, the
interaction between flows of foreign capital and pollution control decisions
within borrowers.
The discussion in chapter 1 highlighted that the environmental crisis in
developing countries took the form of degradation of environmental quality as
well as the depletion of natural capital. Recent debate over the "sustainability"
of development has been concerned with both these aspects of environmental
degradation in developing countries. This suggests a more general issue
worthy of investigation. That is, the nature of the interaction between
indebtedness and sustainable development. In particular, do high debt burdens
constrain the ability of developing economies to pursue development paths
which are "sustainable".
To date, most of the analytical literature on sustainable development has been
conducted within the closed economy context. One final extension therefore
would be to consider the issue of indebtedness and sustainability within the
open economy framework presented in this thesis.
7.3 A final few words.
The broad theme of this thesis has been to consider the use of natural resources
within an international macroeconomic context. More specifically, the focus
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has been on the hypothesised relationship between external indebtedness and
the depletion of natural resources. Economic models consistent with the
hypothesis that increases in indebtedness lead to increases in the exploitation of
natural resources were constructed. Although a link was not indicated for
mineral depletion, empirical evidence was suggestive of a link in the context of
deforestation. Given the global ramifications of continued deforestation these
results would lend support for international initiatives to reduce debt burdens in
developing economies. Such initiatives would have the desirable outcome of
easing financial pressures in the poorest developing economies and providing
developed economies with the benefit of forest conservation.
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